PHILO 
With regard to the Dogmatifm, we difcover, firft, a 
certain practical intereft, fince Religion feems to found 
itfelf upon its principles, and Morality under its prefup- 
pofitions appears not to be chimerical. Einpiricifm, on 
the other hand, not only feems to be deprived of this 
advantage, but really to be againft it. Secondly, Dogma¬ 
tifm agrees with the fpeculative intereft of reafon ; for, if 
we aflutne an unconditioned, then the whole feries of 
conditions receives fupport, and reafon comprehends it. 
The Empiricifm of pure reafon contains indeed alfo the 
idea of the abfolutely unconditioned; but, as it refers this 
idea to the feries itfelf, of which every member is condi¬ 
tioned, reafon has no firm point whereon to attack the 
conditioned. According to Empiricifm, before every 
time there was again a time, and every fpace prefuppofes 
another fpace; every part ftill confifts of parts; every 
caufality is only poflible by another caufality; and every 
condition of an exiftence is itfelf again conditioned. 
The Unconditioned, to which it leads, confifts in the 
abfolute totality of all the conditions, in fo far as each is 
again conditioned. On the other hand, the uncondi¬ 
tioned of the dogmatifm reprefents the abfolute totality 
of all the conditions, in fo far as by each of them fome- 
thing elfe is conditioned. Thirdly, Dogmatifm has the 
preference over Empiricifm in point of popularity, for 
common fenfe is ever accuftomed to proceed from the 
ground to the confequence; and is but little pleafed 
therefore with the invifible afcending from the confe¬ 
quence to the ground. 
The Empiricism of Pure Reafon contains nothing in 
which Reafon could take a practical intereft ; but it is not 
entirely deprived of a fpeculative intereft. For though it 
furnifhes no unconditioned, to enable us to derive from 
it that which is conditioned, it propofes however on that 
account nothing which cannot be attained in the empiri¬ 
cal regreflion. It leads indeed inceffantly from condition 
to condition, each of which is however always areal objedl 
of intuition. It is therefore more favourable to fpecula- 
tion, as it never cuts the thread of it as is done in the 
Thefis, which indeed pretends to have in the abfolute 
unconditioned an object of intuition, though this cannot 
be the cafe. We may however remark, that Empiricifm 
does not ftop here; but, as well as Dogmatifm, pretends 
to know more than it really knows, and confequently 
dogmatifes juft as well as the former; fince it not only 
conftantly diredls us (veryjuftly) to feek the condition 
of every condition, but pretends to know the abfolute to¬ 
tality of the conditions, as being all again conditioned; 
hence its refutation is poflible by the Thefis of each An¬ 
tinomy, as will be made evident in the fequel. But that 
Empiricifm fliould be quite againft the popular fide is in¬ 
deed furprifing, as one thould think that common fenfe, 
whofe whole bufinefs lies in experience, would willingly 
adopt a principle that declares experience to be the only 
region in which human reafon can extend itfelf, and that 
a departure from experience can never be allowed. 
Common fenfe, neverthelefs, gives its confent rather to 
aflfertions, which the mind molt accuftomed to thinking 
cannot comprehend, and probably on this very account, 
that the moft learned, in this cafe, knozvs no snore than the 
mafs of mankind. As it knows not what is meant by 
comprehending, it cares not that it can give no further 
account of the laft principles of itfelf. It has however a 
firm point whence it can conveniently begin ; but, on the 
other hand, it is wearied with eternally afcending from 
condition to condition. Befides,it confiders the praSlical 
intereft of more importance than any thing elfe, and ima¬ 
gines that it perceives that which its wilhes lead it to pre- 
luppofe. In this manner Empiricifm is wholly deprived 
of popularity, nor is it to be apprehended that it ever will 
gain any confideration out of the fchools. 
If, however, we imagine a man who has entirely freed 
himfelf from all intereft, he would find himlelf in a wa¬ 
vering ftate. Now he would imagine, that the human 
will is free; then again, when he refledled upon the in- 
Vol. XX. No. 1363. 
