224 PHILO 
given: but it is not pofiible for me to think an infinite 
leries of caufes which can never be attained by the empi¬ 
rical regrefs, and juft as little a Caufe which pre-fuppofes 
no other caufe (and which yet muft be met with in the 
empirical fynthefis) as a given objeft. 
Hence it follows, that in the major of the fyllogifm the 
condition is merely taken in the conception of the necef- 
iary unity, but not as any thing given; whereas, in the 
minor, the conditioned is thought as an objeft of expe¬ 
rience; confequently this diale&ical conclufion is that 
which we call jbphifmafigures didionis. This deception is 
not however artificial: for, if we abftraft from the intu¬ 
ition of a given conditioned, and retain in our mind 
nothing but a conception, which pretends to refer to an 
object; then it is juft as necefiary to pre-fuppofe the 
completenefs of the conditions as it is necefiary to do fo 
with the premifes of a fyllogifm. We however overlook, 
that the major only is correft in this refpeft ; and as we 
underftand in the minor , by the conditioned, the pheno¬ 
mena whofe condition is alfo given in the intuition, the 
completenefs of whofe conditions can never be given ; we 
imperceptibly extend the conception of the conditioned 
in the major, and apply it alfo to the phenomena. 
Hereby, however, fo much is evident, that the proofs 
of the Thefis, as well as of the Antithefis, are both de¬ 
fective, fince they both refer to the above-mentioned 
dialeCtical conclufion. The difpute itfelf, however, is not 
by this means finithed, fince the invalidity of a ground of 
demonftration does not neceflarily imply the poflibility of 
the thing itfelf, and fince it appears certain that one of the 
two afiertions, the world either has a beginning or it has 
not, muft be true if the other is falfe. In order, therefore, 
to fettle this difpute, it is ftill necefiary to (how that it is 
a difpute about nothing, fince thefe pofitions are not con¬ 
tradictorily oppofite, and therefore may be both falfe at 
the fame time. 
If we fay of a body it either has a good fmell or a bad 
fmell, a third cafe may occur, for it may have no fmell at 
all. The oppofition of the two judgments is not contra¬ 
dictory, but it happens per difparata: they may therefore 
be both done away with, without any contradiction 
arifing. If we mean by the world a given whole of tilings 
in themfelves, then the judgments, the ivorld is finite, and 
the world is not finite, are contradictorily oppofite, and 
one of the two muft neceflarily be true, if the other be 
falfe. If, however, the world is not a whole of things in 
themfelves, but is firft of all reprefented in the empirical 
fynthefis as given, both pofitions may be falfe, and the op¬ 
pofition need no longer be contradictory. For, if I con¬ 
fider the world as a whole of things in themfelves, the 
predicates finite and infinite are indeed empty conceptions; 
but, for the very reafon that neither of them is repre¬ 
fented in any intuition, the one is the contradictory op¬ 
pofite of the other. But, if the world is a whole of phe¬ 
nomena,it is neither finite nor infinite (in time and (pace); 
for it is confidered as given in the empirical fynthefis, 
but not previous to it. The fame takes place with the 
other cofmological afiertions. With regard to a thing in 
itfelf, that which is not Ample is the contradictory oppo¬ 
fite of the fimple, becaufe both conceptions are empty 
without a reference to a given objeCt in the intuition. 
The objeCt given in the external intuition, however, con- 
fifts neither of Ample nor of infinitely-many parts: not 
the former, becaufe the fynthefis of the given neceflarily 
proceeds from part to part; nor the latter, becaufe even 
this decompofing fynthefis can never complete the infinite. 
The parts of a body cannot be thought prior to the fyn- 
tliefis, but firft of all as given in it. If we hold the afl'er- 
rions of the Thefis and Antithefis to be contradictorily 
oppofed, then we confider the world as a whole of things 
in themfelves; but, if we take it for a whole of phenome 
na, then both afiertions are at the fame time falfe, becaufe 
they reft upon the pre-fuppofition that this world is ftiil 
thought prior to the fynthefis as a fomething given in the 
intuition ; and they ftill allow this third afiertion, that 
SOPHY. 
the world as an objeCl of intuition is not thought prior, 
but in its fynthefis. 
