205 
PHILOSOPHY. 
change. Becaufe one ftate of a thing in one time follows 
another in a preceding time, this does not prove the con- 
tingency of the latter} that is to fay, that, at the time the 
tirit ftate of the thing exifted, the fecond might have 
exifted. It therefore follows, that, though the conclulion 
from any contingent exiftence to aground is quite correct, 
this identical pofition does not prove the univerfal pofi- 
tion of Caufality, that every change has a caufc. 
It is very remarkable, that, in order to think an objedl 
by the Categories, we not only require intuitions, but 
external intuitions. In order to think anything as perma¬ 
nent in the intuition, we require an intuition in Space 
(matter), which takes place becaufe fpace itfelf is repre- 
iented as permanent, and time fucceftive. In order to 
reprefent change itfelf, we always think of a change in 
fpace. This holds good even of the changes in the mind. 
For we conceive them by reprefenting time as a line, and 
thefe changes as drawn fucceflively on that line} the 
ground of which is, that all change requires fomething 
permanent in the intuition. In internal fenfe, however, 
no permanent intuition is to be met with. In the fame 
manner it is only poffible to reprefent the objedlive 
reality of the Category Aclion and Re-aftion by means of 
fubftances in fpace; for it is the contaCt which reprefents 
this mutual influence. In order to reprefent anything 
as poflefling extenjive quantity, we always require Space; 
for Time itfelf can be reprefented as a quantity only 
figuratively by the emblem of a line. Intenfive quantity, 
Reality, can only be thought as connedled with an adlion 
in fpace. Hence it follows, that, in order to reprefent 
anything as poflible, adtual, or neceflary, we mult always 
have external intuitions prelent to us. 
By thefe confiderations we refute Idealifm, which 
maintained the fufficiency of internal experience, but held 
external experience to be merely imaginary. On the 
contrary, the fa ft is, that we always require external intui¬ 
tions in order to aflure ourfelves of the objective reality 
even of the Categories by which experience is rendered 
poflible; hence it follows, that internal experience would 
not be at all poflible, were it not for external experience. 
Now thefe principles agree with the four formularies : 
In mundo non datur faltus,—non datin' hiatus,—non datur 
caj'us purus,—non datur fatum. According to the firlt, 
there is no intuition which is abfolutely limited, fo as not 
to admit of further extenfion ; that is, all intuitions are 
exlcnfive quantities. The fecond ftates, that there is no 
fuch thing as a vacuum; that is, no empty time or empty 
fpace can be apprehended, and be the objedl of experience ; 
which is as much as to fay, that every empirical intuition 
is reprefented as fomething real. The pofition, “ Nothing 
happens by chance,” is identical with this, that “ Every 
event has a caufe.” Laftly, the fourth formulary exprefles 
that every necelllty in the world is an intelligible and not 
a blind neceflity, and is identical with the pofition, that 
thofe effedls only can be thought as neceflary, the caules 
of which actually exift. 
Chap. III. Of the Ground of the Divifion of Objects into 
Phenomena and Noumena. 
Having already confidered the conditions which render 
experience poflible, it muft be evident that our knowledge 
is limited to thofe conditions, and that we can never 
attain to a knowledge of objedls unlefs they can be 
intuited. 
The principles of pure underftanding are fo many rules, 
to fubfumpt the empirical intuition under the fchemata 
®f the Categories. The Categories furnifh the neceflary 
unity of intuition, and thereby produce that in it, which 
is called objedlive reference. But the objedlive reality of 
this reference itfelf to empirical intuition, whereby objedls 
of experience are generated, is not immediately perceived. 
As the mode of adlion of the Underftanding confifts en¬ 
tirely in connexion, of which the form of internal JenJe is 
the foundation ; it is poflible therefore that the under¬ 
ftanding, as tranlcendentalimagination, may think ft priori 
Vo l. XX. No. 136a. 
a fynthetical unity of confcioufnefs according to the 
Categories, in reference merely to this form of internal 
fenfe. In this manner the Categories become the fchemata 
of the pure Underftanding, under which every empirical 
intuition muft (land, in order to bean objedl of experience; 
and tranfcendental Judgment determines the application, 
of thefe principles to empirical intuition. The refult of 
this whole inveftigation is, therefore, that thefe principles, 
as well as the Categories themfelves, may well refer to 
objedls of experience, fince they render experience itfelf 
poflible. 
The tranfcendental ufe of a conception, is its reference 
to the things in themfelves. The empirical, on the other 
hand, is its reference merely to the phenomena; that is, 
to the objedls of experience. Now our inveftigation muft 
convince every one, that of the principles of underftand¬ 
ing, as well as all its conceptions, we are only capable of 
an empirical ufe. A conception, independent of its re¬ 
ference to an objedl, is empty. The objedl of a concep¬ 
tion can only be given by an intuition. If this is a pure 
intuition, it merely fhows the poflibility of receiving a 
conception in a pure intuition, but not its objedtive 
validity ; that is, that the given matter of which it confifts 
is connedled into an objedl valid for every one. That 
fpace has three dimeniions, or that between two points, 
only one ftraight line is poflible, is indeed d priori, and 
certain prior to all empirical intuition. But this, as a 
neceflary connexion, is however not identical with the 
objedlive reference. The former implies that the repre- 
fentation of fpace is a pure intuition ; the latter, that fpace 
is the condition of real intuition, in which it muft be 
given. The objedlive reality of all the pofitions of pure 
Mathematics, confifts not in their being certain h priori, 
but in their being capable of illuftration by means of the 
phenomena ; without this, however true they might be, 
they would be a mere play of the imagination. 
The fame thing occurs with refpedl to the Categories. 
We cannot know a priori that they apply to objedls, nor 
is there any meaning in their application to objedls, inde¬ 
pendently of the conditions of fenfe, by which alone 
objedls can be given to them. In conceiving any thing 
as a Quantity, I am obliged to meafure it by a fmaller 
quantity. This fucceftive fynthefis is founded upon the 
reprefentation of time. So it is impoflible to conceive 
any thing as a reality, without reprefenting it as a filled time. 
Again, I can indeed conceive fomething which may have 
properties; but this would be ufelefs if I could not re¬ 
prefent it to myfelf as permanent, and its ftate as changeable, 
which implies time. If I abftradt Time from the relation 
of Caufe and Effeft, there would remain nothing but the 
empty logical pofition of ground and confequence, by 
which however no objedl could be thought. The con¬ 
ception of caufe, and that of lubftance, can explain no¬ 
thing real, without a reference to time, which itands in 
the fame relation alfo to Adion and Re-a£lion, and to the 
Categories of Modality. The application of the Catego¬ 
ries to an objedl is only poflible in this way. They can 
never therefore be of a tranfcendental, but only of an 
empirical, ufe. 
It is certainly true that the Categories arife from a 
fource different from that of Senfe; but we muft not, on 
this account, be induced to extend their objedlive validity 
beyond fenfible objedls, to which alone they are appli¬ 
cable. 
When we think of objedls merely as fenfible intuitions, 
phenomena; it feems neceflary to diltinguifli them from 
fomething that is more than mere intuition, noumenon. 
Now as the Underftanding has no higherconceptions than 
the Categories, we are apt to imagine that we can get at 
the objedls in themfelves by means of thefe pure concep¬ 
tions. The illufion which leads us into this tranfcenden¬ 
tal ufe of the Categories, rells upon this, that we miftake 
the notion of a merely-conceivable being, a fomething of 
which we can have no intuition, for an exifting thing. 
If under noumenon we underftand a thing that is no 
3 G objedl 
