230 PHILO 
netted with the objett itfelf, that of continued moral 
improvement. To thefe Ideals we cannot indeed attri¬ 
bute objettive reality, neither is it delirable, becaufe it 
is to be feared that the natural limits of an objett of 
intuition may not be adapted to this Ideal itfelf; but 
neverthelefs they are not to be confidered as phantoms of 
the imagination, becaufe they may ftill poffefs prattical 
reality. 
Sett. II. Of the Transcendental Ideal, (Prototypon 
tranfcendentale.) 
Under the general view of tranfcendental ideas we have 
fliown, that the procedure of Reafon in the profyllogifm 
of the disjunctive conclufion is the fame as that which it 
employs in order to attain the unconditioned that is 
thought as the higheft condition of the poflibility of all 
objedts. If I determine an objett with refpett to a con¬ 
ception, I reprefent to myfelf its fphere; and, fince I 
choofe between any part of this fphere and its contra¬ 
dictory oppofite, I attribute that one to the objett. To 
take an objett which we think by a conception, from a 
part of its fphere, is the fame as placing it in another; 
and this takes place by means of a disjunctive conclufion. 
Hence it is obvious that there is a difference between the 
determination of an objett with refpett to a conception 
by means of a tranfcendental negation, and the determi¬ 
nation of a conception by means of the merely logical 
negation. The latter negation concerns folely the rela¬ 
tion of one conception to another. Though I oppofe 
negatively the one conception to the other, ftill the latter 
is by no means affirmatively determined on its own 
account, but I thereby alfo oppofe negatively the latter 
to the former. Neither of the two conceptions Mortal 
and Immortal, taken feparately, expreffes either affirma¬ 
tion or negation, but only in their mutual relation the 
one negates the other. With tranfcendental negation, 
by which I determine an objett in regard to a conception, 
it is otherwife. By this is expreffed,in the non-exilfence 
in itfelf, a want of reality. A Conception is a reprefen- 
tation which refers to many objetts; confequently it 
comprehends a certain portion of reality; and an objett 
is determined in regard to it, when a particular portion 
of the collettive reality that the conception comprehends 
is affigned to it, and the reft denied. In order to think 
an objett as thoroughly determined, it is therefore necef- 
fary to confider the collettive reality in general (not 
merely that comprifed in a conception) as given, and to 
determine the objett by attributing to it a certain portion 
of this reality. The negations by which we determine 
it, prefuppofe the oppofite realities, without which they 
could not be thought, and confequently objetts could 
not be determined by them. For inftance, in order to 
attribute poverty to an objett, we muft be able to think 
the oppofite reality, riches. 
Reafon therefore, while it is engaged in determining 
each objett, not only with refpett to the realities which 
are peculiar to it, but alfo in regard to all negations, or 
thofe realities which it does not poffefs, creates to itfelf 
the idea of an omni-reality, (omnitudo realitatis.) In fo 
far as it confiders this as given, it is capable of thinking 
each objett as determined folely by the limitation of this 
collettive reality. 
But the reprefentation of a fingle being, as uniting all 
reality in itfelf, is indeed the molt determined conception 
that we can have of an objett. For the reafon why the 
reprefentation of a fingle objett, notwithftanding it is 
thoroughly determined as to its reality, neverthelefs 
remains undetermined, is the want of reality which cannot 
be thought if its oppofite reality is not conceived. Now, 
in fo far as in the omni-reality all reality is reprefented as 
united, its reprefentation is not determined'by any nega¬ 
tions. But this thoroughly-determined conception is 
alfo the ground of the thorough determination of the 
conception of every objett ; confequently this conception 
is a tranfcendental ideal, and is properly the only one of 
SOPHY. 
which human reafon is capable, becaufe, though it is a 
univerfal conception of a thing, it neverthelefs thoroughly 
determines itfelf, and is the reprefentation of an indivi¬ 
dual. 
In this manner, then, the conception of every objett 
different from the molt real objett may be reprefented as 
derived from it, fo that this difference is placed folely in 
the different limitations of this totality of reality, in the 
fame manneras every figure arifes by means of the limita¬ 
tion of univerfal fpace. As to the exiftence of this being, 
reafon is in regard to it in complete ignorance. It is only 
the relation of an Idea to Conceptions which we have 
obtained, but not the relation of a real thing to other 
given objetts. This objett then of the ideal of Reafon, 
which is difcoverablein reafon alone, is called the original 
being (ens originarium), becaufe the conception of every 
other objett is confidered as derived ftora this idea. It is 
termed the highejl being (ens fummum), in fo far as it has 
none above it; and it is called the being of beings (ens en- 
tium), in fo far as every thing ftands under it as being 
conditioned. It muft alfo be confidered as fimple, becaufe 
its conception forms the foundation to the reprefentation 
of every other being. 
So far as this being, however, is confidered as a fingle 
thing fubfifting of itfelf, it cannot be reprefented as an 
aggregate derived from many beings. The derivation of 
the poffibility of all things would therefore be the deriva¬ 
tion of a ground, and not that of a part from a whole. 
The reality of the objetts of intuition muft be confidered 
not as a part, but as a confequence of the higheft reality. 
Therefore we ftiall be able to determine the original being 
by the mere conception of the higheft reality, as one, 
fimple, allJ'efficient, eternal, fyc. in fliort, in all his uncon¬ 
ditioned completenefs by means of all its predicaments. 
The conception of fuch a being as that of God, in a tranf¬ 
cendental fenfe; and thus the Ideal of pure reafon is the 
objett of tranfcendental Theology. 
If we reflctt upon this procedure, by which Reafon 
arrives at thefe laft determinations of the omni-reality, 
we find that thereby the tranfcendental view has been, 
properly fpeaking, overftepped. For this required folely 
the conception of the molt perfett reality, in order to be 
able to think every objett with refpett to its negations ; 
but by no means that this perfett reality unites in one 
being, and ftill lefs that it is to be thought as the fource 
of all reality in experience. How comes reafon, then, to 
form to itfelf an Ideal in the manner defcribed, which, 
as we perceive, cannot be of any tranfcendental ufe to it, 
and neverthelefs to perfuade itfelf, that it has followed a 
tranfcendental principle ? The anfwer is eafy after the 
inveftigation of tranfcendental Analytics. For it is per¬ 
fectly right, that is, neceflary, in order to think determi- 
nately each objett of experience, to prefuppofe all poflible 
reality (as an objett of intuition), becaufe, with refpett to 
the want of reality, it can only be thought determinately 
under this condition. This complete reality is not 
given in any intuition, it is only propofed to feek it. The 
more the empirical fynthefis is extended, the more deter¬ 
mined is the conception of each objett. Now if we over¬ 
look the difference between the objetts of intuition and 
objetts fo far as they are not intuited, then we fall into 
the error of miftaking this complete reality that is to be 
fought in experience/or a thing in itfelf; and, as we did 
fo in a tranfcendental point of view, (that is, prefuppofed 
the complete reality as given in experience,) we thought 
ftill to do the fame with intelligible objetts, and have 
made the Ideal tranfcendent. We therefore perfmify 
thefe ideas, by changing dialettically the dijlributive unity 
of the experimental ufe of Underftanding, which invefti- 
gates the reality in experience, in order to be able to 
limit it by negations, into the collective unity of a whole 
of experience; and by uniting in this manner all the 
realities in experience, which are only to be fought by 
degrees, and can only be confidered as difperfed into a 
fingle thing, which, according to the ufual confounding 
