233 
PHILOSOPHY. 
empirical contingency of the objefts of intuition, that is, 
from the change of (late of the fubftances, as well as from 
the intellectual contingency which allows us in thought 
to annul the exiltence even of the fubftance itfelf, we here 
conclude the exiftence of an abfolutely-neceflary being. 
Now it is certainly a principle of experience, that every 
change has its caute, whofe caufaiity mu ft be thought, in re¬ 
ference tothe change, as foinething neceflarily exifting; but 
we cannot conclude from the intellectual contingency of 
the objeCts in the intuition, even a conditionally-nc-cef- 
fary exifting thing, Hill let's an abfolutely-neceflary being. 
Further, this proof concludes the exiftence of an abfo- 
lutely-neceftary being, fince it lays as a foundation the 
pofition of Caufaiity. Now, according to this law', 
every event mutt have its caufe; but, as the caufaiity of 
the caufe is always again an event, there is no exiftence 
to be found, however far we extend the empirical regref- 
fion, that is abfolutely neceflary. The proof therefore 
muft omit the empirical regreflion, in order to eftablilh 
the exiftence of an abfolutely-neceflary being, although 
it aflumes the appearance, at firft, of not departing from 
the rule of experience. It has further this defeCt, that 
it endeavours to fatisfy reafon as to the condition of ex- 
iftence, by abfolutely excluding all further condition; and 
thus endeavours, by excluding all ufe of underftanding, 
to produce a unity of reafon. Laftly, the proof con¬ 
founds the logical poflihility of a conception with the 
real, which however can only reft upon a tranfcendental 
ground. For, in order to maintain that a moft real being 
is poflible, it is not fufficient that the conception of it 
agrees with itfelf; fuch an object muft alfo be thought, 
with reference to the conditions under which objects can 
be given. 
Now if we endeavour to find, for the ground which de¬ 
termines Reafon, a proof of the abfolutely-neceflary being, 
nay, even to approve of a faultlefs proof, then we find that 
Reafon has folely in view the fatisfa&ion of its fpecula- 
tive ufe. As it feeks the condition of empirical contin¬ 
gency, it finds this condition again contingently empiri¬ 
cal; and it cannot confider the fearch after the condition 
of this contingency otherwife terminated than by aflu- 
ming the abfolutely-neceflary condition. And, notwith- 
ftanding it is a principle of experience that the permanent 
forms the foundation of change in the phenomena, this 
is however contingent in an intellectual manner, fince its 
exiftence can be annulled in thought, and reafon appears 
to be neceflifated to feek an objeCt whofe non-exiftence 
cannot even be thought. On the other hand, we are 
compelled always to (eek the condition'd' the empirically 
contingent, and to confider every thing that neceflarily 
exifts as neceflarily conditioned; nay, as to the intellec¬ 
tual contingency, Reafon muft confider every poflible ob¬ 
ject as contingent, and be allured that nothing can pre¬ 
sent itfelf to it wdiofe exiftence it could not annul in 
thought. How is the agreement of Reafon with itfelf 
to be here maintained? It is clear that Reafon muft 
be able to anfwer a queftion that arofe in its own terri¬ 
tory. 
If we are compelled to think fomething neceflary to 
every thing that exifts, and we cannot confider neverthe- 
lefsany objeCt as the abfolutely-neceflary being, it follows, 
that neceflity and contingency can by no means apply to 
the things. Nothing remains but to confider the princi¬ 
ple that guides Reafon in fearching after the uncondi¬ 
tioned condition of exiftence, as merely regulative and not 
as conftitutive. As a regulative principle, it is required 
to feek after an unconditioned neceflary exiftence, as if 
we could really arrive at it, and this folely with a view to 
bring the fynthetical unity of Experience nearer to the 
unity of Reafon ; but, at the fame time, even this prin¬ 
ciple is deprived of all hope ever to accomplifh this ob¬ 
jeCt. It has already been (hown,that the affumption of 
an abfolutely-neceflary being out of the fenfible world 
may be admitted ; only this affumption muft not take 
place in a tranfcendental point of view. 
