220 
PHILOSOPHY. 
S 
by means of a feries of Time, whereas the Caufality of 
the abfolutely-neceffary Being, out of the world, is alfo 
thought as not belonging to time; and thus no tranfition 
to him from a feries of time is poifible. Neverthelefs this 
leap has been made, and indeed in fuch a manner, that 
we abftra< 5 Ied from the objedf r^'en in the intuition, and 
thought by the conception the contingent; confe¬ 
quently we thought it by the pure Category of the Con¬ 
tingent, and confider ourfelves juftified in inferring from 
it an abfolu tely-neceffary Being, which is like wife thought 
by a pure Category. Contingent,'in the pure fenfe of 
the Category, is that w'hofe contradictory oppofite is pod- 
fible. When the fubftance changes, the contradictory 
oppolite of its ftate arifes; this oppofite is therefore pofli- 
ble. But in the pure fenfe of the Category, theexillence 
of this new ftate of a fubftance cannot be called contin¬ 
gent ; becaufe for this it is requilite, that the fubftance, 
in the very time in which it exifts in a certain ftate, could 
have exifted in the oppolite ; which cannot be faid of any 
fubftance. There is, confequently, only with regard to 
fubftance as phenomenon, an empirical contingency, ac¬ 
cording to which its ftates are called accidental, becaufe 
their oppolite in another time is real, and is confequently 
thought poflible. This contingency, therefore, is no 
other than that which ftands under the conditions of the 
law of Caufality, according to which every contingent 
«xiftence ftands under conditions that are again condi¬ 
tioned, and are alfo contingent. We cannot therefore 
infer, from the univerfal contingency of all theexiftences 
in the world, the abfolutely-neceffary exiftence of a be¬ 
ing out of the world ; which conclufion w'ould only then 
be valid, when the exiftence of an objefl could be thought 
by the pure Category of Contingency, which however 
contradi&s the law of Caufality. 
gency of the exiftence of the phenomena. But here this 
Angular fail takes place; that both proceed from one and 
the fame principle, in order to refute each other. The 
Thefts concludes, There is a neceffary being, becaufe the 
whole elapfed time contains the feries of all conditions. 
On the other hand, the Antithefis concludes, There is no 
neceffary being, becaufe the whole elapfed time comprifes 
the feries of all conditions. The reafon is this; in the 
proof of the Thefts, we look to theabfolute completenefs 
of the conditions, one of which determines the other in 
time, and we thereby obtain the unconditioned and necef- 
J'ary. In the Antithefis, on the other hand, we look to 
the contingency of every condition itfelf, each of which is 
determined in time; and confequently we obtain no ttnom- 
ditioncd. 
Seel. III. Of the hit eref Reafon takes in this Conflict with 
r itJW 
There are confquently no more than four Cofmological 
Ideas, becaufe there are but four modes of afeending 
from the conditioned to the condition, in fo far as it is 
thought precifely by the fame Category by which we 
think the conditioned; and we have fhown, together with 
their grounds, the aflertions and counter-affertions of 
pure Reafon with regard to its mode of thinking the 
■abfolulely unconditioned. We have, however, only applied 
ourfelves to reprefent thefe problems with their folutions 
logically, without confidermg the intereft that Reafon 
connects with them, which confideration we fhall now 
treat of beforowe proceed. * 
We foon become confcious that we take an intereft in 
the folution of thefe queftions, which is by no means 
accidental, or fuch as u-e might divert ourfelves of, and 
which in faft is quite different from that intereft which 
we take merely in truth in general. From beingoccupied 
with a fcience, an intereft gradually arifes for its truths. 
There are fciences that we call dry, becaufe the inclination 
with regard to the refults of the inveftigatiops in them 
remains entirely undetermined. Mathematics are of this 
nature. For, although the love of this fcience is able to 
engage the refiedling mind, fo much that fonie perl’ons 
confider it the greateft happinefs of their life to occupy 
themfelves with it, and take an intereft in it which other 
fciences can hardly ever produce, becaufe it is more in 
this occupation than in any other that the feeling of 
the fuperiority of the reafoning faculty is preminently 
powerful ; yet it is not indeed the fame to the mathema¬ 
tician, whether upon the whole his inveftigations lead him 
to a refult, but to what refult it is quite indifferent. 
But, if we confider the cofmological queftions by a com¬ 
panion of their oppofite folutions with our inclinations, 
it foon appears that we cannot at all be indifferent as to 
which of the two is the true one. Whether the world has 
a beginning or has always exifted; Whether, with regard 
to fpace, it is bounded or not bounded ; Whether in Nature 
there is nothing flmple, confequently my ownfelf, no 
indivifible fubftance, but every thing divisible and de- 
ftruflible; or whether, on the other hand, every fubftance 
is fimple; Whether there is Freedom, or whether every 
caufality muft be deduced from a higher one; confe¬ 
quently whether I only deceive myfelf when I fancy I a£l 
with freedom ; Whether, laftly, that which is conditioned 
according to its exiftence, leads to that which exifts in an 
unconditioned and neceffary manner;—Thefe are quef¬ 
tions that concern every rational creature, becaufe he 
connects with them a practical intereft. Reafon deter¬ 
mines objeftively his will to fulfil a law which it holds 
up to him as univerfally valid. But, that he may alfo 
fubjeftively determine himfelf to obey this law, he cannot 
wifh that this fhould be a chimera, (not imagination, for 
this it certainly is not, as it is no arbitrary invention, but 
a fad of Reafon ; ) he cannot wifh not to become a parti¬ 
cipator of happinefs when he has made himlelf deferve it 
by the faithful oblervance of the law. From the remark 
of this very natural intereft that mankind takes in thefe 
queftions, which, as is evident, is entirely in favour of the 
Thefts, it refults that, although the aflertions of thefe 
oppofite proofs have been fupported with equal ftrength 
of argument, neverthelefs the number of thofe who fup- 
port the Thefis of each Antinomy is greater than the 
number of thofe who are in favourof the Antithefis : and 
that the former, for the moft part, carry on the difpute 
with warmth, while the others refute their opponents 
with philofophical calmnefs. In the manner in which 
the defenders of the Antithefis proceed, we further 
remark a uniformity and a principle of pure empiricifm, 
fince they never forfake experience, but by it aicend from 
the conditioned to the condition. On the other hand, 
we difeover in the procedure with the Thefis a certain 
inconfiftency, fince it refers the conception of the uncon¬ 
ditioned to objeits of the intuition, yet places this con¬ 
ception fo high, that no objeft of experience can attain 
it. The Aflertions on the fide of the Thefis we will call 
the Dogmatism of pure Reafon, 
With 
