PHILOSOPHY. 
222 
never be attained in experience. For let us fuppofe that 
the world has a beginning, or that with regard to fpace it 
is bounded, there muft have been a time previous to that 
beginning, and there muft be a (pace beyond thefe bounds, 
confequently neither the beginning nor the bounds of the 
world can be experienced. And juft as little can infinite 
time or infinite (pace ever be met with in experience. All 
fubftances mutt be given in fpace, and therefore confift of 
parts. Each part is again an objeft in fpace, which alfo 
contiftsof parts which are again compofed. Confequently 
the fimple, which is not at all compofed, cannot ever oc¬ 
cur in experience, nor is the complete division ad infinitum 
any objeft of experience. Every thing that happens has 
a Caufe, but its caufality is again fomething that happens , 
and prefuppofesa Caufe. Confequently we never can find 
a Caufe, in the empirical fynthetis, whofe caufality does 
not again prefuppofe a caufe; that is, we never can expe¬ 
rience an independent caufe. To experience an infinite 
feries of events, which are dependent on each other, is alfo 
impoftible. Laftly, the exiftence of every change is con¬ 
ditioned; and we do not find in experience any exiftence 
as the firft condition of all conditioned exiftence. Juft as 
little can we experience the infinite feries of all conditioned 
exiftence. 
lienee we perceive, that the objefts of the cofinological 
ideas are no objefts of experience, notwithftanding they 
are fo reprefented, becaufe the empirical fynthefis never 
leads to luch objefts. Hence however it follows, that tiie 
obferved contradiftion with regard to thefe ideas arrfes 
not from a mifunderftanding of experience, and confe¬ 
quently that reafon itfelf muft furnifh the means to re¬ 
move this contradiftion. This conflift concerns no objeft 
of experience, and indeed nothing that is given. As it 
arifes when the totality of conditions is referred to an 
objeft, either fo far as they determine every thing con¬ 
ditioned, or as they are themfelves again conditioned ; 
attention to the procedure of Reafon, by which it attri¬ 
butes objeftive reality to its idea, will enable us to dis¬ 
cover this confiift. 
When the objeft of an idea is tranfcendental, that is, 
when it is implied in the conception of it, that it cannot 
be given, that it is confequently merely confidered as a 
noumenon, then we can neither fay of it that it is pofiible 
or impoftible. This does not however mean, that Reafon 
is unable to give a decifive anfwer with refpeft to it, be¬ 
caufe of its being enveloped in too much myftery. The 
anfwer is decifive enough, if it is explained that fuch an 
objeft cannot be thought by any one of the Categories, 
fince their objeftive validity refers only to empirical intu¬ 
ition. The thinking of fuch an objeft is confequently 
nothing more than the problematical thought of the ne¬ 
ceflary unity of confcioufnefs, which muft remain proble¬ 
matical fo long as there is nothing given, and no connex¬ 
ion of the given variety is thought as neceft'ary by the Ca¬ 
tegories. Of this kind is the conceiving of my own felf 
as of a fimple being, or of the caufe of all things, as abfo- 
1 utely neceft'ary ; fince thefe objefts are not given, confe¬ 
quently the thinking of them by any of the Categories is 
purely arbitrary. With refpeft to the cofmological ideas, 
their objeft is thought as given, though it is fti 1! ceriain 
that it never can be given. The ground of the illufion 
muft therefore lie in the ideas which mifiead us to con- 
fider the objeft of a conception as given, which never can 
be given. We muft not therefore in this cafe complain 
that the objeft is veiled from our fight, becaufe no objeft 
at all has been given to us; we fhould rather feek in the 
idea itfelf the folution of thefe difficulties. 
Seft. V. Sceptical View of the Cosmolocical Ques¬ 
tions, under the four Transcendental Ideas. 
In order to afl'ure ourfelves of the falfehood of a pofition, 
we frequently proceed by revising what confequences 
arife under the prefuppolition of its truth, and enquiring 
whether thefe do not contradift other certain pofitions. 
