226 
PHILO 
all compofition is annihilated ; and, as it is no longer 
com po fed, it muft be fun pie. The proof of the Thefis 
of this Antinomy is therefore quite correfl, when the 
given in the intuition is reprefented as a thing in itfelf, 
and its divifion as independent of the empirical regreffion. 
The proof of the Antithefis regards folely this regreffion, 
and finds that it muft inceffantly proceed. It concludes 
quite correftly that the permanent in the intuition con- 
fifts not of Ample parts, becaufe the objeft in the intui¬ 
tion is a phenomenon, and not a thing in itfelf; but, in the 
alfertion that the whole con fills of infinitely-many parts, it 
falls into the fame error as the proof of the Thefis, name¬ 
ly, that it deviates from the empirical regreffion, and 
Confiders the objedl of the intuition as a thing in itfelf. 
But it is quite otherwife with a whole, which is thought 
as a difcrele quantity. As to the divifion of a body in 
general, it goes to the infinite, becaufe the parts themfelves 
are firlt given in the regreffion, and not prior to it. But, 
if the parts concern a membered whole, it is this concep¬ 
tion of the being membered by which the whole is repre¬ 
fented as a difcrete quantity, that is, fuch a one whofe 
parts are already thought as given in the intuition, prior 
to the empirical regreffion. Of fuch a whole it cannot 
therefore be faid, that its divifion goes to the infinite; 
but, on the contrary, we muft fay that the membered 
parts muft admit of being ex prefled by a number. The 
divifion ad infinitum only concerns the continued quan¬ 
tity whofe parts are not given prior to the decompofition ; 
but the dijcrete quantity is confidered as already divided 
prior to the regreffion, and it may therefore become the 
objeft of experience to feek the number of the parts of 
a membered whole. Though the divifion, however, does 
rot in this cafe proceed to the infinite, yet we may think 
that the regreffion to infinity of a continued quantity is 
always accompanied by organization, and that confe- 
quently it may be a (fumed that a quantum may be divi¬ 
ded into members ad infinitum , but not that it really is 
membered to infinity. 
Concluding Remark to the Solution of the Mathematically 
Transcendental Ideas, and Preliminary Remark to the 
Solution of the Dynamically Tranfcendental Ideas. 
As we endeavour to give the complete number of the 
Cofmological Ideas, according to the clue of the Catego¬ 
ries, we ('defied thofe Categories as fit for our intuition 
by which an objeft is thought as conditioned, and the 
condition is alfo thought by the v-ry fame Category. 
This proceeding was merely the hypothetical fynthefis, 
which takes place in the pro-fyllogifm of Hypothetical 
Conclufions of Reafon. In this manner a feries arofe, in 
which all the members in this refpefl were of the fame 
kind, being thought by the fame Category, and in which 
therefore no unconditioned objefl could be met with. 
From this confideration, it appeared that the uncondi¬ 
tioned objefl of Reafon never fuited the Category, and 
that the unity of Reafon could not be attained by the 
Underttanding. 
Now, as we derive the Cofmological Ideas from the ex- 
teniion of the Categories to the unconditioned, we have 
noticed the difference of the Mathematical and Dynamical 
Categories, and have alfo accordingly divided thefe ideas 
themfelves into the clafs of the Mathematical and Dyna¬ 
mical; however we had no occafion to make life of this 
diftinflion. The regreffion from the conditioned to the 
condition is with regard to all the Cofmological Ideas 
quite the fame; namely, it is the Hypothetical Synthefis, 
and confequently the Condition is always thought by the 
very fame Category by which we think the conditioned. 
But the fynthefis of the Category itfelf is in the Mathema¬ 
tical and Dynamical very different from each other, as 
we have already fhown. In the former it is the fynthefis 
of the homogeneous; in the latter that of the heterogeneous. 
