208 
PHILOSOPHY. 
rationis,) or the idea of certain new mental powers, that 
may indeed be thought without contradiction, but which 
however, as we have no experience of them, cannot be 
confidered poffible. 
2. Quality. An objedl: without Reality is nothing , 
no given object (nihil privativum); for inftance, a va- 
cu urn. 
3. Relation. The mere formal intuition without 
fubftance is nothing, as a mathematical figure which is no 
given object (ens imaginarium). 
4. Modality. The objedl of a conception that con¬ 
tradicts the formal conditions of intuition and thinking, 
is nothing, and no given objedl (nihil negativum); as a 
right-lined figure of two fides. 
The following Table exhibits the divifion of the Con¬ 
ception of Nothing according to the Categories of 
Quantity. 
1 
Nothing 
Quality. 
2. 
Nothing 
Relation. 
3 . s. 
Nothing 
Modality. 
4 . 
Nothing 
is is is is 
an empty Coucep- an empty Object an empty Intni- an empty Object 
tion without an of a tion nithouf an without a 
Object; Conception; Object; Conception; 
Ccns rationis.J f nihil privitivum.) (cns imaginarium.) (nihil negativum.) 
In the reprefentation of nothing as of an objedl, we 
think indeed problematically a necefiary unity of con- 
feioufnefs; but, as no matter is given in which this 
unity can be reprefented as grounded, this object is no¬ 
thing at all. The imaginary thing, N° 1. differs from the 
nonentity, N° 2. fince the former cannot be reckoned 
among poflibilities : the latter is however quite impoffible. 
In both cafes no objedlive reference of reprefentations takes 
place, becaufe there are no data to refer them to. As to 
the formal thing, N° 3. and the contradictory thing, N° 4. 
they refer to no objedls, becaufe they are empty data. 
II. TRA NSC END ENT A L DIALECTICS. 
I. Of Transcendental Illusion. 
The conditions of experience are now clearly exhibited, 
and the poffibility of a knowledge A priori to objedls has 
been made evident, by fhowing how it connedts the vari¬ 
ety of empirical intuition, to produce the necefiary unity 
of confcioufnefs ; that is, experience. Now the queftion 
arifes, whether there be knowledge u'hich cannot at all 
be derived from the principles of poffible experience, and 
yet may refer A priori to its objedls. We have indeed, in 
the Appendix to the preceding Chapter, fpoken of an en¬ 
tire fyjlem of intellettual know ledge, which is founded upon 
the notion of Leibnitz, “ that the Categories refer to the 
objedts of intuition, independently of all intuition ; and 
that the Underltanding, by this tranfcendental ufe of the 
Categories, knows the objedls as they are in themfelves.” 
To guard ourfelves from this error we mull have recourfe 
to a tranfcendental reflexion, to diflinguifh thefituation 
where the objedt is placed; namely, whether it is thought 
by the pure underftanding alone, or is really given in the 
intuition. It is evident, that, when we think objedls by 
the Categories, independently of all intuition, this is a 
completely-arbitrary mental determination ; and that the 
objedlive reality of thefe conceptions can only be evinced 
by objedls of intuition. The pretended knowledge of 
the above fyfiem grounds itfelf upon the tranfcendental ufe 
of the Categories, which, as we have already fhown, is no¬ 
thing but their abuf’e. This knowledge, however, is il- 
lufory, and a tranfcendental reflexion completely annihi¬ 
lates it. Its objedlscan be no other than thofe of experi¬ 
ence, of which, notwithftanding, it exprefles fomething 
that the empirical and only-valid ufe of the Categories 
does not warrant. 
