218 
PHILOSOPHY. 
Remark .—The queftion is hereabout a whole compofed 
of fubftances, which is, properly fpeaking, the compound; 
that is, a whole whofe poflibility depends on the parts. 
As to fpace, the parts are converfely only podible in the 
w hole. If therefore the compofition of fpace is annihila¬ 
ted, nothing remains, not even the points as the bounda¬ 
ries of the (paces ; it is only an ideal compound; whereas 
the compound of fubftances is a real compound. As 
accidents do not exift of themfelves, but are only real 
inafmuch as they conftitute the (late of the fubftances j 
fo nothing fimple remains with regard to them after 
having done away with all compofition, confequently no¬ 
thing at all remains. The demonftration of the Thefts refts 
upon this; that the parts of which the whole is compofed, 
are beings exifting of themfelves, which neither applies 
to fpace, which is only fomething in as far as there are 
objedfs given is fpace, nor to the changes of the fubftances, 
notwithftanding both are reprefented as quantities. 
We here only fpeak of the fimple in as far as it is a 
conftituent part of the compound, but not in as far as it 
exifts of itfelf, and is not compofed of other fimple fub¬ 
ftances, in which latter fignification it is probable that 
Leibnitz took the expreflion monade. With him it is the 
fimple immediately given as fimple, (for inftance in felf- 
confciou(nefs;) but the fimple as a conftituent part of 
the compound fubftances, would be better exprefled' by 
the term Atom. 
£ ' 
Remark. —Againft the proof of the Antithefis which 
demonftrates the infinite divifibility of matter from the 
infinite divifibility of fpace, the monadifts have made an 
objedlion that has the evidence of Geometry againft it. 
They maintain that the principle “ Space is divifible ad 
infinitum,” is a pofition concluded from arbitrary concep¬ 
tions, and is no longer correct when we fpeak of the fpace 
that matter fills. They fupport their aflertion upon this; 
that fpace is nothing exifting of itfelf, and is that which 
determines objedfs; but is real only in fo far as objedts are 
given, and is confequently determined by them; that 
therefore a pofition derived from fomething merelyjabftradt, 
namely, the conception of pure fpace, applies by no means 
to the objedts ; but that, converfely, pofitions which are 
derived d -priori from the conception of the objedts, and 
independently of their being given in fpace, mull alfo 
neceflarily apply to the objedts in fpace. This argument 
is grounded upon the confounding of the pofition, that 
fpace is no objedt in itfelf, and only real in reference to 
given objedls, with the very incorredl pofition, that ob¬ 
jedts are the condition of fpace, and that confequently the 
matter of the objedts precedes their form. Since now, on 
the contrary. Spice is the objedtive condition of the 
things, as objedts of intuition, every thing that applies to 
fpace applies alfo to thefe objedts. The monadifts how¬ 
ever overlook the circumftance, that the queftion here 
only regards phenomena, and that the bufinefs is not to 
conceive the fimple in the conception of the compofed, but 
to difcover in the intuition of the compofed that of the 
fimple. 
If we abftradt from the intuition, we retain merely the 
conception of an objedt, namely, of the neceflary unity of 
confcioufnefs a mere thing of thought ; with regard to it, 
the Thefis is certainly corredt. For, in the conception 
of an enlis noumenon, nothing compound is given, but 
the compofition is arbitrarily thought, and confequently 
the fimple is prefuppofed. But, if the queftion regards 
an objedt of intuition, we mult not abftradt from the con¬ 
dition under which the objedt is given to us; namely, 
Space; and whatever applies to this condition mult apply 
to the conditioned alfo. 
The fecond aflertion of the Antithefis goes much far¬ 
ther than the firft. It denies entirely the exiftence of the 
fimple as an objedt of experience, whereas the former only 
gives out the appearance of the fimple, as of a conftituent 
part of the compofed. But it has a dogmatical aflertion 
againft it, which undertakes to (how by an objedt of expe¬ 
rience, namely, by my own I in the reprefentation I think, 
the abfolute fimplicity of fubftance. Now in the I, we 
have certainly a reprefentation that contains no variety, 
which indeed follows from the conception of thinking; 
but, in order to be able to fay that this I is a fimple fub¬ 
ftance, this reprefentation muft refer to fomething perma¬ 
nent in the intuition. This permanent intuition is en¬ 
tirely wanting; and moreover it is certain that it can be 
only thought podible according to the form of external 
fenfe, confequently as compofed and not as fimple. 
Third Contradiction.—Thesis. 
The Caufality, according to the laws of Nature, is not 
the only one from which the phenomena in the world 
can be derived. It is dill neceflary to a flume a Caufality 
free from nature, for the explanation of them. 
Proof.—-Let us a flume that there is no other Caufality 
but that according to the laws of Nature. Then every¬ 
thing that happens prefuppofes a Caufe of which it is the 
neceflary confequence. But the Caufality . of a Caufe is 
again fomething that has happened ; becaufe, if it had always 
exifted, its effect would not have firft arifen, but would 
alfo always have exifted. The Caufality of a Caufe cqn- 
fequently prefuppofes a (till higher Caufe, whofe Caufality 
is again fomething that has happened. If, therefore, there 
is no other Caufality than that according to the laws of 
nature, then there is no completenefs of the feries on the 
fide of the caufes which originate from one another, con¬ 
fequently no caufe on which the feries itfelf depends. 
Here, 
Antithesis. 
There is no freedom in the world; but every thing 
happens ftridtly according to the laws of Nature. 
Proof.-— For, fuppofe there is freedom, confequently a 
caufe whofe caufality (imply begins a feries ot events. 
Now every caufality is itfelf a Change, fince it is the ftate 
of the caufe in adtion, which is different from the ftate of 
the caufe not yet adting. Every change therefore pre¬ 
fuppofes a Caufe, and its Caufality of which it is the 
neceflary confequence. The caufality of Freedom , there¬ 
fore, alfo prefuppofes a Caufe, and again a Caufality. 
But, as this contradidb the conception of Freedom, its 
aflumption for the explanation of the events of Nature 
is impoflible. 
There is confequently no freedom which as a fupreme 
caufe Amply begins a feries of events, without being 
impelled 
T 
