PHILOSOPHY. 
jedt is contained in the fphereof this conception, without 
its being neceffary to confider it as previoufly contained 
under the conception man. The profyllogifm of the dif- 
jundtive conclufion leads to the complete divifion of a 
conception by which fomething is thought, in order to 
think it with precifion throughout. If I with to think 
fomething by the conception triangle as thoroughly de¬ 
termined, I muft determine it with reference to all the 
reprefentations that are contained under that conception, 
and this is only poffible under the Idea of a complete di¬ 
vifion of this conception : for inftance, “all triangles are 
either redlilineal or not.” If I determine my objedl by 
the conception of a redlilineal triangle, I proceed, by 
means of the divifion of redlilineal triangles into red! and 
oblique angular, to a new determination of my objedl. 
We fee from this, that the Transcendental Ideas which 
will be foon diftindlly ftiown to be produced by a pro- 
fyllogifiic proceeding fimilar to that defcribed, cannot be 
fidlitious conceptions. Reafon, while it afcends to them, 
fets out from fomethinggiven, and from the unity of Un- 
derftanding; but cannot confider its nrogrefs from the 
conditioned to the condition any-where as finifhed 
but at the unconditioned. But whether the objedlive 
reality aferibed to it be not a fidtion, is quite another 
affair. 
As we fhall hereafter employ the term abfolute, a determi¬ 
nation of its hitherto-ambiguous fignification is neceffary. 
We often ufe this word merely to announce that fome¬ 
thing applies to a thing in itfelf, confequently internally. 
In this fenfe, thofe properties of a thing which apply to 
it, in orderto determine exadtly the thing it is, apply to 
it abfolutely. We perceive that in this manner we fay 
the lead of a thing that we can. This word has the very 
oppofite fignification when we mean to exprefs by it that 
fomething applies to a thing in all its poffible references ; 
which is the moft we can fay of a thing. That the ftee- 
ple which I fee before me, muff have that firmnefs, 
height, and other properties, which it really has, 
in order to be what it is, is felf-evident, becaufe this 
pofition is identical; but we fay infinitely more by 
dating that in this place fuch a fteeple in all repedls 
mull neceffarily Hand. Both fignifications fometimes 
coincide, but are frequently alfo divergent. That 
which in the firft fignification is abfolutely impoffible 
(contradidls itfelf), is indeed alfo impoffible in all re- 
fpedls. But it would be quite abfurd to fay, that what 
in the firft fenfe is abfolutely poffible, fhouldalfo be poffi- 
ble in all refpedls. The fignification that we fhall give 
to this word is the latter, according to which it is to de¬ 
note what is valid in all poffible reference. 
The tranfcendental Idea of Reafon applies always to 
the abfolute totality in the fynthefis of the conditions. 
It does not therefore refer to an unconditioned in one 
refpedl only, but to that which is unconditioned in every 
poffible reference. Experience, however, can only lead 
to what is comparatively unconditioned ; i. e. to objedls 
of the intuition, which are indeed conditions of other 
objedls of intuition, but never to fomething abfolutely 
unconditioned. Hence the ufe of thefe conceptions, fo 
far as we refer them to objedls, is always trcnfcendent, fince 
thefe objedls cannot be given in any experience; whereas 
the objedlive ufe of the Categories is according to its na¬ 
ture immanent. 
We fay of a Conception whofe objedl can in no way 
be attained, it is only an Idea. Of thefe tranfcendental 
Conceptions of Reafon we may with equal propriety fay 
they are only Ideas, for their objedls can never be objedls 
ot experience. Should this expreffion appear fomewhat 
derogatory, fo far as it implies that we are occupied about 
a mere chimera; we muft guard ourfelves againfl this 
prejudice with regard to the tranfcendental Ideas. For, 
though the objedlive reality aferibed to them can in no 
way be demonllrated, and one thing at\leaft is certain, 
that their objedls cannot be found in any poffible expe¬ 
rience, ftill they are not fidlitious conceptions, but are 
211 
guides for the underftanding always to give to its know¬ 
ledge a firmer connexion. Still lefs mult we degrade the 
practical Ideas on the ground that they are only Ideas. 
