210 
philo 
Plato employed the term Idea to indicate immaterial 
exijtmces; and they were to him very different concep¬ 
tions f rom what the Categories were to Ariftotle. Plato 
was pf opinion that the foul, before the birth of man, was 
in immediate intercourfe with thefe immaterial beings-, 
that our Ideas, though grown obfcure, were deceived from 
that intercourfe; and that, by remit:ifceooe, (Philofo- 
phy,) they mu ft be again drawn forth from their obfcti- 
rity ; that although they, in the prefent life, (the date of 
experience,) fometimes appear to be without objedtive 
reality, they (till refer to objedts in whofe immediate in¬ 
tuition the foul has formerly been; an intuition which it 
loll in its fecond exigence, retaining only fome faint 
ideas of it. All conceptions and truths, of whofe non- 
empirical origin he was convinced, confequently all the 
mathematics, he ranked among thefe ideas ; but, above 
all, the conceptions of Morality. 
Though, with regard to the myftical derivation of 
ideas, as well as the confounding thofe whofe objedts are 
not to be met with in experience with thofe which refer 
d priori to objedts of intuition, by rendering the know¬ 
ledge of fuch objedts poffible, we cannot alfent to the 
opinion of this great man; yet their importance cannot 
be doubted. As to the practical or moral Ideas, the idea 
of virtue for inftance, conceived as to far above all in¬ 
citement to tranfgrefs the moral law, that it cannot even 
be tempted, is a conception of hoiinefs itfelf, of which we 
can find no example in experience : this idea is neverthe- 
lefs fo rooted in the human foul, that it is the ftandard 
by which we judge of all adtions in experience, in order to 
eftimate their moral worth. It is therefore the duty of 
the philofopher to reprefent this idea in its higheft pu¬ 
rity, to free it from all heterogeneous and accidental ad¬ 
ditions; in other words, to draw it forth from its obfeu- 
rity, and to exhibit it juft as the fublime philofopher 
wiflied. He maintained tint a prince could not govern 
well, if he did not polfefs thefe Ideas. This thought is 
not to he defpifed, but merits great confideration; for 
certainly it would be for the benefit of a government, if 
the ruling power were to form for himfelf a perfeft model 
from this Idea, and adt conformably to it. If it be re¬ 
plied, that this Idea is after all but a phantom of the 
brain, fince in experience nothing is ever found that cor- 
refponds with it, we forget that it is only to ferve as a 
pattern by which we are to regulate events in experience 
fo far as they depend on our free will; and that the great 
difference between Ibis Idea and the fadts in experience, 
confifts in this very deficiency of the latter. As to the 
merely Jpeculative Ideas, the fequel will fhow, that, al¬ 
though we cannot allow them to poflefs objedtive reality, 
Reafon mull: neverthelefs confider them of great import¬ 
ance, fince the Underftanding, receiving them from Rea¬ 
fon as a maximum, is thereby induced to ftrive after the 
completenefs of its knowledge. 
SedV. I. Of Transcendental Ideas. 
In Tranfcendental Analytics we deduced the Catego¬ 
ries from the forms of Judgments. For, as we have al¬ 
ready remarked, that Judgment is that adt whereby the 
connexion of reprefenrations is thought as univerfally- 
valid ; the moft univerfal conception of an objedt is how¬ 
ever the conception of things necefiarily belonging to 
each other: this leads us to leek out, from a complete 
development of the fundlion of Judgment, thofe concep¬ 
tions which form the foundation of the objedtive unity of 
confcioujhejs in general, though their objedtive reality mull 
however be fhown in the concrete; that is, adtually fhown 
in the objedts of empirical intuition. We may therefore 
expedt, that the mere form of rational Conclufions will 
lead to conceptions, which, when applied to empirical 
intuition, do not indeed produce its objedtive unity, (for 
this is already done by the Categories;) but which ne¬ 
verthelefs comprehend it under a unity that the Un¬ 
derftanding by its conceptions cannot reach, but from 
which the knowledge of underftanding itfelf may be de- 
SOPHY. 
rived. Thefe conceptions we fliall call Transcendental 
Idess. 
