PHILOSOPHY. 
231 
of the things in thenifelves with the objects of intuition, we 
take for a thing in itf'e 1 f, in order to derive from it the 
poflibility of all things, as from a ground. 
Seft. III. The Arguments of Speculative Iieafon for the 
exijtence of a Higheft Being. 
However natural the courfe of Reafon may be in arriv¬ 
ing at the idea of all-reality, fince only by its prefuppo- 
fition can we think determinately of each objeft with 
refpeft to its negations; nay, however imperceptible the 
ftep from a merely tranfcendental prefuppofition to the 
adoption of a tranfcendent objeft may be; yet it muft be 
obvious that it has neverthelefs only made an adoption, 
and that it has not by this means at all perceived the 
exiftence of fuch a being, that comprifes all reality in 
itfelf, and from which muft be derived every particular 
reality. Reafon confiders the adoption of this being as 
neceffary, not only in a fpeculative but even in a praftical 
view, fince without it the law of morality, though it is a 
praftical principle hpriori, would have the appearance of 
a chimera. It finds itfelf, therefore, compelled to affure 
itfelf of this exiftence by a proof. 
Now, if we take as a foundation of inveftigation any 
change given in experience, the empirical fynthelis pro¬ 
ceeds from this change to its condition, which can only 
be thought by the conception of the Caufe. Its 
caufality is again a change, confequently again only a 
conditioned exiftence. Notwithftanding in this manner 
an unconditioned exiftence is never found, reafon never¬ 
thelefs overlooks, fo far as it feeks a refting-place, this 
very peculiarity of the empirical fynthefis, and confiders 
the exiftence of an abfolutely-neceffary being as a pod i ft i- 
cally certain. Having convinced itfelf of this, it now 
only wants a conception by which it can determinately 
think this neceffarily-exifting being.' Among all con¬ 
ceptions, there is, however, none w'hich is fo thoroughly 
determined by itfelf, as the conception of all reality (omni¬ 
reality), fince all other conceptions are, on account of 
their negations, undetermined. There feems, therefore, 
no other means, in order to be able to think the abfolute- 
ly-neceffary being as determined, than to apply to it all- 
reality, and to think confequently the ens necejfarium at 
the lame time as the ens realijjimum. This is the defcrip- 
tion of the courfe ofcommon lenfe, on which it endeavours 
to affure itfelf of the exiftence of the moll real being. 
If we illuftrate this procedure, no one can help making 
the remark, that, though we allow the conclulion of an 
unconditioned neceffary exiftence, (which however, as we 
have already (liown, cannot reft upon any tranfcendental 
principle,) yet all objettive ground for the tranfition from 
the exiftence of the neceffary being to its omni-reality is 
wanting, and that this tranfition is effefted folely by a 
fubjettive ground, namely, a voluntary determination. 
Now, as the proof of the exiftence of God is not fo mani- 
feft that common fenfe could eafily difcover it, we have 
reforted to fpeculation. 
Thus there are but three modes of demonftration. We 
lay as a foundation either a determined exiftence, namely, 
that of the fenfible world conftrufted for wife purpofes, 
and conclude, according to the law of Caufality, that 
there is a commenfurate Caufe; or we lay as a foundation 
the experience of an undetermined exiftence, namely, only 
of fomething in general that exifts in a conditioned man¬ 
ner ; or laltly we abJlraEl from all experience, and conclude 
wholly from mere conceptions that there exifts a moll 
real being of all. The firft proof is the Phyfico-lhcological, 
the fecond the Cqfmological, and the third the Ontological, 
proof. Our preient objeft is to examine thefe proofs. 
In this inveftigation we lhall reverfe theirorder, and begin 
with the examination of the ontological proof, becaufe 
it will appear that it is properly this proof which the 
other two really prefuppofe, notwithftanding they have 
the appearance of avoiding it. 