SOPHY. 221 
difloluble chain of human events, he would maintain, that 
the freedom of the will is nothing but illufion. But in 
his adlions he would proceed completely according to his 
pradlical intereft, and conftantly forget the refults of his 
{peculations. As it is an effential charadleriftic of human 
reafon not to regard this conflict with indifference, it is 
equally the duty of philofophy to fearch for the grounds 
by which it can be removed ; and it is the duty of man¬ 
kind to liften to thefe grounds, and to examine them im¬ 
partially. 
Sedl. IV. Of the Transcendental Problems of Pure 
Reason, in fo far as they mull be abfolutely refolved. 
That there are queftions, of which we mayjuftly fay, 
that they cannot at all be refolved from what has been 
given for their folution, there can be no doubt. With 
regard to the phenomena, it often happens that the data 
do notfuffice to explain them with fafety from other phe¬ 
nomena. But, if the queftion does not concern any ob¬ 
ject of experience, but belongs to the fciences that origi¬ 
nate folely in Reafon, then the pretence of the impoflibility 
of their folution is by no means admiflible; but, on the 
contrary, as Reafon itfelf is the fource of fueh a fcience, 
and as nothing in it rells upon empirical data, every 
queftion it contains mull admit of being folved; and this 
is afufficient ground not to defift from the endeavour to 
folve it, fince, however difficult and intricate the fubjefl 
may appear to be, Reafon need not wait for the affiftance 
of any thing out of its own fphere. Pure Mathematics 
and pure Morals are fciences which are not in the lead 
derived from experience. The problems which reafon 
meets with in the profecution of thefe fciences mult ne- 
cefl'arily find their folution in the very fame fource from 
which thefe fciences fpring. The integration of many 
differential formularies is not yet difcovered, but no one 
is authorifed to fay that they never can be difcovered. 
This is precifely the cafe with regard to queftions which 
concern wdiat is conformable or what is contrary to 
duty. There can be no fingle action imagined, with re¬ 
gard to which Reafon is not able to decide whether it be 
right or wrong, although it may perhaps not always be 
immediately ready with its decifion the inftant the queftion 
is propofed. 
Tranfcendental Philofophy, however, is the fcience 
whofe pofitions apply d prioi-i to objects. Pure Mathe¬ 
matics is a fcience that exills for itfelf, and has no regard 
to objedls. Its pofitions are certain beyond doubt, though 
there are no objedls that correfpond to them. With Mo¬ 
rality this is alfo the cafe. Reafon fets up a Moral Law, 
which ought to be followed, even though it never is fol¬ 
lowed. As to Tranfcendental Philofophy, its pofitions 
are not indeed empirical truths, but they refer immediately 
to objedls of empirical intuition; and the eflence of this 
philofophy confifts in explaining how they can be appli¬ 
cable a priori to objedls. But, befides thefe pofitions, 
whofe reference to objects of intuition is evident, becauie 
they render our knowledge of thefe objedls poflible, there 
is ftill, as we have already fhown, a whole fyftem of afier- 
tions of pure reafon, whofe objedlive reality does not ap¬ 
pear from that principle, and whofe objedl cannot be ex¬ 
hibited in any experience. As to the objedl of rational 
pfychology, we cannot indeed fay that it is impoflible ; 
but this we muft fay, that it cannot be given to us, confe¬ 
quently that the Categories cannot be applied to it, and 
that the connexion of the variety of fuch an objedl is not 
neceflarily reprefented by th em ; therefore no real objedl 
is thought. The poflibility of fuch an objedl means 
nothing more than the neceflary unity of confcioufnefs 
conceived problematically. The cofmological ideas, how¬ 
ever, are of that peculiar nature, that their objedls are 
coniidered as if they were in the terr tory of experience, 
and are yet never met with in the empirical lynthefis, 
which is indeed contradidlory. So much however is cer¬ 
tain, that, adhering either to the fide of the Thefis or the 
Antithefis, the idea is of fuch a nature that its objedt can 
3 L never 
