PHILO 
cutty is given to man to determine hitnfelf, independent¬ 
ly of the compulfion of the Senfes. Now, if all caufality 
were merely that according to the laws of nature, there 
could be no freedom in the practical fenfe of the word. 
By the tranfcendental idea of Liberty is underftood that 
Caufality which abfolutely commences a feries of events, 
and which reafon creates to itfelf, in order to give cotn- 
pletenefs to each feries of this kind in the fenfible world. 
If'this were impoffible, then we cannot grant to any indi¬ 
vidual a faculty of performing any aftion, without having 
been determined to it by a caufe that lies in the fenfible 
world. 
We (hall (how the way in general in which we can 
prove the poffibility of the objeftive reference of this 
idea, whofe reality however cannot in any manner be 
proved. If we think a feries of events as completed and 
confequently as given before the regreffion, then we con- 
(ider the objefts of the intuition as things in themfelves. 
In this way, then, the Antinomy of Reafon is unavoida¬ 
ble, and it is impoffible to remove it. But, by difcover- 
ipg its origin, we find alfo the very fame folution as that 
of the two firft cofmological ideas. For we (liould fay 
quite correftly, in a negative manner, of a feries of events 
given in the fenfible world, that there is no abfolutely 
firll member, that is, no caufe that begins to ait of itfelf; 
and we (hould correftly fay, in a pofitive manner, of the 
regreffion, that it proceeds to the indefinite. In this we 
fhould have declared fomething which applies to objefts 
only fo far as they are objefts in experience. But now 
we remark, that, as the fynthefis in the Category of Cau¬ 
fality (of Caufe and Effeft) is the fynthefis of the hetero¬ 
geneous, (though in the hypothetical regreffion the cau¬ 
fality of the Caufe is an Eft’eft, and confequently homo¬ 
geneous with the given effeft,) an event may be thought 
as the effeft of a free-acting Caufe in fo far as we think 
its caufality merely by the pure Category, confequently 
as a thing in itfelf. By adopting Liberty as the faculty of 
a being in fo far as its caufality is a thing in itfelf, we (hall 
by no means fall into an Antinomy. For we do not 
thereby contradict the Law of Nature, Caufality, but only 
determine that it is a rule to which the objefts of experi¬ 
ence are neceffarily fubjefted ; and that confequently, in 
fo far as an event is an objeft of experience, the regreffion 
in the feries of its Caufes has no end, but that neverthe- 
lefs the very fame event can be diftinftly thought by a 
Caufality which does not again prefuppofe another Cau¬ 
fality, in fo far as this Caufality is no objeft of experi¬ 
ence, but a thing in itfelf. The very fame event may 
therefore have arifen, in different refpefts, both from Na¬ 
ture and from Freedom, fo that it is perhaps nocorreftly 
disjunftive pofition, that every event has either arifen 
from Nature or from Liberty. 
Poffibility of Caufality by means of Liberty, in union with 
the univerfal law if the Necejjity of Nature. 
We call that, in objefts of intuition, which does not be¬ 
long to the intuition, intellectual. Now, if we apply to 
an objeft in experience a faculty that is no objeft of ex¬ 
perience, that is, whofe caufality is not under the condi¬ 
tion of time, hut whofe effefts are phenomena, then we 
confider this caufality under two points of view ; as intel- 
le&ual, according to which it is itfelf no event, and dees 
not belong to experience; and as fenfible, according to 
which its effefts are objefts of experience. In this way 
we fhould not adopt any thing that contradifts the law 
of experience. This refts upon the pofition, that foine- 
thing forms the foundation to the objefts of experience 
which itfelf is no objeft of experience, of which however 
the poffibility cannot be denied. This thing in itfelf, 
which Reafon is naturally difpofed to give to the pheno¬ 
mena as their foundation, cam indeed be thought only by 
the notion of the objeftive unity. It cannot, however, 
be decided whether it contains anything correfpondingto 
the. Categories; though the contrary can be juft as little 
maintained. It is confequently conceivable, that a being, 
SOPHY. 227 
in as far as it is, according to its caufality, a thing in it¬ 
felf, produces effefts that are objefts of experience, of 
which the Underftanding feeks the Caufe according to the 
law of experience, confidering its caufality, in the fame 
manner, as alfo an event; without attaining, in this em¬ 
pirical regreffion, any end. For this faculty is entirely 
laced out of the fenfible world; experience is therefore 
y no means interrupted by it, but only confidered in re¬ 
lation to it. 