For, though it can equally he afferted of them, that in 
experience a completely-adequate objedl- never can cor- 
relpond with them, ftill pure Reafon is, with refpedl to 
them, prattical, fince it authorifes the fulfilment of the 
maximum which the Idea prefents. 
This fedlion has dil'eovered the fource from which 
Reafon derives the conception of the abfolutely uncondi¬ 
tioned, and found it in this faculty itfelf fo far as it ma- 
nifefts itfelf logically. The development of this pure 
Idea will take place in the fequel. As we find the way 
in which reafon attains its tranfcendental Ideas is by pro- 
Jyllogifms, which afeend from the conditioned to the con¬ 
dition; the queltion ftill occurs, whether, when reafon 
defeends from the condition to the conditioned by epifyl- 
logifms, the Idea of a laft condition does not arile as na¬ 
turally as that of a firft unconditioned. We fhall how¬ 
ever foon obferve, that reafon requires abfolute totality 
of conditions, in order to be able to think a conditioned 
tiling as given ; but totality on the fide of the condi¬ 
tioned is not at all neceffary in order to think a condi¬ 
tion as a condition. 
Sedl. II. Syftem of Transcendental Ideas. 
Though the abfolutely unconditioned can be no object 
of poffible experience, luppoling even its conception bad 
objedlive reality ; this however is certain, that Reafon, 
when it afcends to the unconditioned, can begin in no 
other manner than from a conditioned fynthefis, which is 
thought by the Underftanding. It muft begin fomewhere, 
in order to afeend by profyllogifms from the conditioned 
to the condition ; and without fomething given it never 
could begin anywhere. 
Now all reference of our reprefentations is, ill, the 
reference to our own fubjedt; zdly, the reference to 
objedls, and indeed either as objedls of intuition, or 
objedls of thought. My reprefentations belong altogether 
to myfelf, and I refer them to my thinking fuhjedl; fe- 
condly, objedls are reprefented by them, in which Iobferve, 
in the firft place, the neceffary unity of confcioufnefs 
itfelf in the reprefentation of an objedl; and fecondly 
the variety in the objedls, in regard to which each parti¬ 
cular objedl is given to me. 
Now the tranfcendental Ideas proceed to the abfolute 
totality of all conditions in refpedl to the conditionally- 
given objedls of Intuition ; and, as all reference of repre¬ 
fentations is threefold; the thought of the totality of the 
conditions of the conditionally-given may be conceived, 
firft in reference to the thinking lubjedl, fecondly in 
reference to the neceffary unity in the reprefentation of 
objedls, and thirdly in reference to the given variety of 
each objedl. The idea of the abfolutely-unconditioned 
as the higheft condition of the reference of reprefentations 
to the thinking fubjedl, is treated of in Psychology; the 
idea of the abfolutely-unconditioned as the higheft condi¬ 
tion of the neceffary unity of the intuition of objedls, the 
fubjedl of Cosmology; and the idea of the abfolutely- 
unconditioned, upon which the given variety of every 
objedl refts, the fubjedl of Theology. More than thele 
tranfcendental ideas there cannot be. As reafon, in order 
to arrive at them, begins to afeend from the conditioned 
fynthetical unity, that is, from the objedls of intuition, 
they will proceed according to the order of the Categories. 
It will not be evident until we have advanced, that the 
procedure of Reafon, whereby it attains the abfolute unity 
of the thinking fubjedl, is nothing but the profyllo- 
gifm of the Categorical rational conclufion ; that the 
profyllogifm of the Hypothetical rational conclufion is 
exadtly the procedure of Reafon in thinking the uncon¬ 
ditioned unity with refpedl to the conditioned neceffary 
unity of confcioufnefs in the reprefentation of objedls ot 
Intuition ; and that, laltly, the profyllogifm of the Dil- 
jundtive rational conclufion is identical with the proce¬ 
dure 
