ms 
PHILOSOPHY. 
the underftanding, thouglit as conditioned. By the Ca¬ 
tegories, therefore, the various parts of the Intuition are 
reprefented as connected in a univerfally-valid manner; 
and thereby is produced what is called a reprefentarion 
of an object in the intuition. Now inafnniCh as this ob¬ 
jective unity is thought as conditioned, and its condition 
by the very fame Category again as conditioned, an hypo¬ 
thetical fynthejis in antecedentia, and an Idea of its abio- 
lute compietenefs, take place. Thefe Ideas of the abfo- 
lute totality of the conditions of the conditioned objec¬ 
tive unity of the intuition are therefore entirely different 
from that which refers to the Ideal of pure Reafon, and 
by which is reprefented a totality of the conditions of the 
thinking of objeCts in general; that is, of the entire pof- 
fibility of things in order to be able to think them as 
given inexperience. But, though the cofmological Ideas 
have their origin in pure Reafon itfelf, ftill the quelfion 
concerning their objective reality remains. The firlt re¬ 
mark that offers itfelf is this. The condition is always 
an objeCt of intuition of the very fame kind as the condi¬ 
tioned ; that is, it is again conditioned becaufe. it is 
thought by the fame Category. The abfolute uncondi¬ 
tioned is likewife thought as an objeCt of intuition by this 
very Category, yet not as further conditioned, whereby 
the nature of the intuitively-given objeCt is contradicted, 
and by which is prefuppoled, that we, in the regrcfive 
J'ljntlieJis, (hall at length find it, which, however, can ne¬ 
ver take place. IfweabftraCt from the intuition of objeCts, 
and merely bear in mind the neceffary unity of confciouf- 
neis, independently of the manner in which the objeCt is 
given to us, it would be quite correCt, that, if the condi¬ 
tioned is given, the abfolute totality of the conditions, 
confequently the abfolutely unconditioned, is alfo given. 
But this objective unity would however only be arbitra¬ 
rily thought, fince thus no objeCt at all would be given 
to us. If we imagine that the regremve fynthefis will 
meet with an object as fomething abiolutely uncondi¬ 
tioned, we imperceptibility abftract from the neceffary. 
mode of Intuition, according to which an objeCt is given 
to us, and refer ne.verthelefs the conception of the abio¬ 
lutely unconditioned to objedts of intuition. 
This unconditioned may be thought in two ways; ei¬ 
ther as merely confiding in the whole feries, in which 
therefore all the members are unexceptionably condi¬ 
tioned ; the feries itfelf, however, is entirely given, and 
unconditioned ; or the unconditioned may be thought 
as a member of the feries, in which cafe all the members 
except this one are conditioned. In the former cafe the 
feries is given h priori without limits (without a begin¬ 
ning), that is, infinite, and is at the fame time given en¬ 
tirely, although the regrefs is never thought as completed. 
In the latter cafe, however, there is a firlt member in the 
lenes, which, with regard to the time elapfed, is the be¬ 
ginning of the world; with regard to Space, the boundary of 
the world; with regard to the parts of a whole, given in its 
limits Jimple; with regard to the canjes, theabfolute /e/f- 
a&ivity (freedom) ; witli regard to the exidence of change¬ 
able tilings, the abfolute neceffily of nature. 
Thele trunjccndental ideas have been called “ cofmolo- 
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. 
.First Contradiction—Thesis. 
The "World has a beginning in Time, and bounds in 
j Space. 
Proof. —For, if we affert that, according to time, the 
World has no beginning, then at every given indant an 
infinite time has elapfed. But the determination of time 
as an elapled time, is the determining it as a whole, fince 
this implies that all the parts of time have once been pre- 
ient. Confeque.nrly the fynthefis in the reprefentation 
ol infinite elapled time is thought as complete, whereby 
however the repreleniation of infinite time whole fynthe¬ 
fis can never be completed is contradicted. Therefore, 
with 
gical ideas," becaufe they contain the abfolute condi¬ 
tions of the phenomena, whofe fpbere is the world, and 
becaufe they only refer to objects of intuition when objec¬ 
tive reality is afcribed to them, although in faff no ob¬ 
ject of intuition can correfpond to them, fince this is al¬ 
ways thought by the very fame Category by which we 
think the conditioned. 
We have above divided the Categories into mathemati¬ 
cal and dynamical. Now, fince the cofmological ideas are 
the Categories extended to the unconditioned, the drvi- 
fion of the Categories can be applied to thefe ideas. The 
mathematical cofmological Ideas arc directed to the abfo¬ 
lutely unconditioned of the intuition of the objects ; and 
it would be neceffary to call them in a particular fenfe 
cofmological Ideas, in fo faras we underftand by the world 
the mathematical whole of phenomena, that is, the abfo¬ 
lute totality of all the conditions of the intuition of ob¬ 
jeCts. The dynamical ideas, on the other hand, apply to 
the unconditioned of the exiftence of the phenomena,, 
both in relation to each other and of exiftence in genera!; 
that is, in relation to the knowing faculty; and may 
therefore be called conceptions of nature, becaufe by na¬ 
ture is thought the dynamical whole of phenomena, that 
is, the whole of the phenomena in as far as they exift. 
SeCt. II. Antithetic of Pure Reason. 
By the Antithetic of pure Reafon is not here under- 
ftood a whole of dogmatical affertions that are oppofed to 
the afl'ertions of another fyftem, and which lay claim to 
approbation becaufe they refute the others; but the con¬ 
flict in which reafon finds itfelf with regard to certain po- 
litions, whole truth or falfehood cannot be detected by 
experience, which can be either proved or refuted with 
the lame plausibility, and whole refutation always appears 
to prove the contradictory oppofite, fo that reafon is in 
the fituation of explaining one of thefe contradictory af¬ 
fertions as true, if icconfiders its oppofite as falfe. The 
duty of the “Critic” will therefore be; Firlt, to lay open 
faithfully this conflict. Secondly, toaflign the realons of 
the conflict, and to inveftigate if a way to certainty 
does not remain open for reafon with regard to it. 
The prel'ent feCtion will accomplifti the firlt. It will 
appear that this contradiction is not at all artificially 
produced, but that reafon detects itfelf in it. We lhall 
ihow that one of thefe contrarily-oppofed afl'ertions, is 
always too great for the unity of Underftanding, while the 
other is loo fmall for the unity of Reafon. In order to 
form a decilion upon this conftifl, we mult firlt watch it 
impartially. Perhaps the objeCt of this contell is in it¬ 
felf nothing. The method we firlt begin with is there¬ 
fore fceptical, though very different from Scepticifm. The 
latter decides dogmatically, that upon certain queftions 
it is abfolutely impofiible to obtain information, accord¬ 
ing to our method: we only fulpend our judgment in or¬ 
der, by reflecting upon the pros and cons, to prepare our- 
felves to decide politively upon the contradictions. 
Thefe Antinomies will follow' one another according to 
the order of the Tranfctndental Ideas. 
Antithesis. 
The World has no beginning in Time, and no bounds 
in Space. 
Proof. —For, if we fuppofe the World has a beginning; 
as the beginning is an exiftence preceded by a time, an 
empty time mutt have elapfed before the world was. The 
la pie of time is only by means of change in reference to 
fomething permanent that changes. A yet-elapfed time is 
therefore fomething contradictory. Hence follows, that: 
previous to the beginning of the world no empty time can 
have elapfed ; that is, the world can have no beginning 
with regard to time. 
Contradictions of the Transcendental Ideas. 
Let 