Now, as to the fynthefis in the regreffion, (the hypothe¬ 
tical one,) it is certainly quite correft, that, With regard 
to the Dynamical Ideas, no leap from the objects of in- 
4 - 
SOPH Y. 
tuition into a mere intellectual world can take place. In 
all cafes the conditioned is a phenomenon, and the condi¬ 
tion is likewife neceflarily an objetl given in the empiri¬ 
cal intuition. However, as the fynthefis in the dynami¬ 
cal ideas is that of the heterogeneous, it is here poffible 
to think the condition of a conditioned given in the in¬ 
tuition, merely by the thought of the objective unity, 
(though only problematically ;) confequently as a thing 
in itfelf. Notwithftanding that the Antinomy of Pure 
Reafon has its origin alfo with regard to thefe ideas in 
this, that the feries of the conditions is thought as al¬ 
ready given previous to the.regreffion, whereas it is firft of 
all given in the regreflion itfelf, (till there will here be a 
poffible cafe for the objective reference of thefe ideas, 
though it may only be problematical. In the mathemati¬ 
cal fynthefis, I proceed from one empirical fpace to ano¬ 
ther, and from one empirical time to another. Here 
therefore is no determination of the exiftence of a pheno¬ 
menon, but only a determination of its place in Time and 
Space; the queftion therefore can only refer to pheno¬ 
mena, according to the nature of this fynthefis. In the 
Dynamical Synthefis, on the contrary, the exiftence of a 
phenomenon is determined. Now, though the hypotheti¬ 
cal fynthefis here likewife cannot quit the feries of pheno¬ 
mena, yet it is permitted to place a thing in itfelf out of 
that feries by which the exiftence of a phenomenon is de¬ 
termined, which however as an objeft of the intuition is 
only knowable as to its exiftence by the hypothetical fyn¬ 
thefis, which preceeds from phenomenon to phenomenon. 
The Antinomy of Reafon arifes, when the unconditioned 
is placed in the feries of the phenomena. Now, if it is 
placed without it, neither the Thefis nor Antithefis con¬ 
tradict this fuppofition, and both admit then of being 
united, as will loon be fhown. 
3. Solution of the Cofmological Idea of the Totality of the 
Derivation of the Events of the World from their Caufes. 
That every thing that happens has a Caufe, is a law of 
Nature, from which as a rule a priori no exception is pof¬ 
fible. The Caufality of a Caufe is however likewife fome- 
thing that has happened, becaufe, if it had always been, 
its effect alfo would not have merely arifen now. The 
Caufality of a Caufe therefore neceflarily prefuppofes 
again a Caufe; and there is therefore from every event a 
regreflion, which muft he called a regreffion ad infinitum, 
and which can never attain an abfolutely firft member. 
Freedom, on the other hand, is a power to begin a. Hate 
of itfelf, whofe caufality therefore prefuppofes no other. 
Freedom, in this fenfe, is a pure tranfcendental idea, formed 
to comprehend the totality of a feries of objefts in expe¬ 
rience, of which the one is the condition of the other, but 
which totality itfelf has not been borrowed from experi¬ 
ence, and whofe objefl cannot be given in any experience, 
fince every caufality given in experience neceflarily pre r 
fuppofes another caufality. Now, though this is indeed 
only the creature of Reafon, yet it is neceflary to recur to 
it,if we confider the feries of events as already given be¬ 
fore the regreffion. The Antithefis of this Antinomy, 
which on the contrary merely regards the regreffion, re¬ 
marks that this regreffion cannot ceafe at any member, 
and very properly denies Freedom. It only again com¬ 
mits this fault, that it gives out the feries of events fuIn¬ 
ordinate to each other as infinite, which is only poffible 
by conceiving it as already given before the regreffion. 
Practical Liberty is- founded upon the t ran fee n.- 
dental; fo that, if the poffibility of the objeftive refe¬ 
rence has been proved, we may alfo grant the exiftence of 
objects which are endowed w’ith the former power. This 
practical liberty is the independence of the Will on the 
compulfion of fenfual defircs. A Will is fenfual when it 
is pathologically affefted. It is called brutal, when it is ne¬ 
ceflarily determined by thofe motives; that is, when it 
can be pathologically neceffitated. The human Will is 
indeed a fenfitive Will, not a brutal Will, but free, be¬ 
caufe Senfe does not make its actions neceflary, but a fa¬ 
culty 