Seft. IV. Of the Impoffibility of an Ontological Proof of 
the Exiftence of God. 
Among the conceptions with which we fecm to be well 
acquainted, and whofe complete unintelligibility we dif¬ 
cover upon a more minute examination, is that of an ab- 
Jolutely-neceffary Being. We perfuade ourfelves that we 
underftand it, becaufe we are able to give this explana¬ 
tion : An abfolutcly-necejfary Being is that whofe non-exift¬ 
ence is impoffible. But, if we confider that, to explain the 
poflibility of the objeft of a conception, our being una¬ 
ble to prove its impoflibility is not by any means fufficient, 
and that confequently the real poflibility of the objeft is 
not to be thus known, we become fenfible that we do not 
in any way underftand the real poflibility of an abfolutely- 
neceflary being by its mere nominal definition. 
Previous to any further inveftigation, we therefore put 
the queltion, whether the conception of an abfolutely-ne- 
ceffary being is intelligible ? It is not here meant, whe¬ 
ther this conception agrees with itfelf; for, if this were 
not the cafe, the conception would then be nothing, and 
the real poflibility of the objeft would difappear of itfelf, 
becaufe its conception would be illogical. On the con¬ 
trary, the queftion is this; whether we could fay with juf- 
tice of every being, that its non-exiftence without further 
condition, and in itfelf, is impoflible ? The exiftence of 
an Effetd is neceffary when the Caij’e is pofited ; but the 
queftion here regards an abfolutely-neceffary exiftence, with¬ 
out any condition. 
Now an objeft can only be given to us in the empiri¬ 
cal intuition, and its real poflibility is always the poflibi- 
lity of the intuited objeft, and refers confequently to the 
conditions of experience. When the conception of an 
objeft is fo qualified that it has a reference to the empiri¬ 
cal fynthefis, and reprefents the objeft according to the 
laws of this fynthefis, then only can we attribute to it 
realpoffibility. But the empirical fynthefis leads us only 
to a conditional/y-neceffary being, but by no means to an 
abfolutely-necejfary one. Therefore the conception of an 
abfolutely-neceflary being is the conception of an objeft, 
in to far as it cannot be intuited. Now we cannot attri¬ 
bute real poffibility to fuch an objeft. 
It has however been attempted falfely to attribute the 
logical poflibility of a conception to the reality of the ob¬ 
jeft, and to explain it by examples; thus: “The non- 
exiftence of the three angles of a triangle is impoflible.” 
Here then appears to be a cafe in which an abfolutely-ne- 
ceflary exiftence could be known. 
The illufion here raifed is eafily folved. If a triangle 
is affumed, the three angles are affumed of courfe, fince 
they are included in the conception. But, if there be no 
tfiangle, there are no angles: confequently the neceflity 
in this example is nothing but a logical neceflity. If we 
fuppofe an objeft, which we think by a conception, we 
muft neceffarily fuppofe the predicates that lie in this con-< 
ception. But the true queftion is, whether the objeft: 
itfelf muft be thought as neceffary. An example of luch 
an objeft (hould be found in order to illuftrate the exift¬ 
ence of the abfolutely-neceflary being. To evade this 
objeftion, we give up for the prefent the explanation of 
the unconditioned neceft'ary being by examples, and adduce 
the cafe itfelf which is in dilpute, and which is the only 
one where the abfolutely-neceflary exiftence of the objeft 
itfelf can be (hown; whereas the other examples can only 
ferve for the explanation of a neceffary being in general. 
We wifli it to be admitted, that we are able to think a 
being who comprifes all reality in himfelf. Now we fay 
that a conditioned exiftence, or even its non-exiftence, 
would imply negation. In the conception of the omni- 
real being lies therefore the conception of its abfolutely- 
neceflary exiftence. If we were to deny that the omni- 
real being exifts in a neceffary manner, we (hould contra- 
dift ourlelves, as we (hould think the omni-real being 
