PHILO 
{landing is affirmed as real, tlien its matter (according to 
Leibnitz its monads) is fi.rft fuppofed to exift, and its form 
is confidered afterwards. But it is quite otherwife with 
the objeCts of intuition. Here the formal intuitions 
(Time and Space) muft be conceived as preceding the 
material intuition in which fomething is really given. 
Since Leibnitz miftook the phenomena for things in 
themfelves, Time and Space became to him the forms of 
thefe things, and he attributed to the delufions of fenfe, 
the fancy that Time and Space have an exiftence in them¬ 
felves, and feparate from the objeCts. We have, however, 
fhown that the objective reference of the conception of 
Exiftence is only known by means of the empirical intui¬ 
tion ; and we cannot at all know whether the conceptions 
of pure underftanding refer to things or not. But, if we 
take from it all objective reference, the doCtrine of Leib¬ 
nitz retains nothing more than the identical pofition 
that “ the conceptions of which a Judgment confifts muft 
firft be given, before they C211 be connected into a Judg¬ 
ment.” 
The ftation which we give to a conception, whether in 
Sense or in pure Understanding, we will call its tranf¬ 
cendentalftation. Therefore the aflignment of the trans¬ 
cendental ftation of a conception is its Tranfceiulental 
Topic. This can only take place under the above four 
heads. In order, therefore, that our tranfcendental reflec¬ 
tion may diftinguifti the two ftations, we muft remark, 
that it is very different to think a thing by the Categories 
as an object, becaufe it is given in the intuition, and to 
confider it an objeCt without any reference to pofiible in¬ 
tuition. In the comparifon of mere conceptions it is 
firnply enquired, whether they are identical or different; 
whether they agree or contradict each other ; whether 
the one is already thought in the other, or is foreign to 
it; and laftly whetherthey are problematical or aflertorical. 
But, if we are to think objeCts by the Categories, it is firft 
of all neceft'ary to difcover whether the objeCt is merely 
thought by the Categories, or whether we alfo have an 
intuition of it by ScnJ'e. The great Leibnitz omitted this 
tranfcendental reflection, fince he knew no difference be¬ 
tween phenomena and noumena, though he employed thefe 
terms. For the object of intuition was with him nothing 
but the effence of the underftanding itfelf, the Categories ; 
fince he feparated from it what he confidered the illufions 
of fenfe. Time and Space therefore were, according to 
him, not the forms of the phenomena, but of the things 
in themfelves: confequently he could not acknowledge 
any limits of the ufe of the Categories, but confounded 
incautioufly their tranfcendental with their empirical ufe. 
Locke fenfualized theCategories; that is to fay, confidered 
them as empirical conceptions derived from experience by 
means of reflexion. Leibnitz, on the other hand, intellec- 
tualized them, and together with them the phenomena, 
fince he fuppofed he knew, by means of thefe pure concep¬ 
tions, the things in themfelves. 
What univerfally agrees with or contradicts a Concep¬ 
tion, alfo agrees with or contradicts each particular Con¬ 
ception contained under it. If we were to reverie the 
rule, and fay that which is not contained in an univerfal 
conception is alfo not contained in the particular concep¬ 
tions under it, this would be abfurd ; for a particular 
conception is only fo called becaufe it contains more in 
itfelf than the univerfal. It efcaped the obfervation of 
the great Leibnitz that his intellectual fylletn refts on this 
falfe pofition. 
The pofition of the Indijlinguijhable, when we abftraCt 
from the objective reference of the conception, is quite 
correCl ; for it is always the fame conception when it is 
thought by the fame marks. But, if objects are to be 
represented-by it, a tranfcendental reflection is firft requi¬ 
site; that is to fay, as to where they are to be placed, 
whether they are to .be confidered as objeCts of intuition, 
or merely as objects of pure underftanding. But the 
conceptions of Quantity and Quality have no meaning 
except when applied to objeCts of intuition. Though 
therefore in the preceding conception we have abftraCted 
SOPHY. 207 
from the intuition, we cannot abftraCt from it, if it is to 
be referred to an objeCt. Conceptions confequently refer 
to more than one objeCt, though they are thought by 
the fame quantity and quality if they occupy different 
places at the fame time. 
