212 PHILO 
dure of Reafon in thinking the abfolute condition of the 
given variety of every objedt. 
An objective deduction of thefe conceptions cannot be 
undertaken, as took place with the Categories ; and this 
becaufe they neither refer to any objedt whatever, nor can 
their objedtive validity be thown by any given objedt, as 
will be explained hereafter. But a fubjedtive derivation 
of them from the very nature of reafon is poffible, and 
is here accomplifhed. The object of the prefent fedtion 
is therefore attained, fince by deriving them from their 
true fource we have not only determined their exadt 
number, but diftinguifhed them from the Categories. 
Book II. Of the Dialectical Conclusions of Pure 
Reason. 
-Of an objedt whofe real poflibility we cannot reprefent 
to ourfelves, w'e commonly fay we have no conception. 
It may be laid with equal propriety of the objedts of the 
tranfcendental Ideas , that we have no conception of them, 
becaufe no intuition can correfpond to thofe Ideas. 
With lefs danger of being mifunderftood'we may. fay that 
we have no knowledge of the objedt to which we refer an 
Idea, though we may have a problematical conception of 
it; for this conception is that of the neceflary unity of 
confcioufnefs, which can only then be called Knowledge 
when it becomes the unity of empirical intuition. 
The rational conclufions which lead us to the tranfceh- 
daital Ideas as tranlcendent conceptions that refer to 
objedts, will now be of that particular kind, that they 
will contain no empirical premifes. They will be tranf- 
cendent pofitions, by means of which we conclude, from 
fomething known, upon fomething elfe, of which we have 
no other conception but a problematical one, and to 
which we neverthelefs attribute, by a natural mental 
iliufion, objedtive reality. Thefe conclufions might very 
properly be called pretended conclufions ; we however call 
them rational conclufions , becaufe they are nor artificially 
produced, but arife quite naturally from Reafon itfelf. 
They are notwithftanding dialeClical rational conclufions, 
whofe iliufion is fo natural, that even he who perceives 
their fallacy cannot free himfelf from their iliufion. 
There can be but three kinds of thefe dialc8ical con¬ 
clufions-, that is, juft as many as there are Syllogifms, and 
confequently alfo as many as there are tranfcendentalIdeas. 
In the firft, or Categorical profyllogifm, we infer, from the 
conception of a fubjedt which can only be confidered as 
J'uljiCt, the .abfolute unity of this fubjedt, of which I have 
no conception. This dialedtical conclufion we will call 
Transcendental Paralogism. In the feccnd, or 
lit/pot helical profyllogifm, we inferfrom the neceflary unity 
of intuition in the reprefentation of objedts, the abfolute 
unity, as their higheft condition, of which I have no con¬ 
ception. This unconditioned unity will in this cafe be 
of two kinds; and we infer the one from the contradidtory 
conception which we have of the other. On this account 
this dialedtical conclufion is called the Antinomy of pure 
Ilcafon. Laftly, in the third, or Disjunctive profyllogifm, 
we inferfrom the given variety of each objedt, the abfolute 
unity of the poflibility of all objedts; that is, a being of all 
beings, of wdtich I can form no conception. This dialedt¬ 
ical conclufion is called the Ideal of pure Reafon. 
Chap. I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. 
The tranfcendental paralogifm is diftinguifhed from a 
merely logical one, thus; that the former is raifed upon a 
tranfeendent principle, which it has in common with all 
the other dialeCiical conclufions of pure reafon. This 
tranfcendental principle is that already mentioned. If 
the conditioned is given, then the abfolutely uncondi¬ 
tioned is alfo given. The mode of concluding of the 
Paralogifm is exadtly that of the Categorical Profyllo¬ 
gifm. 
