213 
PHILO 
as the unity of empirical intuition. This thought will 
guide us in the examination of the chief principles of ra¬ 
tional Pfychology. 
1. That the I in all thinking can only occur as fubje.d, 
but never as predicate, is an apodidlical pofition, becaule 
it is identical, fince it is a mere expofition of the Concep¬ 
tion of Thinking ; hut that /, as an exifting thing, exift: 
only as a Subject, that is, am Sub/lance, is far more than 
can be found in the mere conception of thinking. The 
dcdudlion of the principles of tranfcendental Judgment 
lias fhown the objective reality of the Category Snbjlance 
in empirical intuitions. To the reprefentation I, howe¬ 
ver, no intuition correfponds, fince it only expreftes the 
adl of confcioufnefs; nay, it has only fignification in the 
connexion of reprefentations. 
2. In the fame manner it lies in the conception of 
thinking, that the I which accompanies all my reprefen¬ 
tations can contain no variety. But that the thinking I 
is a fimple fubftance, is a fynthetical pofition, and is not 
identical with the preceding. 
3. It is alfo analytical, that the Jin all my reprefenta¬ 
tions is always reprefented as one and the fame, which 
likewife explains the conception of thinking. It is quite 
another thing that the I as fubftance is always the fame, 
for an intuition is requifite in order to reprefent it as a 
fubftance. 
4. Laftly, it is by an analytical pofition, that I feparate 
myfelf, as a thinking being, from all objects external to 
me. But to fay, that I exili as a fubftance different from 
external things, is very different, and is a Jynthetical por¬ 
tion. Nor do I even perceive, w hether confcioufnefs is at 
all poffible without external objedls. Confequentiy the 
analyfis of confcioufnefs in the conception of thinking 
does not aftift us, when by means of the conception J we 
attempt to determine it as an objedl ; becaufe this necelfa- 
rily requires intuition, without which no fynthetical pofi¬ 
tion is poffible. 
In the procedure of rational Pfychology a Paralogifm 
reigns, which is reprefented by the following Syllogifin : 
“ That which can never be thought otherwife than as 
fubjedf, exifts only as fubjedl, and is therefore fubftance. 
Now a thinking being, confidered merely as fuch, cannot 
be thought otherwile but as fubjedl, it therefore exifts 
only as fuch, that is, as fubftance.” 
The major takes no notice of the condition under 
which that which can only be thought as fubjedl exifts as 
fubftance, namely, the intuition; fince it mult run thus: 
“That, in the intuition which can only be thought as 
fubjedl, exifts only as fubjedt, and is fubftance.” As now 
the minor under this limitation is not true, and a thinking 
being merely as fuch, that is, in the mere reprefentation 
of J, is not given in any intuition, it cannot be ufied as a part 
of the fphere of thole things, wliich, being given in the 
intuition, are only thought as fubjedls. The conclufion 
has therefore been falfely drawn, i. e. perfophij'ma jigurcc 
didionis. 
We here merely call to mind that which is accom- 
plifhed in the principles of tranfcendental Judgment. 
The dedudlion of the Categories fhowed by developing 
thefe pure conceptions of underftanding from the form of 
Judgment, that by them is reprefented the connexion of 
the variety as neceffary, confequentiy the necefiary unity 
of confcioufnefs ; and that therefore the fundi ion of think¬ 
ing by means of the Categories is precifely the fame adlion 
as that which confilts in referring reprefentations to an 
objedl. The dedudlion of thefe principles fhowed, how¬ 
ever, firft the cafe of application of the Categories. Now, 
indeed, if we even abflradl from all intuition, that thing is 
fubftance which is only determined as a jubjefl in think¬ 
ing ; but fuch an objedl is however only intelledtual, fo 
long as the cafe of the application of the conception is not 
really given. Change (the being and not being in Time), 
reprefented as objedl, furnifhes the application of this 
Category to empirical intuition, fince I perceive that only 
by fomething lafting in time, Change can be reprefented. 
Vol. XX. No. 1362. 
