232 
PHILOSOPHY. 
by a negation. This being muft therefore exift in an 
abfolutely-necefl'ary manner. 
What enables us to think a being that poffeffes all rea¬ 
lity is our excluding every condition under which an ob- 
jedt can be given, and therefore keeping in mind merely 
the logical polTibilities of the conception. But the quef- 
tion is, Does this being really exift? We may now en¬ 
quire whether the propofition this or that exifts, is ana¬ 
lytical, or fynthetical. If we affert the former, it is as if 
we laid, “ Something exifting exifts,” which is mere tau¬ 
tology. But, if every pofition regarding exiftence is fyn¬ 
thetical, which is really the cafe, then we afk ; “ Why 
ftiould I neceflarily aflame the objefl as really correfpond- 
ing to the conception of it?” If the queftion concerns 
an objefl of intuition, it is not enough to have the con¬ 
ception, but we muft moreover have the apprehenfion of 
if, by means of w'hich the conception is firft of all referred 
to the object. But the reprefentation of the objefl may 
be already fully determined prior to the apprehenfion, 
which in that cafe can add no new mark to it. After 
the apprehenfion, therefore, the reprefentation may re¬ 
main unaltered in its contents; only its objedl, which 
was previotifly thought as really poflible, is now confi- 
dered aflual. With regard to objects of intuition, there¬ 
fore, we never deceive ourfelves by imagining that the 
conception of an objedl includes its exiftence, becaufe we 
are fenlible that a material condition muft be added to 
the conception, in order that we may be able to refer it 
to an exifting objefl. If however we have an objedl in 
thought, which cannot be given in the intuition, then 
that material condition is wanting; and hence we per- 
fuade ourfelves, that the mere conception of an objedl 
which does not belong to experience may contain its ex¬ 
iftence. It is clear that the conception of an objefl may 
be quite complete, before we enquire whether fuch an 
objefl aflually exifts. Its reality adds to the conception 
no new predicate; for, if it did, the objefl would not be 
the fame that we thought it. If therefore we muft allow' 
that a being can be thought which comprifes all reality 
in itfelf, (by which indeed we concede little enough, 
fince, however rich the objefl itfelf might be, no thought 
can poftibly be poorer than this is,) it is at lead certain 
that its exiftence cannot belong to its conception. If I 
think in a thing all realities, with the exception of one, 
this one deficient reality is not added by my thinking that 
the objefl exifts. Let therefore the reprefentation of an 
objefl, as a reprefentation of an individual, be fully de¬ 
termined ; yet we muft go beyond this, in order to be able 
to fay, that fuch a thing exifts. With objefls of intui¬ 
tion, the apprehenfion is the medium of this fynthefis ; 
with objefls, however, that cannot be given in the intui¬ 
tion, the apprehenfion is wanting, and there is therefore 
no means to enable us to fecure to them their exiftence. 
Sefl. V. Of the impoffibility of a Cofmological Proof of the 
Exiftence of God. 
Reafon undoubtedly requires dn unconditioned for all 
the conditioned exiftence of the objefls of intuition pro¬ 
duced by change; and, linceeven the permanent, which 
forms the foundation of the changeable in the phenome¬ 
non, may be confidered as annihilated, at leaft in the Con¬ 
ception, and as non-exifting, it w'as requifite to difcover an 
objefl which cannot be annihilated, even in conception. 
This drove Reafon to that ontological proof, according to 
which it produced an arbitrary conception, and laid in it al¬ 
ready the exiftence of its objefl, in order afterwards to de¬ 
rive it again from the conception. In the cofmological ar¬ 
gument, Reafon refts upon experience; and it has there¬ 
fore the appearance of avoiding the error of which it was 
convifled. The “ Critic of Pure Reafon” will however 
ihow, that the whole ftrength of the cofmological proof, 
after all, lies merely in the prefuppcfnion of the ontolo¬ 
gical proof. 
