203 
PHILOSOPHY. 
Cal ihtuition. If by nature we underhand the dynamical 
whole of objects, or the aggregate in fo far as they are de¬ 
termined according to their exiftence, then our analogies 
are thofe laws which form the foundation of nature a 
priori. We are therefore juftified in faying that it is the 
underftanding itfelf that prefcribes laws to nature, namely, 
thefe analogies, which are rules of the determination of 
time. 
4. Postulates of Empirical Reasoning. 
t. What agrees with the formal conditions of expe¬ 
rience (according to Intuition and Conception) is poffible; 
that is, may exilf. 
a. Whatever coheres with the material conditions of 
experience (fenfation) is aCtual; that is, really exifts. 
3. That, whofe coherence with the real and univerfal 
conditions of experience is determined, exifts nccejfarily ; 
that is, exifts in all time. 
Illustration. —The Categories reprefent the connex¬ 
ion of reprefentations as neceffary and univerfally valid 
for every one, and hereby procure that which is called the 
reference of reprefentations to an objedt. When this is 
determined according to Quantity, Quality, and Re¬ 
lation, we then obtain the reprefentation of an objedt. 
Allowing that the conception of an objedt is complete, 
we may ftill afk whether this objedt is poffible, or aCtual, or 
neceffary. This laft determination by no means adds to 
the conception of the objedt, but only exprefl'es its relation 
to the knowing faculty. On this account the principles 
which determine the application of thofe Categories to 
empirical intuition, are only explanations of the pure 
Categories in reference to empirical thinking in general. 
In Geometry, thofe pradtical politions are called poftulates 
which neitherrequire nor are fufceptibleof demonftration, 
becaufe the fynthefis which they require, in order to pro¬ 
duce an objedt, is the fame that already precedes in the 
reprefentation of the objedt. The pofttion,To draw a 
ftraight line,” is a poftulate, becaufe the reprefentation of 
a ftraight line is produced by precifely the fame fynthefis 
which it poftulates. Now the principles of Modality are 
of this kind. For, to conlider any thing as conformable 
to the conditions of intuition and of the Categories is ex¬ 
actly the fame as to think it by the conception of pofflbility. 
The fame thing occurs with refpedt to the two laft poftu¬ 
lates. In this manner the cafes of application of thefe 
Categories are determined without its being either pof- 
fible or neceffary to prove the rules of thefe determina¬ 
tions. Thefe pofitions are therefore not objectively fyn- 
thetic, becaufe their predicates already lie in the fubjedls, 
fo far as the given, and. puffibte ..objeCi is already confulered 
under the poffible, adtuaf, and neceffary. They are only 
fubjeClively J’ynth&tio, in fo far as I pafs over from the 
univerfal conception of .an objedt (the objedtive unity) to 
the determining of the given and conceived. 
By the Categories of Modality the connexion of the va¬ 
riety of a fenfible intuition in reference to a knowing fa¬ 
culty is reprefented as neceffary. In fo faras this fenfible 
intuition is not yet determined as an empirical intuition, 
thefe Categories are nothing-but logical functions of j udg- 
ment. The Category of Pofflbility, in its original mean¬ 
ing, only exprefl'es that what does not contradidl itfelf is 
logically poflible, confequently that it agrees with the 
conditions of thinking in general. But the cafe is very 
different with objective pofflbility , which our poftulate ex- 
preffes. As an objedt mull be given to us in Time and 
Space, and as the Categories view its variety in aconnedted 
manner in the conception, of an objedt that is only ob- 
jedtively poflible which exadtly agrees with thefe condi¬ 
tions of Empirical Reajoning. If I think of a right-lined 
figure enclofed by two fides.this is by all means a poflible 
thought, becaufe the partial reprefentations of it do not 
deftroy one another. On the other hand, no objedt of 
intuition can correfpond to it; and the conception has 
therefore indeed the logical pofflbility required for a 
thought, but no objective pofiibility. 