SOPHY. 
On the other hand, the I expreffes nothing more than a 
mere reprefentation, and wmuld not even as fuch be poffible, 
if there were no connexion of a given variety. All re¬ 
prefentations change: and there mult indeed be a perma¬ 
nent fomething to which the being and nol-being of them 
muft be fixed. It muft, however, be fomething given, 
and can only be found in Space, which is the permanent 
form of things. It is the external phenomenon. In 
Internal Senfe, whofeform is fucceifive, nothing permanent 
will be found ; but all its objedls, that is, all reprefenta¬ 
tions to which that of my / belongs, are fubjedted to a 
conftant change. 
In the fimple nature of the Soul as fubftance, its immor¬ 
tality was fuppofed to be found; for, though it were per¬ 
manent as a fubftance, yet a divifion of it would be poffible 
if it were compofed, and this would be equivalent to its 
annihilation. Mendellohn, however, did not think him- 
felf fecure with regard to the perdurability of the foul, 
by this argument of its being a fimple fubftance. He 
thought it might be objedted, that, though the fimplicity 
of the foul might prevent its being deftroyed by divifion. 
it ftill might evanefee, and abfolutely ceafe to exift. 
To remove this objection, heanfwered, that, if weaffume 
that the foul may exift in one point of time and not in 
another, a time muft elapfe between the two points. 
Neverthelefs we may alfo fay that no time has elapfed, 
becaufe the fame moment which belongs to its exiftence 
alfo belongs to its non-exiftence. From this contradidlion, 
which follows from adopting the vanifhing of the Soul, 
this acute man inferred theoppofite quality, i. e. its perdu¬ 
rability. But he did not confider that, though we allow 
the foul a fimple nature, confequentiy no extenjivs quantity, 
it muft have neverthelefs, like every thing exilting, an 
intenfive quantity ; and that, although it cannot vanilh in 
the former manner, it may (fill elangnefee, that is, may 
decreafe in all its powers, by an infinite number of 
degrees, without, however, completely attaining the 
zero; this, however, would be equivalent to adlual 
annihilation. Here only the elan^uejience of confcioufnefs 
need be confidered as poffible, fince in it the elanguefcence 
of the foul itfelf is implied. 
If notv we infer, as has been Qiown above from the 
tranfcendental reprefentation I am, the exiftence of the 
Soul as fubftance independent of external objedls, then 
Idealifm is at leaft problematically incontrovertible. For, 
according to this fyftem, the confcioufnefs of one’s-felf, 
as an exifting fubftance, is found in the mere I am, 
diredtly contrary to the empirically-determined confciouf¬ 
nefs of the exiftence of one’s-felf. If, on the other hand, 
we fee, that the determination of exiftence in Time is 
only poffible by changes in reference to a permanent, 
that itfelf changes, but that every thing in me belongs to 
the reprefentations, of whefe exiftence I am decidedly 
confcious, by means of my own exiftence in time, there 
mull bea permanent exifting without me, by whofe cha.'.ge 
I determine my own exiftence in time. Accordingly I 
am immediately confcious of the objedlive reality of my 
reprefentations, whereas, according to Spiritualijm, I can 
only become conicious of their reality, without being 
certain that objedts correfpond to them. 
In that Theory, which reprefents fyftematically the 
abfolutely unconditioned as inferred from the given con¬ 
ditioned, (from the reprefentation I think,) we were com¬ 
pelled to make the beginning with the pofition, The Soul 
is Snbjlance ; confequentiy firft to determine the uncon¬ 
ditioned according to Relation in the fame manner as it 
could only he thought according to Modality as exift¬ 
ing independently of all external objedts. If, on the 
other hand, we adhere to the conditioned, and reprefent 
it in a fyftematical connexion according to the Categories, 
the order is reverfed, fince in that cate the exilteime itfelf 
(as the given l think ) muft come firft. The l’yitem ot the 
given will therefore be as follows, according to the Cate¬ 
gories. 
3 I 
1. Of 
