214 
PHILOSOPHY. 
1. Of Modality. I think. 
2. Of Relation. As fubjedi. 
3. OfQuality. As i'nnple fubjedi. 
4. Of Quantity. As identical fubjedi in all my thinking. 
The I think is that representation in which I am given 
to myfeif, and implies the polition, ‘ I am confciousof my 
exiftence in Time,'' which pofition is empirical. For, 
although the reprefentation I be tranfcendental, yet the 
empirical confcioufnefs of my exiftence is only potfible 
by objects being empirically given to me, fince the I think, 
whereby I am confrious of my exiftence as cf a being 
exifting in Time, can only take place in as far as I think 
given objedls. 
The fecond pofition, which exprefies my exigence as a 
thinking fuhje£t,\& not however identical with this, Iexift 
as Subjiance ; for it exprefies only the given, namely, that 
I can only confider myfeif in all my thinking as fubjedt, 
but never as predicate. Since, however, no permanent 
Intuition forms the foundation of my own I, which is 
entirely feparated from every thing thought; the pofition, 
I always think as Subject, is not identical with this, I exijl 
as fubjlancc. 
The third pofition, I think as fimple fubjedi, is important 
of itfelf, though it does not go beyond the given. For, 
it is evident that, fince thinking cannot be conceived as 
th.e action of many fubjedts, this thinking cannot tie 
explained by whofe compofition always a number of 
fubjedls ariles ; and that confequently Materialifm is as 
little able to lead us to the unconditioned of the given 
I think as Spiritualifin. 
The conclufion from this is, that we can have no ration¬ 
al Plychology as a fcience, but only as a difeipline which 
fhows us the limits of our faculties, that is, our inability 
of afeending from the given condition to the abfolutely 
unconditioned ; and that it is therefore impoffible to arrive 
in a fpeculative way at the infight, that the Soul is immor¬ 
tal. Reafon, on the other hand, in its practical ufe, con¬ 
tains demands which in this life can never be fulfilled, 
and holds out to us a profpe< 5 ! of an exiftence of the 
thinkingfubjedi after death. “ The Critic” has refuted 
Spiritualifm only fo far as it is a dogmatical fyftem. The 
pofition of t.he immortality of the foul, which Spiritualifm 
takes under its protedfion, and in which mankind takes 
fo great an intereft, is not in the leaft injured by it. Nay, 
the popular demonftration which refts upon analogy gains 
in impreffion on the mind, when we perceive that in a 
f peculative way it is impoffible to arrive at any apodidlical 
convidiion, which, however, it is our objedt to attain. 
But, if every-vvhere in nature we find agreement of the 
means with certain ends, man would be the only excep¬ 
tion to this rule, if he were provided with faculties which 
are capable df a continual improvement,and, what is more, 
whofe Reafon holds out a law to him, that, difregarding 
all arbitrary ends, preferibes to him an end which he is to 
obtain, and which yet cannot be completely attained in 
this life, if he were only deftined for this earthly exiftence. 
As to the Solution of the connexion of the foul with the 
body, of which we have to treat in the conclufion of the 
Critic of Rational Pfychology; the problem is to explain 
how an objedt of internal fenfe can ftand in connexion 
with objects of external fenfe. But, if we confider, that, 
though we have feen that the pofition of connexion ren¬ 
ders poftible the experience of the co-exiftence of objedts 
in fpace, and is confequently a rule a priori to which the 
objects of experience are fubjedted, we have r.everthelefs 
not thereby in any way feen how fubftances are able to 
adt mutually on each other in fpace: yet we fee that, in 
order to obviate this difficulty, tlie problem, how objedts 
can have a mutual influence on each other, muft be folved, 
which problem lies beyond all doubt out of the field of 
human knowledge. 