By a rational conclufion, the affertiqn in one judg¬ 
ment is deduced from another in fuch manner, that the 
fecond judgment aflerts of a whole fphere what the firft 
judgment only exprefies of a part. This fphere is there¬ 
fore the condition under which the alfertion of the Con¬ 
clufion is underftood. If I fay, “ Cains is mortal,” then 
the conception man is The condition under which the. af¬ 
fection of this judgment may be underftood; that is, in 
fo far as the conception man implies that of Caius under 
it, aird the predicate mortal is valid of the whole fphere 
of this conception. Every fyllogifm therefore prefuppofes 
two adtions : the one confiders the fubjedt of a judgment 
as a part of a greater fphere, and is confequently the fub- 
fumption of a conception under another conception 
which the miriov exprefies; but, by the other adtion, the 
affertion is thought, which applies the predicate of the 
judgment to the whole fphere ; this is done in the major. 
If this pofirion is confidered as conditioned, its condition 
muft be a conception of a flill greater fphere, which com- 
prifesits fubjedt under it. The compafs of a conception 
conceived as complete, when the conception is thought as 
the higheft condition of the affertion of a Judgment, is 
univerfality. With refpedt to the fynthefis of intuition, 
in fo far as it proceeds from an objedt of the intuition to 
its condition, from this condition as an objedt of the in¬ 
tuition to a higher condition, &c. then Totality corre- 
fponds with that logical univerfality. We may there¬ 
fore explain the TranJ'cendental Idea by a conception, 
which exprefies the totality of the conditions of a given 
conditioned thing. 
Now there are three kinds of Syllogifms, as fo many me¬ 
thods of thinking the condition of a judgment which is 
confidered as conditioned. Confequently Reafon will 
contain juft fo many methods by which we may afeend to 
the unconditioned of the conditionally-given objedts of 
the intuition ; and this unconditioned will itfelf be of 
three kinds : i. an unconditioned of the Categorical Syn- 
t/iefis in a fubjedt; 2. the Hypothetical Synthefcs of the 
members of a feries ; 3. the Disjunctive Synthejis of the 
parts in a fyltem. When we confider more particularly 
thefe three modes of afeending by means of profyl/ogijms 
to the unconditioned, we find that the profyllogifm of a 
Categorical Conclufion leads to a fubjedt which does not 
prefuppofe any other fubjedt. The condition of the judg¬ 
ment, “Caius is mortal,” I find in the conception man 
in the fame manner as I find the condition of tile judg¬ 
ment, “ All men are mortal,” which contains that con¬ 
dition in the conception animal, as the fubjedt of the 
judgment, “All animals are mortal.” The conception 
of the unconditioned in this cafe, therefore, is the con¬ 
ception of a lajl fubjefl, beyond which there is no higher 
as a condition of the given judgment. The pro-fyllo- 
gijhi of the hypothetical conclujion leads to a prefuppofi- 
tion, which does not prefuppofe any thing further. The 
condition of the judgment, “ Men who continue in wick- 
ednefs are punifhed,” I find in the prefuppofition, “ If 
God be juft;” in the fame manner as the truth of this 
very preluppofed judgment, “ God is juft,” lies in a new 
prefuppofition, “if there be a God.” I order to diitin- 
guifh the hypothetical fynthefis from the categorical, we 
remark, that the firft always proceeds in a feries, fo that 
we can only arrive at the higheft condition by going 
through all the intermediate conditions. The judgment, 
“ there is a God,” is then only a condition of the given 
judgment, “ Men that continue in wickednefs are pu- 
nirtied,” when we take the intermediate prefuppofition, 
“God is juft.” On the other hand, I arrive from the 
laft fubjedt (the unconditioned) of the categorical fyn¬ 
thefis immediately to the conditioned given judgment, 
and require no intermediate condition in order to think 
the given as conditioned by a higher condition. In the 
preceding example, the conception animal is the immedi¬ 
ate condition of the given judgment in fo far as its fub- 
