PHILOSOPHY. 
202 
notion, Time and Space are of empirical origin. Having 
then previoufly laid the conception Caufe in experience, 
becaufe otherwife experience would not be poffible, it was 
certainly eafy for us to find it there again. Befides, we 
need not be apprehenfive that the univerfality of the law 
of Caufality, “Whatever happens has a caufe,” will at any 
time be ferioufly confidered as a fidtion, and not objedtively 
valid: for this pofition forces ilfelf with an irrefiftible 
and apodidtical certainty upon the mind; and, in order 
to become confcious of its neceflity, we need but compare 
it with a pofition whofe univerfality is merely grounded 
upon analogy, and from which experience has not yet 
fliown us an exception : for inftance, All men are mortal , 
whole proof ought rather to be called a Deduction , which 
is always neceffary, becaufe we mult make it a maxim to 
fhut our eyes even againft the immediate certainty with 
which a pofition derived from conceptions announces 
itfelf, until its deduction is completed; fince many po¬ 
liticos, derived from mere experience, pretend to this 
character. We mifs our aim when we attempt to derive 
the law of Caufe and Effedt from the development of con¬ 
ceptions. Change is the refult of two (fates of a fub- 
Ifance ; in this conception the mod penetrating expofition 
can never find the conception of Caufe. The pofition is 
confequently fynlhetic, and we muff proceed in quite 
another manner in our dedudtion. We apply the con¬ 
ception of CauJ'e to that of change, not becaufe it is already 
found in it, but becaufe only by the reprefentation of a 
determinate confequence of apprehenfions is the expe¬ 
rience of a change poffible. When two apprehenfions 
follow one the other, this is nothing but the fucceffion of 
two reprefentations. But how does it happen that to this 
merely-fubjedtive confequence we attribute a reference to 
our objedt ? The dedudtion of the Categories has plainly 
fhown, that they give the determination of the connexion 
of our reprefentations, which is identical with an objedt- 
ive reference; and this is the reafon why this connexion 
is reprefented as neceffary. If two apprehenfions followed 
one the other, without this objective reference furniffied 
by the Categories, this confequence would be merely a 
fubjedtive play ; and we might indeed fay, that one appre- 
lienfion follows the other in a fubjedt, but not that it muff 
neceffarily follow it. But, fince this connexion is thought 
by the Categories, it thus obtains that neceflity which does 
not lie in the apprehenfion, and by which what precedes 
and follows is determined and rendered valid for every one. 
When we underfland, by adtion, the relation of a 
fubjedt, as caufe to the eff'eCt, and lay in the conception of 
this fubjedt that of fubftance, (the permanent in the phe¬ 
nomena,) then the conclufion is very eafy from the adtion 
to the permanency of the adting fubjedt. But how’ (hall 
•we juftify it, if we muff remark that the conclufion does 
not proceed from the adlion, (a conception in which the 
permanent fubjedt is already thought,) but from the effedt 
to the fubjedt ? From what has already preceded, the fo- 
lution of this queflion is eafy; for all effedts pre-fuppofe 
a permanent caufe, in which the effedt as change of its ftate 
can alone be obferved. But now the caufality of a Caufe is 
itfelf fomething that has happened, and neceffarily leads 
to a permanent fubftratum that muff form its foundation. 
This jultifies the application of the conceptions aClion, 
paver, in which the caufe is confidered as fubftance to the 
phenomena, and (hows why we always confider adtion as 
a proof of the fubftantiality of the adting fubjedt. 
The arifing and vanifhing,according to the firit analogy, 
concerns only the accidents, the fubftance itfelf only un¬ 
dergoes a change. The arifing and vanifhing of the fub- 
ftances themfelves as effedts of an intelligent caufe is called 
creation, which cannot be admitted as regards the phe¬ 
nomena. In reference to the things in themfelves, we 
certainly think it by the conception of dependence, but 
are unable to determine it any further. 
