219 
PHILOSOPHY. 
Here, then, there would be fomething that has happened, impelled to aftion by a higher Caufe; but every caufe 
which had no caufe. But this contradi&s the law of na- (lands under a higher caufe. The aflumption o ifreedom 
ture itfelf. Since now the pofition, that all caufality in is indeed a refting-place for inveftigating reafon, in order 
nature is conditioned and depends on a higher caufality, to be able to comprehend completely a feries of events ; 
contradifts itfelf in its unlimited univerfality ; it is ne- but we deceive ourfelves when we a flume it for this pur- 
cefiary to adopt, for the explanation of the events of na- pofe, becaufe it appears that the caufality of this very 
ture, an unconditioned caufality, and confequently a caufe freedom, as an event, neceflarily prefuppofes a yet higher 
that prefuppofes no other caufe. The conception ot caufe. 
Caufe, however, that Amply begins a feries of phenomena, 
is the conception of Freedom. Confequently it is ne¬ 
cefl'ary that every feries of events in the world mull end 
on the Ade of the caufes in an abfolutely lajl cahfe ; that 
is, in Freedom. 
Remark .—It is, properly fpeaking, Tranfecndental Free¬ 
dom, whole necefl'ary aflumption the Thefls has proved. 
The difficulty which Reafon finds with regard to the pfy- 
chological conception of freedom, concerns however folely 
tranfcendental freedom, that is, the poflibility of a Caufe 
which Amply begins a feries of events. Now only the 
neceflity of the aflumption of fuch a Caufe has indeed 
here been proved, in order to comprehend the origin of 
the world as the whole of the feries of phenomena: but, 
if this neceflity of the aflumption of tranfcendental freedom 
Hands firm, it comprehends alfo the poflibility of the af- 
fumption of praftical freedom as a power to begin in the 
world a feries of events; for, that the caufality of the 
afling caufe in this cafe has been preceded by a Hate of 
things, and a feries of events, produces no difficulty, be¬ 
caufe this feries is not thought as determining the a£ting 
fubjeft. Laftly, it is no objection againft the Thefis, that 
it cannot be explained how the exillence of a free caufe 
produces another exillence, becaufe that explanation 
cannot be given with regard to the caufes of Nature ; but 
we mull be fatisfied to comprehend that the Category of 
caufe renders the experience of a change necefl'ary. 
Fourth Contradiction.—Thesis. 
There exills an abfolutely-neceflary Being, who is ei¬ 
ther the Caufe of every thing that exills in the world, or 
himfelf a part of the world. 
Proof .—In the world there are changes whofe exillence 
is proved by the confcioufnefs of time, which is only pof- 
fible by changes. Now the exillence of every change is 
conditioned, becaufe it prefuppofes a CauJ'e which it fol¬ 
lows as its condition. An exillence is however condi¬ 
tioned, inafmuch as there is fomething that is its condi¬ 
tion. Now if there were no exillence that is abfolutely 
unconditioned, the conditioned could not be conditioned; 
confequently there mull be an abfolutely-neceflary Being 
whofe exillence is unconditioned. But, this being mud 
neceflarily belong to the world ; for the conditioned 
mud begin to exilt; and, before its exidence, there mud 
have been a time in which it was not; which time mud 
contain the complete ground of the conditioned exidence. 
The abfolutely-neceflary Being mud therefore be in time, 
and belong to the world, whether it be the whole feries of 
the world ora part of it. 
Remark.— It is to be obferved, that in this pofition, as 
well as in all thofe of Cofmology, the conception of the 
unconditioned is referred to an object of intuition; al¬ 
though it is immediately evident how very contradidflory 
this proceeding is, when we areconfcious that the uncon¬ 
ditioned, as an objefl of the intuition, is thought by the 
very fame Category by which we think the conditioned, 
that it mud therefore neceflarily be again conditioned. 
Hence however it follows, that the Thefis no more than 
the Antithefis can allow of a lea-p into the intelligible 
world, becaufe thereby the regrefs from the condition to 
the conditioned is annihilated, as this can only proceed 
Remark .—The Antithefis refutes the dynamical begin¬ 
ning of the world. He who then denies the mathematical 
beginning of the world, and maintains that thefubdances 
in the world have always exifted, can find no difficulty in 
this, that the change of its dates, and confequently a fe¬ 
ries of changes, has always been ; and that therefore 
there is neither a mathematical nor dynamical beginning 
of the world. The incomprehenfibility, however, that a 
feries of changes, without beginning from a firjl member, 
Ihould be entirely ended, may by another incomprehen¬ 
fibility, be made, if not more conceivable, at lead lefs af- 
tonilhing. That there are changes experience teaches ; 
but no one is able to (how how it happens that a certain 
exidence is followed by another quite different. The An¬ 
tithefis however has the merit of admitting no deviation 
from experience : for, although we grant the Faculty of 
Freedom to a being, this freedom can never be an objedl 
of experience, but only be confidered as caufa noumenon, 
in which cafe its adoption makes no difference with re¬ 
gard to the phenomena of Nature. 
Antithesis. 
There exids no abfolutely-neceflary Being, either in 
the world or out of it, as its Caufe. 
Proof .-—Let us fuppofe that there exids in the world 
an abfolutely-neceflary Being: then it would be necefl'ary 
that the feries of the changes in the world terminate on 
the fide of the conditions in an exidence which is abfo¬ 
lutely necefl'ary ; or the whole feries itfelf, of which every 
member is conditioned, mud on the whole be abfolutely 
unconditioned. As to the former, every member of a 
feries of changes is conditioned ; confequently the abfo¬ 
lutely - unconditioned exidence mud be conditioned, 
which contradicts itfelf. But, Ihould the whole feries 
itfelf exifl as abfolutely-neceflary, it mudlikewife be con¬ 
ditioned, becaufe the exidence of a whole, of which each 
member is conditioned, cannot neceflarily exid. There¬ 
fore no abfolutely-neceflary Being exids in the world. 
If, however,, there were an abfolutely-neceflary Being 
out of the world, this would then commence the feries of 
changes in the world. This Caufality of the abfolutely- 
neceffary Being would belong to the world. Theablo- 
lutely-neceffary Being out of the world, as the highell 
condition of all conditioned exidence, would belong 
therefore to the world, which contradifts itfelf; confo- 
quently, even out of the world, there exids no abfolutely- 
neceflary Being. 
Reniark .~The Antithefis pays no regard to the con¬ 
ception of the abfolutely-neceflary Being, in as far as it 
is merely a pure conception of the underdanding, and 
in as far as its exidence is maintained without a 
reference to the phenomena conditioned according to 
their exidence, and mud confequently be refuted alfo 
without reference to them. The Thefis maintains the 
exidence of the abfolutely-neceflary being merely in a coi- 
mological point of view, in order to comprehend the con¬ 
tingency of the different dates of the fubdances in the 
world ; the Antithefis denies the abfolute exidence of a 
being alfo cofmologically, in order to explain the contin¬ 
gency 
4 