There is however another fp’ecies of knowledge, which 
is celebrated for referring A priori to objedls, and which is 
of that peculiar kind, that its objedls cannot be met with 
in poffible experience, and therefore cannot be derived 
from the principles of the poffibility of experience, yet 
which is by no means illufbry. Underftanding has no 
other pure conceptions but the Categories ; and their 
ufe with refpedl to this peculiar kind of knowledge is not 
merely tranfcendental, in which cafe it might feem to re- 
prefent objedls of experience as they are in themfelves; 
but it fteps beyond all experience, and refers to objedls 
that cannot be given in any poffible experience. In the 
pofition, for inftance, the world has a beginning, the ufe of 
the Categories is of fuch a nature, that its objedl cannot 
be met with in experience. Knowledge of this kind myft 
reft upon principles that admit of this extended ufe of 
the Categories. We fhall call thefe principles tranjeendent, 
in oppofition to thofe which admit of no other but the 
empirical ufe of the Categories, and which may be termed 
immanent. We mull be careful to diflinguifh the expref- 
fions Tranfcendent and Tranfcendental. The knowledge 
that a certain intuition, conception, or principle, refers 
A priori to objedls of experience, inafmuch as they ren¬ 
der experience poffible, we have called tranfcendental. 
The axioms of geometry, or the pofition. Whatever hap¬ 
pens has a caufe, are indeed certain a priori, yet they are 
not to be termed tranfcendental; the knowledge that 
thefe pofitions refer a priori to experience, fince they ren¬ 
der it poffible, is called tranfcendental. Of the Categories, 
and the principles of pure Underftanding, it has been 
proved that they never overftep the empirieal intuition, 
but can only be of empirical ufe. A principle that pre¬ 
tends to pafs thefe limits is called tranfcendent. 
If the underftanding never went beyond that which is 
given to it, no error could poflibly arife. That we fee the 
remote part of a horizontal plane by higher rays, is a fadl, 
and this judgment is therefore not erroneous. But, if 
we judge that the fea in the diltance is elevated, this judg¬ 
ment is not identical with the preceding, and may be 
falfe, which in this inllance really is the cafe, notwith¬ 
ftanding it appears to the fenfes to be corredt even after 
we are afiured of its falfity. This illufion arifes from the 
fadl, that many objedts which we fee by higher rays are 
really more elevated than others which are feen by lower 
rays; and from our infenfibly changing this particular 
judgment into a univerfal one. 
Th is will be the cafe with the tranfcendental appear¬ 
ance which accompanies the above pretended knowledge; 
and indeed will not ceafe, though we are afiured of its 
falfity, becaufe it is founded upon principles which, taken 
fubjedtively, are as certain as the fubjeftive judgment of 
apprehenfion, “that we fee the remote part of the fea 
elevated,” which is erroneoufly confidered as objedlive. 
When we arrive at the point to be able to difeover the 
illufion in thefe principles, they will then be only imma¬ 
nent; on the contrary, they are tranfcendent, if we fuffer 
ourfelves to be deceived by this illufion, and really take 
them for objedlive judgments. 
II. Of Pure Reason, as the Seat of Transcendental 
Illusion. 
Univerfal Logic inveftigates the merely formal ufe of 
underftanding,by developing our notions of a Conception, 
a Judgment, and a Conclufion. The adlof referring repre¬ 
fentations to an objedl, is treated of in Tranfcendental Logic 
which has difeovered certain conceptions and judgments 
as the property of the tranfcendental faculty of under¬ 
ftanding and judgment, whofe objedl is, to introduce a 
necefiary unity into the variety of empirical intuition, 
and thus to produce experience itfelf. Now, whether 
pure Reafon, as a tranfcendental faculty, .be not alfo a 
fource of a particular kind of knowledge which refers a 
priori to objedls, Tranfcendental Dialectics will inveftigate. 
Reafon, in its logical ufe, is the faculty of concluding 
mediately; that is, a faculty to deduce the truth of one 
judgment from another by means of an intermediate 
judgment. Such a conclufion is termed a rational conclu¬ 
fion, to dirtinguiih it from a conclufion of underftanding, 
in which the truth of one judgment follows immediately 
from another, without requiring a third. (See Logic, 
vol.xiii. p. 25.) If I fay, “All men are mortal,” I imme¬ 
diately 
r 
