20 i) 
PHILOSOPHY. 
diately perceive the truth of the following pofitions; 
“Some men are mortal; Some mortals are men; Nothing 
immortal is man.” On the other hand, thepofition, “ All 
learned are mortal,” lies not in the judgment, “ All men 
are mortal,” and can only be inferred by means of an in¬ 
termediate one. In every rational conclufion there is 
therefore a rule, (major.) This reprefents the relation 
of a certain knowledge to its condition, and is thought 
by the underftanding. Secondly, Judgment fubfumpts 
the knowledge under the condition of the rule. LalHy, 
Reafon determines the knowledge by the predicate of the 
rule i priori. There nuift be therefore as many different 
kinds of rational conclufions as there are ways to ex- 
prefs the relations of knowledge in the underftanding; 
namely. Categorical, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive, ra¬ 
tional Conclufions. 
If we mean to examine whether ajudgment is inferred 
from preceding judgments, then we confider it'as the 
conclufion of a fyllogifm, and look out forits middle term, 
whofe fphere contains the fubjedt of the judgment, and 
which is itfelf contained in the predicate of the judgment. 
If we find it, we have then obtained another judgment, 
the major of the conclufion, which we may again confider 
as abandoned, and feek its condition by a new effort. 
Every new-judgment found in this manner, is not only 
thecondition of the abandoned judgment, but of many 
other judgmerits not examined. By this procedure Rea- 
fon endeavours to bring the great variety of knowledge 
under the finalleft number of principles, (univerfal con¬ 
ditions;) and thereby to obtain its greateif unity. 
Hence the pofition, “If the conditioned is given, the 
whole feries of its fubordinate conditions is aifo given,” 
when underftood fubjedtively, is a corredt rule, and no¬ 
thing more than a fubjedtive maxim of Reafon, to ftrive 
after the unconditioned as the higheft unity of all know¬ 
ledge. It may be more corredtly expreffed thus: “ If the 
conditioned is given, the whole feries of all its J'ubordinate 
conditions is admitted ;” confequently, to feek the abfo- 
lutely unconditioned is alfo allowed. But if it is objectively 
underftood, confequently the abfolutely unconditioned, 
confidered as given, and grounded in an objedt; then we 
confident as afynthetical pofition, in which we are by no 
means juftified. If the conditioned be given, then it al¬ 
ready lies in its conception that its condition is alfo given ; 
but that the whole feries of conditions as completed is 
alfo given, is not comprehended in it, and is quiteground- 
lefsly connected with it. 
It is clear of itfelf, that the conditioned, as a given 
knowledge, always concerns an obje< 5 t of experience ; and 
that the condition, fo long as it is again conditioned, is 
likewife fomething given in the intuition which the Un¬ 
derftanding thinks by its Categories as an objedt. But 
that condition which is no longer conditioned can be no 
objedt of experience ; for the Underftanding which thinks 
it, only thinks the connexion of the variety in the intui¬ 
tion as neceffary; and indeed according to its own laws, 
which forms the foundation of this neceffary unity of in¬ 
tuition. But, according to thefe laws, the underftand¬ 
ing cannot refer the conception of the alfohitehj uncondi¬ 
tioned to any objedt. Thus for inftance, the experience 
of a change is only thereby poflible, that the given in the 
empirical intuition is thought by the conception of Ef¬ 
fect. But the caufality of the CauJ’e from which the given 
change muft necefiary follow, is likewife a change, and 
refers to a higher caufe. That which is an abjblnte canj'c, 
v<, _hofe caufality Hands under no higher caufe, can be no 
given objedt. Hence it is clear that the neceffary unity, 
which is thought in the abfolutely unconditioned, in a word, 
the unity of Reafon, is elientially different from the unity 
cf Underftanding, by which a given objedt is thought. 