If a conception is thought folely by affirmations, it can 
contain no negations. But it is quite otherwife, when 
we refer affirmative representations to objeCts. As the 
conception of Reality can only be referred to objeCts in 
the intuition, thefe may certainly differ from each other, 
though they may be thought by the fame conception. 
The marks of a conception no doubt belong to it. But, 
when the conception of Subftance is referred to objeCts, 
it becomes immediately evident, that this reference is 
only poflible in empirical intuitions. This fubftance in 
the phenomenon, however, hasabfolutely nothing internal. 
Laftly, Conceptions themfelves muft be firft formed, 
before they can be connected in a judgment. But it is 
quite otherwife when the conception of Matter (of the 
given) and of Form (the arrangement of the given) are 
referred to an objeCt. For, as objeCts can only be given 
to us in time and /pace, the formal intuition neceflarily 
precedes the empirical intuition. In fliort, the whole 
intellectual fyftem of Leibnitz refts on the pofition, that 
“ what is valid of conceptions abftraCted from all objective 
reference, is alfo valid of them when they refer to ob¬ 
jects.” 
If by a noumenon is to be underltood an objeCt that is 
thought by the Categories alone, without the fchema of 
Senfe, then fucli an objeCt is impoflible. The principles 
of tranfcendental Judgment have fhown the application of 
the Categories to empirical intuition, in order to render 
poflible the reprelentation of a univerfally-valid connexion 
of an empirical variety ; that is to fay, the reprefentation 
of an objeCt. But they exprefs no more than the 
poffibility of thinking objeCts by means of the Ca¬ 
tegories. An objeCt in itfelf is a noumenon in a pofi- 
tive fenfe, which cannot be admitted. In the conception 
of a noumenon in a negative fenfe, there lies nothing more 
than the reprefentation of an objeCt; that is, of a univer¬ 
fally-valid connexion. But in what manner this con¬ 
nexion is to be thought, is not comprifed in it. In 
empirical objeCts (phenomena), it is thought by the Cate¬ 
gories. As the application of this connexion can only be 
fhown in empirical intuitions, it is not poflible to fay any 
thing more of noumena, than that they are objeCts, the 
conception of which is merely problematical. It ferves 
only as a limit, and is admiffible merely to indicate than 
there may be objeCts to which our fenfitive faculty cannot 
attain. But whether fuch objeCts exift, or whether they 
be poflible or impoflible, is a queftion that fpeculative 
reafon pretends not to anfwer. There may therefore be 
noumena that correfpond with the phenomena : but, as 
they can be determined by nothing pofitive, it is by no 
means afcertained, whether they are in the mind or out 
of the mind. We cannot determine whether they are 
annulled with fenfe, or remain after fenfe is annihilated ; 
nor can we even determine whether thefe queftions re- 
fpeCling noumena have any meaning. 
Transcendental Analytics have confidered the 
conditions of the objective reference of reprefentations. 
The conception of an objeCt is that of the neceflary or 
univerfally-valid connexion of a variety; this may either 
be reprefented as given or not given. In the former cafe 
it is a real objeCt, J’omtthing ; in the latter it is only pro¬ 
blematically thought as an objeCt, and is, properly lpeak- 
ing, nothing. As an objeCt can only be reprefented by 
the Categories, a divifion of nothing according to the Ca¬ 
tegories is poflible, and we (hall add this to the concluiion 
of Tranfcendental Analytics. 
i. Quantity. An objeCt that is neither one, many, 
nor all, is no objeCt; i. e. is nothing. Such is the objeCt 
of a conception to which no intuition correfponds, a 
conception without a given objeCt; for inftance, a nou¬ 
menon, which cannot be reckoned among poflibilities, but 
is not on that account to be confidered as impoflible, (ens 
rationis,) 
