PHILO 
Thefe analogies of experience will therefore determine 
the cafes of application of the three Categories, of Sub¬ 
stance, Cause, and Concurrence, to empirical intu¬ 
ition, as the preceding did the application of Quantity 
and Quality, In the principles themfelves, we have 
always employed the Categories; and now, in the proof, 
we fubftitute for them the Schemata; confequently, the 
Schemata, and not the Categories,(which according to our 
deduction is impoflible,) can only be applied to intuition. 
Hence it follows, that thefe principles can by no means 
concern the things in themfelves , but only the phenomena. 
A. Analogy the first, or Principle of the Perdura- 
hility of Subftance : “ In all changes of the phenomena the 
fubftance remains, and its quantity in nature is neither 
increafed nor diminifhed.” 
Proof. —The determination of the exiftence of objedls 
is that, according to which we reprefent, either the being, 
not-being, or co-exiftence, of objefts. This determination 
takes place in'time. But empty time is nothing, and time 
can only be reprefented as an objedl when it is filled. 
Confequently the determination of the exiftence of objefts 
in empty time is impoflible. It muft therefore be con- 
fidered as filled time, if the change or co-exiftence of objects 
in it is to be determined. That which fills time, and 
upon which change depends, is the fubftance in the phe¬ 
nomenon. As this fubftance therefore cannot change in 
its exiftence, its quantum in nature can neither be in¬ 
creafed nor diminifhed. 
This principle determines the application of the Cate¬ 
gory Substance to empirical intuition. The pofition, 
The fubftance lafls, is indeed tautological; and we might 
fancy that it is here given as analytical. But the perdu¬ 
rability of a reality whole properties change is that alone 
which authorifes the application of the conception fub¬ 
ftance to the empirical intuition. That perdurability 
therefore is thefchema of fubftance, is here pre-fuppofed ; 
and now the cafes of application of the fchema, not the 
category, to the empirical intuition, can be determined, 
which take place through the principle of perdurability 
of fubftance. This afferts, that in every phenomenon 
there is. fomething that lafts, which forms its foundation : 
a pofition that never can be proved from conceptions, 
becaufe it is fynthetical. But its poflibility is eafily fhown 
by a tranfcendental deduction, as it only requires to be 
fhown that the determination of the exiftence of an objeft: 
is poffible under the pre-fuppofition of a permanent reali¬ 
ty, as this is valid of all objefts of experience, becaufe it 
renders experience poffible. 
Let us admit that there are at the prefent moment 
things which did not previoufly exift, or things that 
ceafe.to be vvhich had previoufly exifted ; for this change 
tune is requifite, as well as for the permanency of things. 
To conceive that this can take place in empty time, is im- 
poffible; for empty time is nothing. In order to reprefent 
this change in the phenomena, it is neceflary to conneft it 
with empirical or filled time; that is, with fomething 
real, by means of which time itfelf is reprefented. 
- w lp c li can only be confidered as predicate in the 
intuition, is the accident. In the fame manner as the per¬ 
manent in the phenomenon is the fubftance, fo is the 
changeable in it (the different ftates of its exiftence) that 
which permits the application of the conception of the 
accident; (of that which can only be confidered as the 
determination of another.) The exiftence of the accident 
is therefore only inherence; and that of the fubftance, on 
the other hand, is Jubfiftence. The accidents of the fub¬ 
ftance arife and vanilh ; the fubftance itfelf is permanent, 
and can neither arife nor vanifh. That which merely 
arifes and vanifhes does not alter in its nature; on the 
other hand, the permanent alters its nature as it acquires 
different qualities. 
B. Analogy the second, or Principle of Succeffwn 
according to the la tv of Cavfality ; “ All changes take place 
according to the law of Connexion, of Caufe and Effect,” 
Vol.XX. No. 1361. 
SOPHY. 201 
Proof .—The fynthefis of apprehenfions is always fuc- 
ceffive, and we can only become confcious through the 
connexion ofapprehenfions, in which we have apprehended 
fomething at one moment whofe oppofite we apprehend 
at another; but the apprehenfions which follow a certain 
order in my confcioufnefs, do not neceffarily follow the 
fame order in that of every one elfe. If a change is 
pofited, a fubftance in two different ftates immediately 
appears; then the fucceffion of apprehenfions for every¬ 
one’s confcioufnefs is determined. This objeftive con¬ 
nexion can only be poffible from a ground d priori, by 
means of which the order of the various ftates of a fub¬ 
ftance is determined, and without which the fucceffion of 
apprehenfions would be a mere fubjeftive play, and never 
conftitute experience. This ground it priori is the con¬ 
ception of Caufality, according to which each new date 
of a fubftance, as produced by a caufe, receives its deter 
minate fituation in time. 
According to this principle, Change is that in the intu¬ 
ition upon which the conception of caufe has its appli¬ 
cation. The fucceffion of apprehenfions, which arifes 
from change, is objectively valid for every one ; all other 
fucceffion is only valid for the apprehending fubjeft. 
Suppofe I fee a houfe, the apprehenfion of it may begin 
either from the ground and end at the roof, or begin from 
the roof and terminate at the foundation. On the other 
hand, the fucceffion of apprehenfions is determined by a 
change. When the apprehenfion of a clear fky is followed 
by that of a cloudy one, this fucceffion holds good for 
every body. This is nothing but the objective validity 
by means of which the connexion of the variety of an in¬ 
tuition is reprefented as neceflary, and which is identical 
with the reference of reprefentations to an objeCt. Now 
as the Categories are the conceptions by means of which 
the connexion of the reprefentations is conceived as necef- 
fary, we muft find among them that conception by which 
a fucceffion Is confidered as determined, and as holding 
good for every one. This is no other than the conception 
ofOaq/eand Effe 6 t. For, when the fecond ftate of a fub¬ 
ftance is thought under the conception of Effett, there is 
fomewhere a Caufe, which determines its place in fpace, 
and makes the order of the apprehenfions neceflary. 
Without this application of the conception Caufe, the 
fucceffion of apprehenfions would not refer to any objeft, 
becaufe it would not be reprefented as neceflary ; and we 
might indeed fay, that one apprehenfion follows the other, 
but not that they muft neceflarily follow in a particular 
order. 
The determinate caufes of the changes, however, are 
only known by a comparifon of changes of the fame kind 
with phenomena in a preceding time ; therefore only ana¬ 
logically. When we enquire how we know that fire burns 
wood into afhes, we are apt to imagine, that as, whenever 
wood has been put into the fire, allies have followed, the 
confcioufnefs of neceffity has accidentally attached itfelf 
to the connexion of thefe reprefentations, which is confe- 
quently a merely-fubjeftive neceffity or habit, falfely con¬ 
fidered as objective, by combining it with the neceflary 
connexion of Caufe and Effe£i. For we cannot juftify 
the application of the conception Caufe to changes 
vvhich we arrive at merely by analogy. It may be an- 
fwered, that we certainly arrive by analogy at the repre- 
fentation of a certain determined caufe of a given change, 
as that of fire being the caufe of allies ; and that in confe- 
quence we often err in our conclufion. The prefent 
principle does not, however, maintain that we know it 
priori the definite caufe of every particular change, bu 
only that each change muft have its caufe, for otherwife 
the experience of a change, that is, the connexion of two 
fucceflive apprehenfions, valid for every one, would not 
be poffible. To give the dignity of the objective refe¬ 
rence to the connexion of apprehenfions, they muft be 
connefted by a Category. 
If we imagine that the conception Caufe is empirically 
obtained, this would imply that, according to the old 
3 F notion, 