Reafon, as a tranfcendental faculty, is therefore the 
facility to produce knowledge from principles. It is in¬ 
deed iai its logical ufe likewife a knowing faculty from 
principles, it we underftand by a principle, a univerfal 
pofition, which may be no more than a pofition of expe- 
Vol. XX. No. 1362. 
rience rendered univerfal by indudtion. The axioms of 
geometry would, in this fenfe, be called principles in pre¬ 
ference; becaufe they cannot be derived from other po¬ 
fitions. But, though they are principles, they are not 
however abj’olute principles ; i. e. pofitions, which are not 
only univerfal, but which are known only from concep¬ 
tions, without correfponding intuitions. From the pre¬ 
ceding it is clear, that the abfolute unconditioned is no 
objedt: of poflible experience. If, however, its reprefenta- 
tion is to become knowledge, then the mere rational fa¬ 
culty muft contain in itfelf the ground of this objective 
reference, and the unity of Reafon, without any unity of 
Underftanding, muft reprefent an objedt. In' this fenfe 
the word principle is taken, when Reafon, as a tranfcen¬ 
dental faculty, is explained as a faculty of principles. 
The queftion that we have to inveftigate is therefore 
this: Is Reafon of itfelf a fource of conceptions and 
judgments, that refer to objedts; or is it only a fubordi¬ 
nate faculty, to arrange the variety of our knowledge un¬ 
der a few principles, and thereby merely to allift the Un¬ 
derftanding ? 
The principle upon which the whole tranfcendental 
ufe of Reafon refts, is the above-mentioned pofition: 
“ When the conditioned is given, the whole feries of the 
fubordinate conditions is alfo given ; confequently the 
abfolutely unconditioned.” If this is taken objedfively, 
many other fynthetlcal pofitions will ari'fe from it, which 
will all together furnilh an abfolutely unconditioned, as 
an objedt. Since the abfolutely unconditioned cannot be 
comprehended by a unity of Underftanding, all thefe po¬ 
fitions are traujeendent. Tranfcendental Dialectics will 
therefore develope this chief principle itfelf, examine 
whether it na 5 objedtive validity, and reprefent fyftemati- 
cally all that follows from it; or, fliould it be a mere mif- 
underftanding which attributes to a pofition an objedtive 
validity which it does not poffefs, it being only a Jubjec- 
tive rule, to ftrive after higher principles in order to pro¬ 
duce a whole of experimental knowledge, but which 
rule, namely, the abfolutely unconditioned, is no objedt at 
all. 
Tranfcendental Dialectics are divifible into two chief 
parts. The one treats of the Tranfcendental Ideas of pure 
Reafon, the other of the Tranfeendental and Dialellical 
Conclufions of pure Reafon. 
Book I. Of the Ideas of Pure Reason. 
Without a more intimate acquaintance with thefe 
Ideas or Conceptions of Reafon, we may remark their 
entire difference from Conceptions of Underftanding. By 
the latter (the Categories), the connexion of the variety 
in an empirical intuition is thought as univerfally-valid ; 
that is, as an objedt. They are confequently not ob¬ 
tained from Conclufions, and prefuppole no other concep¬ 
tions ot objedts, from which they may be deduced. They 
therefore render the phenomena intelligible by giving 
objedtive and univerfal validity to our empirical intui¬ 
tions. Every conclufion, that afcends to the uncondi¬ 
tioned, muft begin from the Categories, becaufe only by 
them can the given be thought as conditioned, that is, as 
an objedt. The conceptions of Reafon, then, by which 
the unconditioned is thought, are Ideas. They do not 
ferve, like the preceding, to render the phenomena intel¬ 
ligible, but compreheniible, fince they include collective 
experience, and lince-every objedt of experience is to be 
derived from them, without however their entering as 
unconditioned objedts into experience itfelf. Reafon 
leads to thefe objedts by conclufions merely. Provided 
they have objedtive validity, they muft be termed correft- 
ly concluded conceptions, (conceptus raiiociuati:) but, if 
the objedtive validity attributed to them is nothing but 
an apparent conclufion, they muft be called merely pre¬ 
tended conceptions of reafon, ( conceptus ratioeinantes ) As, 
however, neither of thefe denominations can be given to 
them previoully to inveltigation, we lhall call them for 
the prefent Tranfcendental Ideas. 
3 H 
Plato 