The caufality of an afting Caufe mu ft be fubjeft to a 
rule, which applies as well to that which is merely an ob¬ 
jeft ofthe pure Underftanding as to that which,asan event 
itfelf,jis given in experience. The ground of this is, that 
it is thought as an objeft which is the conception 
of fomething neceffarily connefted. This rule we 
(hall call the Character of Caufality. We may therefore 
diftinguifh in a Caufe a twofold charafter; an empirical 
one, which is the law derived from experience itfelf, ac¬ 
cording to which law a Caufe operates and Caufality de¬ 
termines to aftion; and an intelligible one, which belongs 
to it inafmuch as it is a thing in itfelf, which charafter is 
by no means to be known by experience, andean only be 
known, if at all, by pure reafon. 
According to its empirical charafter, a thing would be 
an objeft of experience, and fo cohere with other objefts 
of experience ; but, according to its intelligible charafter, 
it would be a thing in itfelf, whofe effefts are indeed given 
as phenomena, and whole intelligible charafter can per¬ 
haps be comprehended h priori, but whofe caufality is no 
event in the Senfible World, and nothing given. Of this 
Caufality we may juftly fay, that it does not at all com¬ 
mence to be, becaufe it does not at all ftand under the 
conditions of time, which can only apply to a Caufality 
that is thought conformably to an empirical charafter. 
The Effefts, as belonging to the fenfible world, would ne- 
verthelefs be confidered in a relation to this intelligible 
Caufe. It would be neceffary to derive them as phenomena, 
agreeably to the empirical charafter of the rational being, 
from a preceding fiate of that being; and yet it would be 
poffible to conceive the whole feries of thefe phenomena 
as founded in an intelligible fubjlratum. Liberty and Na¬ 
ture would thus be found co-exiftent, and without con- 
tradiftion in the very fame aftions, each, in its complete 
fignification, according as it is compared either with its 
Intelligible or Senfible Caufe. 
Illujlration of the Cofmological Idea of Freedom in connex¬ 
ion with the univerfal Necejfity of Nature. 
If we wifh to prove the poffibility of the objeftive va¬ 
lidity of this idea, we muft take care not to place its 
objefts in the feries of the objefts of intuition. It is a law 
of experience that has no exception, that Every thing that 
happens has a Caufe. Now if the free Caufe were an 
objeft of experience, which the hypothetical fynthefis 
might perhaps forne time or other meet with, and whofe 
caufality itfelf would of courfe be an event; then this 
fynthefis mult, agreeably to its nature, neceffarily enquire 
after another caufality which has produced the free caula- 
l:ty, and muft neceffarily prefuppofe a caufe of the free 
caufe. Freedom, therefore, as an objeft of experience, 
would not be Freedom. 
If, on the other hand, we refer the feries of events 
given in the empirical regreffion, as a whole of phenomena, 
to a Caufality out of this feries, then we avoid the contra- 
diftion which we meet with in the former cafe. It is true 
that we cannot underftand the poffibility of this Caufality, 
which does not ftand under the conditions of Time, of 
which therefore we cannot fry that it is an Event. But 
this need not furprife us. The poffibility of an objeft is 
underftood when it is confidered agreeably to the laws of 
experience. The Caufality of a free Caufe is however not 
given in experience, confequently we cannot find more in 
its conception than we have placed in it. We therefore 
do not indeed underftand the poffibility of Freedom, nor 
is its adoption in a cofmological refpeft at all ferviceable 
for 