The given conditioned from which the- conclufion be¬ 
gins is the I think that accompanies all our reprefenta- 
fions. On that account, becaufe it is the chief condition 
SOPH Y. 
of thinking objedts, by rendering poffible the aggregate of 
reprefentations, it is tranfcendental confcioufnefs, and 
different from every empirical one, which is the confciouf¬ 
nefs of a given empirical variety. This pure I think, en¬ 
tirely freed from every thing empirical, is now the foun¬ 
dation upon which rational Pfychology is eredted ; and in¬ 
deed is that alone upon which it can be built, in order 
to conftitute a rational fcience ; as the leaft addition of 
any thing empirically given, for inftance, the feeling ftf 
pleafure and difpleafure, mtift transform it into an empi¬ 
rical fcience. In the 7 think I am confcious of myfeif as 
an objedt of internal fenfe, that is, of my Soul; and I fe- 
parate myfeif from all the objedts of external fenfe, which 
I call bodies. 
The Categorical Profyllogifm infers from fomething 
thought as fubjedt to a higher fubjedt as its condition, 
and when extended to the unconditioned it infers a laft 
fubjedt as the higheft condition of the given conception 
to be thought as fubjedt. Our paralogifm infers from the 
conception I of the tranfcendental reprefentation 1 think, 
which is given only as a fubjedt for thinking, an abfo- 
lutely laft fubjedt, namely, the fubftance of the foul. To 
determine this (till further is only poffible by a fimilar 
mode of conclufion according to the Categories. As in 
the/, thought as fubjedt, no parts are diftinguifhed, the Soul 
as Substance is, according to Quality, fimple ; as the 
I which accompanies all my reprefentations, is always re- 
prefented as identical, the fubftance of the foul is, accord¬ 
ing to Quantity one, and not many ; and laftly, as, in 
the I am, or I think, I am confcious of my own exiftence, 
the Soul exifts as fubftance, according to Modality, in¬ 
dependently of all objedts in Space, and yet, in relation to 
them, as exifting. 
The chief contents of rational Pfychology, from 
which all the reft is derived, confifts therefore in thefe 
four Propofitions, which proceed according to the Ca¬ 
tegories. 
1. Of Relation. The Soul is fubftance. 
2. Of Quality. The Soul is fimple. 
3. Of Quantity. The Soul is one (identical). 
4.. Of Modality. The Soul ftands in relation to ob- 
jedts in fpace. 
From thefe elements arife, by mere combination, all the 
conceptions of rational Pfychology. This fubftance, 
merely as an objedt of internal fenfe, furniflies the concep¬ 
tion of Immateriality ; as fimple fubftance, that of Incor¬ 
ruptibility ; its identity as intelledhial fubftance that of 
Perfonality ; all thefe three parts taken together, that of 
Spirituality ; the relation to objedts in fpace, that of com¬ 
merce with bodies; confequently it reprefents the think- 
ing fubftance as the principle of life in matter, that is, 
as Soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality; this, 
limited by fpirituality, is Immortality. All rational Pfy¬ 
chology is therefore built upon the fingle thought /. 
But of this I, independently of a reprefentation, we have 
not the leaft conception ; for we are only confcious of it 
in the 1 think, and this only fo far as fomething is really 
thought; and there is moreover the inconvenience, that 
we are obliged to ufe its reprefentation in reprefenting it. 
The I think rnuft accompany all my reprefentation in 
their fynthefis, in order to produce a whole of reprefenta¬ 
tions. Even the adtion of the underftanding by which 
this whole is referred to an objedt, and the connexion of 
the reprefentations, thought as neceflary by the Catego¬ 
ries, is only poffible when accompanied by this I think. 
Hence all that can be faid of this tranfcendental repre¬ 
fentation, can be nothing more than an explanation, that 
knowledge is brought about by it; but not how the 
knowledge of a particular objedt reprefented by the 
thought of 1 is to be attained. The reprefentation of an 
objedt is always that of the neceflary unity of confciouf¬ 
nefs, which may be indeed thought problematically, as 
in the conception of a nouraenon ; but the knowledge 
of an objedt is the reprefentation of that neceflary unity* 
as 
4 