We have therefore removed the Antinomy of Pure 
Reafon, by (bowing that it is no real contradiction, but 
only a dialectical one, and a confliEt of appearances ; 
whereby is eftablifiied the foundnefs of the proofs both of 
the Thefis and Antithefis of thefe Antinomies. As how¬ 
ever Critical Idealism has furnifhed the Key to this 
folution, it is alfo an indirect proof of the correCtnefs of 
this fyftem. The following dilemma contains this indirect 
proof: If the world is an exifting whole in itfelf, then it 
is either finite or infinite. Now it is neither finite nor in¬ 
finite ; confequently the world cannot be a given whole 
in itfelf, but can only be thought in tiie fynthefis as given, 
therefore only as a Whole of Phenomena. 
SeCt. VIII. A regulative Principle of ture Reason 
with refpeCt to the Cofmological Ideas. 
The conflict of pure Reafon arifes therefore from the 
illufion that leads us to fancy the objeCts of intuition as 
really given before the empirical fynthefis, and our confe¬ 
quently taking the phenomena for the things in themfelves. 
This conflict isfolved as foon as we underftand that objeCts 
can only firft be thought as given in the empirical regref- 
fion and not prior to it; which is as much as to fay, that 
the given objeCts in Time and Space are not the things in 
themfelves, but only phenomena (appearances), that is, 
objeCts of intuition, and that out of the intuition they 
are nothing. Hence it follows that the cofmological prin¬ 
ciple of Reafon cannot be a confiitutiveprinciple, by which, 
as by an axiom, we (hould be led to confider the totality of 
the conditions of a given conditioned as itfelf given. It 
is merely a regulative principle which bids us not to ftop 
at any condition given in the intuition, but conftantly to 
feek again its condition among the objeCts of intuition. 
It is a rule that pofiulatcs what is to be done by us in the 
regreflive fynthefis, but not a principle that anticipates, and 
declares what is given in the objeCt in itfelf prior to the 
regreflion. Accordingly we can neither fay, that theferies 
of conditions requifite to a given conditioned is finite , nor 
that it is infinite, becaufe we (hould then have in thought 
in both cafes a given independently of the empirical lyn- 
thefis, though prior to it nothing can be thought as given. 
Confequently the idea of the regrejjive fynthejis will only 
preferibea rule, according to which it proceeds from the 
conditioned to the condition in the intuition ; but no 
rule ever to attain the abfolutely-unconditioned, which 
never can be attained in experience. 
Notwithftanding it is certain that the regreflion from 
the conditioned to the condition can never be thought as 
ended, there is, however, with refpeCt to it, a very re¬ 
markable diftinfiion. The mathematician (peaks of a 
progreflion ad infinitum. The philofopher, on the con¬ 
trary, will only allow the exprefiion of a progreflion in in - 
definitum. We will endeavour to determine thefe concep¬ 
tions correflly with reference to our objeft. 
If we underftand by the regreflion in infinitum the pro¬ 
cedure from the conditioned to the condition in fo far as 
we can continue it without ceafing, this takes place in 
reference to all the cofmological ideas. In this fenfe we 
exprefs ourfelves quite correftly when we fay that a ftraight 
line may be produced to the infinite, though the geome¬ 
trician means by the exprefiion, to lengthen a line to the 
infinite, only the drawing of it to an undeterminable 
diftance. We alfo fpeak correftly when we fay, that from 
one pair of progenitors to a preceding a regreflion to the 
infinite may take place, becaufe we have no realon to ftop 
at any member, and we may therefore think that this feries 
really has no beginning. 
But we eafily remark, that, notwithftanding in all cafes 
the unconditioned of the cofmological idea can never be 
attained by the regreflion ; and that the fynthefis may be 
continued without end, yet in another refpeft they are 
not identical. For this regreflion may proceed indeed to 
any member whatever; but, though the empirical fyn- 
tlielis 
