PHILOSOPHY. 
20G 
objeft of fenfible intuition, this is a notimeuon merely in 
a negative fenfe; but, if we underftand by it a fuperfenfible 
and yet exilting object, this is a noumenon in a pojitive 
JenJe. 
It is quite agreeable to the nature of our Knowing 
Faculty, to form toourfelves a reprefentation of fomething 
as not intuitive, and which yet forms the foundation of 
an intuited objeft. We, however, are fenfible, at the 
fame time, that fuch an intellectual object cannot be con¬ 
ceived by the Categories, becaufe its objective validity 
mu ft depend on intuition, and indeed on the fchemat a, 
which mult reprefent the variety by means of a neceflary 
unity in time. In order to be able to apply the Categories 
to the noumenon, we mult poffefs an intelleBual intuition, 
which would reprefent them as noumena in a pofitive 
fenfe. An underftanding which intuits the objefts them- 
felves by means of the Categories, which does not require 
the variety to be previoufly given, would intuit of itfelf, 
that is, create. Such ah underftanding we may form an idea 
of, but can by no means perceive its real pofiibility. 
Human Underltanding is merely difcurfive; that is to fay, 
it can know nothing but by means of the application of 
the Categories to fenfible intuition. Sense furnifhes us 
with intuitions; Understanding produces conceptions. 
It is only by the union of both faculties, that knowledge 
arifes, that is the objective reference of our reprefentations. 
As the Categories reprefent the neceffary and univerfally- 
valid unity of confcioufnefs by means of a given general 
variety, the Categories extend themfelves in this manner 
farther than the lenlible intuition, fince they are univer- 
l'al and neceflary. In this pure fenfe they are, however, 
only forms of thought, and reprefent no objeft, fince the 
connexion of a pofiible variety is quite arbitrarily thought 
by them, which is only really poflible by means of empiri¬ 
cal intuitions. 
The conceptions of a noumenon in a negative fenfe is 
therefore not only allowable, but neceflary, as a concep¬ 
tion of limitation to warn us that fenfible intuition does 
not extend to the things in themfelves. But, as we have 
no right to fay that fenfible intuition is the only pofiible 
intuition, this conception remains problematical. The 
real pofiibility of the noumena cannot be known, as we 
can have no intuition of them. 
Appendix.— Of the Amphiboly of the ref.eB.ive Conceptions 
which occafion the Empirical ufe of Underftanding to be 
mif alien for the TranJ'cendental. 
When we attend to the ground of connexion of the 
reprefentations in a judgment, we may be faid to invefti- 
gate it. A previous inveftigation, however, may be made 
into the knowing or connefting faculty itlelf. We 
may, for inftance, enquire whether inclination or habit 
do not in fome hidden manner miflead our.judgment, or 
whether the underftanding judges freely. This is a 
logical refledf ion ; the reflection is tranfcendcntal, however, 
when we inveftigate the knowing faculty in a tranfeenden- 
tal point of view ; that is to fay, to afeertain whether the 
underftanding can conceive objedfs without a reference 
to fenfible intuition, or whether it can think them only by 
means of this reference. 
All connexion of reprefentations in an objeftive judg¬ 
ment takes place according to the Categories, wliofe 
Table completely exhibits all the kinds of univerfally- 
valid connexion. This refts on comparifon, which muft 
precede the judgment. We may therefore enquire whe¬ 
ther our reprefentations are the fame or different; hence 
arife all Particular Judgments. Whether they agree or 
difagree : the former produce Affirmative the latter 
Negative Judgments. Whether they areinternalor external; 
hence Categorical and Hypothetical Judgments. Laltly, 
whether they are material or formal; hence Problematical 
and Affertorical Judgments. 
i. Identity and Diverfity. —When an objeft is formed 
merely by the Underftanding, and is thought by the Ca¬ 
tegories of Quantity and Quality, without being given in 
a fenfible intuition ; the repetition of it does not produce 
many things, but only one and the fame. If, on the 
other hand, it is a phenomenon occurring at different 
places at the fame time, then it would not be one thing, 
but different things having quantity and quality. Thus 
two drops of water may be of equal fize and completely 
homogeneous, yet they are neverthelefs numerically differ¬ 
ent, provided they occupy two different places at the fame 
time. Leibnitz confidered the phenomena to be the 
things in themfelves, only confufed and rendered obfeure 
by our fenfitiye faculty, and that it is the bufinefs of the 
pure underftanding to clear them from this obfeurity : 
thus arofe his pofition, that all equal and fimilar things 
are identical; (principium identitatis indifeernibilium.) 
If the Underftanding could make any other ufe of its 
Categories than an empirical one, that is, an application 
to fenfible intuition ; then indeed the pofition of Leibnitz 
might have fome plaufibility. His pofition, therefore, can 
only have a logical fenfe; namely, that, “if we abftraft 
from the difference of two reprefentations, we thereby 
obtain an univerfal one, which comprehends both.” 
a. Agreement and ContradiStion. —If any thing could 
be thought as an objeft of pure underftanding by the con¬ 
ception of Reality, without its being given in a fenfible in¬ 
tuit ion, no con trad i6f ion could be found amohgitsqualities. 
If, on the other hand, an object is thought in the intuition, 
by the conception of Reality, and conlequently a pheno¬ 
menon is pofited, there may certainly be a contradiction 
among its qualities, in which the one might either wholly 
or partially deftroy the other. Thus, for inftance, two 
powers deftroy one another which aft upon a body in 
oppofite directions. As in this way Leibnitz thought he 
knew the things as they are in themfelves by the Under¬ 
ftanding alone, he adopted the pofition, that no contra¬ 
diction can be found between realities ; and that the con¬ 
tradictions in nature which conftantly prefent themfelves 
to our view, are only apparent, and produced merely by 
the fenfes. But, if we abftraft from the neceflary condi¬ 
tion under which this conception of Reality can be re¬ 
ferred to objefts, confequently from all objective reference 
of it, there remains the true but identical pofition, that 
“ a conception which contains pure affirmatives contains 
nothing negative.” 
3. Internal and External. —If fomething is thought, 
merely as an objeftof pure underftanding, by the concep¬ 
tion of Subjlance, all its determinations are internal; that 
is to fay, they refer to no exifting objeft. On the other 
hand, the conception of fubftance as a phenomenon con- 
filts only of Relation, fince its exiftence is not included in 
it, but can only be thought under the pre-fuppofition of 
fomething given. According to the intellectual fyllem 
of Leibnitz, every fubftance was a noumenon; and that the 
determinations of fubftance appear to us only as relations, 
he confidered as a confufed notion arifing from fenfe. 
But, after the underftanding has removed the veil, he 
finds nothing but internal determinations in fubftance. 
As then connexion is one of the external relations of fub- 
ftances, w'hen confidered as objefts of pure underftanding, 
they muft be fimplefubftances. And, as he fancied he had 
found an inftance of a purely-internal determination in 
internal fenfe, independently of all reference to the giufw, 
he attributed it to his fimple fubftances; and hence arofe 
his monads. On the other hand, it has been fliown, that 
the conception of fubftance can only be applied to empiri¬ 
cal intuition, and indeed only by means of its fchema 
(perdurability), by which the connexion of the variety is 
thought as univerfally valid. Whether in an objeft of 
pure underftanding this conception ftill has meaning, we 
are quite unable to determine. If we take away the 
intuition of an objeft, the conception of fubftance refers 
to nothing. In that cafe, there only remains the thought 
of a fubftance, and confequently the identical pofition, 
that “all the marks of a conception are to be found 
in it.” 
4. Matter and Form.— When an objeft of pure under- 
4 Handing 