Concluding Remark. —The reprefentation I think has its 
origin in the connexion of a given variety;-and, although 
it is a priori, and a tranfcendental reprefentation, ftill this 
pure tranfcendental confcioufnefs would not take place if 
there were no empirical confcioufnefs whofe condition it 
it, as it were, it priori. While the understanding views the 
variety of the intuition, and accompanies it with the 
original I think, itaftedls internal fenfe, in which affedlion 
that variety arifes in which the mind views itfelf, and 
arrives at the empirical confcioufnefs of itfelf. That 
which is original is no knowledge of myfeif, but lam only 
confcicus in it of my faculty of connexion 5 but in the 
empirical felf-confcioufnefs I know myfeif as I am given 
to myfeif in the intuition, that is, as phenomenon. 
Now our Theory does not deny that the manner in 
which I am given to myfeif in Internal Senfe has fome- 
thing for a foundation which is not intuited ; but a know¬ 
ledge of myfeif as a noumenon is not poftible, becaufe, 
otherwife, in the original / think, I muft neceftarily 
intuit myfeif, which however is not the cafe. But, if now 
Reafon manifefts itfelf in the moral law, which, without 
the leaft regard to the fenfible motives of the will, makes 
a demand upon it as pare practical Reafon, namely, as a 
faculty whofe caufality cannot be an objedt ot the fenfible 
world, that is, as a Free Will;—this gives us a profpedl 
of an intelligible world in which we muft place the objedt 
as a thing in itfelf that forms the foundation of the phe¬ 
nomenon which we call Soul-, we cannot, however, 
define this objedt by a fingle predicate, and the knowledge 
of it is impoffible. 
Sedt. II. Antinomy of Pure Reason. 
In the former fedtion, the procedure of Reafon, by 
which it afeends in the Categorical Synthejis from the 
conditioned to the abfolutely-unconditioned, has already 
been (hown. Our objedt now is to inveftigate the conclu¬ 
fion from the conditioned to the unconditioned in the 
Hypothetical Syntliefis. In thefonner mode of concluding, 
Reafon feeks an abfolutely laft fubjedt as the condition 
of the reprefentation 1 , which in thinking is always con- 
fidered as fubjedi. In the fame manner as in the Categori¬ 
cal Projyllogijm, even the remoteft condition is the imme¬ 
diate condition of the given conditioned, even if the 
underftanding, in afeending to a fubjedt, as to the condi¬ 
tion of a given fubjedi, goes through many intermediate 
conditions; fo is alfo the abfolutely-unconditioned of 
the dialedtical conclufion of Reafon, upon which rational 
Pfychology refts, the immediate condition of the given, 
conditioned. If the conditioned is given, the condition 
is indeed alfo given ; but, whether the abfolutely uncon¬ 
ditioned is alio given, that is, whether an objedt really 
correlponds to this conception, cannot be inferred from 
the given. But it already lies in the eflence of the Cate¬ 
gorical Projyllogifm, that the more remote condition is the 
immediate condition of the given fubjedi, without re¬ 
quiring intermediate conditions; and that confequently 
alfo, by means of the former Para/ogiJ'm, the foul as fub- 
ftance is thought as the higheft and immediate condition 
of the fubjedi always given in confcioufnefs. 
It is quite otherwife with the dialedtical conclufions of 
Reafon, in which the Profyllogifm proceeds by hypothe¬ 
tical fynthefis. The more remote condition cannot be 
here confidered as the immediate one of the given condi¬ 
tioned ; but we can on the contrary, think it only as the 
condition of the given, inafmuch as we think all the 
intermediate conditions. 
Tranfcendental Paralogifm carried with it however a 
very partial appearance. Here every thing fpeaks in 
favour of Spiritualifm, and the aflertions of Materialifm 
have not the leaft plaufibility. When, on the other hand, 
Reafon afeends to the unconditioned from the neceffary 
unity of the intuition in the reprefentation of objedts, it 
perceives that it muft think this unconditioned in a two-fold 
manner; and it determines itfelf always in favour of the 
one, becaufe it difeovers in the reprefentation of the other 
a contradidtion. Here therefore will refult an antithetic 
of pure Reafon, which art cannot produce, but to which 
every human reafon, inclined to fpeculation, muft necefla- 
rily come, and to folve which is a duty of the “ Critic.” 
We fliall call the tranfcendental Ideas at which reafon 
arrives in this Hypothetical Syntliefis, “ Cofmological Ideas,” 
and 