This is the indireft proof which is chiefly ufed in the Ma¬ 
thematics. As to our Cofmological Ideas , let us prefup- 
pofe that their objeft is really given, and fee what follows 
from this prefuppofition. If we find that, whether we 
confider as given the unconditioned of the Thefts or of 
the Antithefis, fuch an objeft will be either too great or 
too fmall for our empirical conception, (the Category 
which reprefents the neceflary unity of the empirical va¬ 
riety,) it muft follow, therefore, that the prefuppofition 
of the unconditioned, as of a given objeft, cannot occur, 
and that there is fomewhere a concealed error in our fup- 
pofing the objeft of the idea as given, which betrays itfelf 
in the confequences. 
The objeft of the cofmological ideas is looked upon as 
given ; confequently it muft, if it be really given, adapt 
itfelf to the Categories, by which alone a given objeft can 
be conceived. On the other hand, we find that it is either 
too great or too/mail for the Category, according as it is 
the given unconditioned objeft of the thefts or of the an¬ 
tithefis. 
For, if we maintain that the world has no beginning, 
then this is too great for the Category, which can never 
reprefent the infmitely-elapfed time. If we fay, the world 
has a beginning, then previous to it there was a time, 
and the Category which thinks the world with refpeft to 
time as a quantity, muft fuppofe things before the be¬ 
ginning of things. The world is therefore, fo far as it has 
a beginning, too fmall for this conception. If the world 
is unbounded with regard to fpace, then it is too great for 
this conception, which thinks it as a quantity in fpace; 
for this conception can never wholly reprefent it. But, 
if it is enclofed in bounds, there muft be a fpace furround¬ 
ing thefe bounds, and this muft be filled fpace, which 
alone can be reprefented empirically; (that is, as objeftive 
and given, as is here the cafe, and not as the form or con¬ 
dition of our external intuition;) therefore the world 
thus reprefented is too fmall for the empirical conception. 
Every objeft in fpace confifts of parts, which are again 
compofed. Yet the divifion ad infinitum can never be 
completely reprefented; and this objedt is therefore too 
great for the empirical conception, which can never reach 
it. If we maintain, on the other hand, that every fubftance 
in fpace is compofed of fimple parts, then is the fimple too 
fmall for the Category of the matter of objefts, becaufe, 
as an objeft in fpace, it again prefuppofes parts. 
If every thing that happens in the world happens ac¬ 
cording to the law of nature, agreeably to which fomething 
elfe nuift always have preceded it, then the empirical con¬ 
ception-can never attain this objeft, which is too great for 
it. If we fuppofe, however, that every feries of events 
begins from a caufe which prefuppofes no previous one, 
then this objeft is too fmall for the Category, becaufe, ac¬ 
cording to it, every caufality is again an event that pre¬ 
fuppofes another Caufe. 
If we afiurae an infinite feries of conditioned exiftence, 
then this objeft is too great for the empirical conception. 
On the other hand, the objeft of an unconditioned and 
neceflary exiftence, as the chief condition of all condition¬ 
ed exiftence, is too fmall for the empirical conception. 
For this ftill enquires neceflarily after the condition of 
this chief condition. 
In all thefe cafes we have faid, that the objeft, to which 
th'e cofmological idea refers as fomething given, is either 
too great or too [mail for the Category. The reafon why 
we have not exprefled ourfelves converfely, and faid, that 
the Category is too great or too fmall for the cofmological 
idea, is the following. We fay of a thing that exifts on 
account of another, that this is too great or too fmall for 
that: for inftance, that the coat is too long or too fhort 
for the man, and not the man too fhort or too tall for the 
coat; becaufe the coat is for the man, and not the man 
for the coat. Now an objeft is thought in the intuition 
by the Category. If the Underftanding, therefore, is to 
be able to think fomething as a given objeft, this objeft 
muft fuit its conceptions, whereas this fomething is no 
objeft of intuition if it agree not with thefe conceptions. 
i Confequently, 