Now this proof is the following : If fomething exifts. 
then fomething muft alfo exift neceflarily. Now at leaft I 
exift myfelf; therefore an abfolutely-necefl'ary being ex¬ 
ifts. But this being cannot be fubjefted to any change in 
the nature of its exiftence; it muft therefore be deter¬ 
mined, with refpefl to all predicates which oppofe one 
another, only by one of them: confequently it muft be 
thoroughly determined by its conception. Now, among 
all poflible conceptions, there is only one which tho¬ 
roughly determines its objefl ; and this is the conception 
of a moji real being: confequently the conception of the 
moll real being is the only one by which the abfolutely- 
neceflary being can be thought. Confequently it is at 
the fame time the being that comprifes all reality in it¬ 
felf. Let us bring this mode of proof under examina¬ 
tion. 
This proof begins with an experience. But it avails 
itfelf of this fupport folely in order to make a Angle ftep ; 
namely, in order to eftablilh the exiftence of an abfolute- 
ly-neceflary being. But, in order to determine it with 
refpefl to its predicates, experience can add nothing fur¬ 
ther. It therefore leaves out experience, and it fearches 
by what conception this abfolutely-necefl'ary being muft: 
bethought. Here then it perceived, that this being it¬ 
felf, as the higheft condition of all changeable exiftence, 
cannot be fubjefled to change; and confequently it mull 
be thoroughly determined with refpefl to all predicates. 
Now there is but one conception, by which an objefl is 
thoroughly determined, namely, the conception of the 
mod real being. Confequently Reafon thinks itfelf 
authorized to apply this conception to the neceflary 
being. 
We will firft explain the tranfition from the exiftence 
of the abfolutely-neceflary being to the affection, that it is 
alfo the omni-real being. The ftrength of the proof con- 
fifts herein ; that, becaufe the neceflary being is the high¬ 
eft condition of all changeable exiftence, the nature itfelf 
of its exiftence muft be one and the fame ; confequently 
its conception muft be thoroughly determined. Now 
the ground why we believe that this being muft be 
thought by the conception of the moft real being, cart 
certainly be no other but this, that we cannot find any 
intuition in which fuch an objedl has been given. An 
Intuition is a thoroughly - determined reprefentation, 
whofe contents however are given; for want of which, there¬ 
fore,we look fora conception which can fatisfy thisdemand. 
But now it is in no other way poflible to take the con¬ 
ception of the moft real being for the required one, ex¬ 
cept in fo far as we prefuppofe that the coticlufion from 
this conception to the exiftence of the abfolutely-necef- 
fary being alfo is valid. For, as we have now merely to 
do with conceptions, and as confequently we cannot here 
apply the fynthefis of thefe conceptions to any intuition ; 
it is neceflary to pronounce the connexion analytical. 
Confequently the whole ftrength of the Cofmological ar¬ 
gument refts upon the Ontological proof, to avoid which 
it however was intended. In order to fee very clearly, 
we muft obferve, that, if it be faid that every abfolutely- 
necefl'ary being is alfo the moft real being, this judgment 
muft allow itfelf in fome inllances to be reverfed. There¬ 
fore we muft he able a!fo to {ay, fome moft real beings are 
at the fame time abfolutely-necefl'ary beings. But now 
one moft real being is not different from another. Con¬ 
fequently we (hall be able in this inftance Amply 
to reverie it, and to fay, Every moft real being is a necef- 
fary being. But this is the very afl'ertion of the Ontolo¬ 
gical proof. Becaufe it has the appearance, that this po¬ 
fition can be proved of itfelf from mere conceptions, and 
that we could thus derive from the conception of the 
moft real being, its exiftence as an abfolutely-necefl'ary 
being; therefore we choofe this very conception in order 
thereby to think the neceflary being, without which 
ground we have no ground at all for this procedure. 
The otherdefefls of this cofmological proof that we 
have yet to remark upon are the following. From the 
i empirical 