To penetrate however into the poffibility of change fur- 
pafl'es all our faculties. Experience only makes us ac¬ 
quainted w ith real changes, and to this the law of caufa- 
lity forms the foundation, From the comparifon of their 
data, we may conclude the determinate changes, by which 
we know that they are effedts, whofe determinate caufes 
we cannot know A priori. 
When a fubftance pafles over from oneftatetoanother, 
this fecond ftate does not arife all at once. Between the 
moment of the firff ftate and that of the fecond there is a 
time in which the tranfition happened. Upon what is this 
fynthetical, but yet A priori, pofition grounded ? The 
new ftate of the fubftance is reprefented by fenfation as a 
Reality, and confequently as an intenfive quantity: 
therefore it is, like all intenfive quantities, fucceffive, and 
cannot be reprefented all at once, but muff: arife through 
an infinite number of degrees. 
C. Analogy the third; or Principle of co-exijlence 
according to the law of Concurrence. “'All fubftances, in 
fo far as they are apprehended as fimultaneous, are in 
thorough adlion and re-adtion.” 
Proof. —Apprehenfions always follow one another in 
the mind ; and I am only confcious of their connexion, 
that I have the one when I have not the other. Experience 
however confifts in the reprefentation of the neceffary 
connexion of apprehenfions. Now in order that the 
connexion of reprefentations be reprefented as neceffary, 
it malt be determined whether they can follow one 
another in any order at pleafure, or whether their order 
is determined and not voluntary. Each of thefe objedtive 
and univerfally-valid connexions is only poffible by means 
of a category. Now, as the Category of Caufality reprefents 
the order of apprehenfions as determined in one way' 
only, and has thereby made the experience of change 
poffible; fo it is the Category of AClioji and Re-aClion, by 
which the voluntary order of apprehenfions is reprefented 
as determined, and by which the experience of the co-ex- 
ijlence of objects is poffible. Two objedts are in aClion 
and re-a€iion when each contains the ground of determi¬ 
nation of the other in itfelf, whereby they mutually de¬ 
termine each other’s place in time, and are confequently 
reprefented as co-exiflent. In this manner is the arbitrary 
order of apprehenfions confidered as valid for every body. 
The co-exiftence of fubftances in fpace is therefore the 
application of the Category of AClion and Re-aCiion to em¬ 
pirical intuition. I lock at the moon, and then I turn 
my eyes to the earth. As thefe apprehenfions follow one 
another in empirical confcioufnefs, I enquire, how does 
it happen that I do not attribute fucceffion to thefe objedts? 
It arifesfrom this, becaufe the apprehenfions are recipro¬ 
cally related to one another as ground and confequence, 
and thus one apprehenfion as ground makes the other 
poffible. In this example the light guides my eye from 
one planet to the other, and vice verfff. Suppofe thele 
objedls were feparated by a completely empty fpace, fo 
that they could not adt upon each other, then I might 
well fay, that I had the one apprehenfion when I had net 
the other, but not that the objedls co-exifl. In order, 
therefore, to perceive objedls as co-exifting, it is neceffary^ 
to confider them as reciprocally influencing one another 
by means of the apprehending fubjedf, whereby the arbi¬ 
trary order of apprehenfions is reprefented as objedtive 
and univerfally valid. 
Thefe three Analogies determine the cafes of applica¬ 
tion of the Categories of Relation to empirical intuition. 
Change in the phenomena is only under the pre-fuppo- 
fition of a permanent reality, an objedt of experience. 
Confequently all change (being and not being) is nothing 
but change of the fubftances. Experience of change, 
however, is a determined confequence of the apprehen¬ 
fion, and is only poffible through the conception of Caufe. 
Laftly, the co-exiftence of objedts in fpace is only an objedt 
of poffible experience when they are confidered in aClion 
and re-aClion with one another. Thefe analogies are on 
that account principles of the determination of the exift- 
ence of objedts, and they hold good refpedting them, be¬ 
caufe they are rules for applying the categories to empiri- 