We therefore maintain that the objedtive poflibility of 
conceptions ti priori is confined to poflible experience. 
With regard to the conceptions of geometry, it is indeed 
true that objedts are given to them dpriori ; that is to fay, 
they may be conftrudted. With refpedt, however, to their 
objedtive poflibility, this is not fufticient, as they would 
ftill only be fubjedtive determinations of the mind, con¬ 
fequently nothing but chimeras. Objedtive poflibility is 
attributed to them becaufe the fynthefis by which thefe 
pure objedts are produced is the fame which produces 
the intuition of the empirical objedt that fills the fpace. 
In experience alone we are to look for the objedtive reality 
of reprefentations, or that determination of them, accord¬ 
ing to which their connexion is conceived as univerfally 
valid and neceffary. Becaufe I can draw a curved line in 
thought, this mult not be taken for the objedtive poflibi¬ 
lity of the conception, which is attributed to it by the 
confcioufnefs that this pure intuition is applicable to 
every empirical one. This mental determination is not 
then merely arbitrary, and thus becomes objedtively pof¬ 
fible. 
The fame thing holds good of the Categories. I can 
indeed reprefent fomething to myfelf that lads, and 
whofe ftate changes; bur, from the poflibility of this 
thought, it by no means follows, that objedts muft be met 
with that correfpond to it. This objedtive poflibility, 
however, is cleared up in the knowledge that this con¬ 
ception of the connexion of apprehenfions forms the 
foundation of the neceffary unity of confcioufnefs. Juft 
fo we may reprefent to ourfelves, without contradidtion, 
fomething that is fo qualified, that, when it is pofited, 
fomething elfe always follows; or we may think a number 
of things To qualified as mutually to influence one another. 
Thefe determinations of the mind are, however, merely 
arbitrary. They receive objedtive poflibility only by 
rendering poflible the reprefentation of a necefiary con¬ 
nexion of apprehenfions,and thus make experience poflible. 
As to thofe conceptions, whofe objedtive poflibility 
does not reft upon the tranfcendental ground of the pof¬ 
flbility of experience, they can only be known by means 
of experience itfelf. When we conceive the materials 
furnifhed by apprehenfion as having other modes of con¬ 
nexion than thofe which experience exhibits to us, they 
become mere fidtions, for whofe objedtive poflibility we 
have no proof. For inftance, a fubllance prefent in (pace 
without filling it; or a faculty to anticipate the future; 
or a power to Hand in immediate communication of 
thought with other men, however diftant. Thefe con¬ 
ceptions are completely deftitute of objedtive poflibility ; 
for experience furnifhes no examples of fuch, nor can 
they be explained according to any of its known laws. 
As fenfation is that by which alone the reality of objedts 
can be reprefented, we are reftridted from inventing new 
realities. Even our fidtions muft appear to conform to 
thefe laws in order to be imagined poflible. 
Reality merely implies that fomething is, but by no 
means that it is objedtively real; it is merely the adt of 
the underftanding, by which fomething is pofited in re¬ 
ference to a fenfible intuition. But that is objedtively real 
whofe objedtive reality is given in the fenfation itfelf. 
The reprefentation of a thing may be perfedtly deter¬ 
mined without its exiftence being included in its deter¬ 
minations. In order to think it real, apprehenfion is re- 
quifite; and confequently fenfation, and thefe may en¬ 
tirely precede the conception of a thing. But, if the con¬ 
ception precedes the apprehenfion, this in a great meafure 
proves the objedtive poflibility of the thing. It is not 
always neceffary that immediate fenfation fhould afl'ure us 
of the exiftence of objedts; they muft, however, at leaft 
Hand in relation to given fenfations. We conclude the 
exiftence of a magnetic matter penetratingall bodies, with¬ 
out being able to apprehend it. But apprehenfion, though 
not that of the objedt itfelf, yet of the effedt, namely, of 
the attradtion of iron-filings, muft lead us to the pre-fup- 
pofition of the exiftence of this matter. 
Now 