Vol. XX. No. 1364. 
Seel. VI. Of the Impojfibilily of the Phyfico-Theological 
Proof. 
There ftill remains to be examined the proof which 
arifes from a particular experience, namely, from the ar¬ 
rangement and conftitution of the world, and which 
grounds itfelf upon this, in order to (how the exiftence of 
a higheft being. 
The remark however (trikes us at firft fight, that, after 
all, every experience in its nature is limited, and that the 
empirical fynthefis cannot meet- with the unconditioned 
in any Angle inftance. The complete in experience is 
only fo called in reference to fomething lefs complete. 
But abfolutecompletenefs requires the Idea of its objedl. 
We fee however thus much beforehand, that experience 
can no more produce an abfolutely-complete effedt of the 
objedl of a'tranfcendental idea, than it can furnifli the 
tranfcendental ideal itfelf. Nay, fince that which is con- 
fidered as the effedl of the higheft being belongs to Na¬ 
ture, this being itfelf however muft be placed without 
Nature, becaufe it otherwife could not be confidered as 
abfolutely unconditioned. The queftion is, How is the 
tranfition from objedls of experience to an objeCt that does 
not belong to experience poflible ? 
It cannot here be our intention to deny the order and 
arrangement of Nature, which feems every-where to reft 
on defign and on a plan. We may contemplate Nature 
in the whole as well as in detail ; and we find, as far as our 
obfervation extends, fuch an accordance of its parts, 
adapted to the generation of certain produdls, that w ; e 
cannot avoid thinking of the ends in reference to which 
this arrangement has been made. Experience alfo (hows 
that, in inveftigating Nature, if we take for a foun¬ 
dation the principle, that its arrangement in all refpeCIs 
has been made according to certain views, we find this 
principle to be a happy guide. Hypothefes that have been 
formed to fupply the want of experience, and have been 
grounded folely on this principle, (for inftance, that of 
the arrangement of the univerfe as reprefented by the ce¬ 
lebrated Lambert,) confirm themfelves by degrees ; and 
confirmations of this kind operate again upon the mind, 
and generate a firm belief of the correCtnefs of the af- 
fumed principle. It becomes however a duty of the 
“Critic” to inveftigate this affumption, and to confider 
whether it ought to be called a mere belief or knowledge. 
It will be fliown, that the phyfico-theological is not pro¬ 
perly a proof, except fo far as it prefuppofes the ontologi¬ 
cal ; and that, while it remains in its own territory, it is 
lure of approbation, in proportion as the natural im- 
pulfes have already interelled the mind in its favour. 
This ph/fico-theological proof refts upon the following 
chief points : Firft, Nature is fo conltruCted, that every¬ 
where is to be perceived diltinCt marks of ends which have 
been executed with great wifdom, and indeed in a whole 
of indefcribable variety, in which even thofe parts which 
are apparently the moft infignificant muft neverthelefs 
contribute to this great objeCt, as we ultimately find. 
Secondly; the things in the world could not of themfelves 
agree in fuch a manner* thatfo much variety, and at firft 
light fo much confufion, muft always tend to one point. 
Thirdly; there exifts, confequently, a wife intelligence, 
(or feveral in unifon,) which by Freedom is the caufe of 
this excellent arrangement, that cannot poflibly be af- 
cribed to a Nature acting blindly. Fourthly ; the unity 
of this caufe may be fafely inferred from the agreement of 
the parts to form a whole as far as experience goes, and 
with probability, according to analogy, where experience 
does not extend. 
With regard to productions of Art, it is ourconftant 
practice to infer, from the agreement of a variety to one 
end, an Intelligence as the caufe of fuch a production. 
But Reafon exceeds not Experience in the conclufion re- 
fpe&ing works of Art, fince both the caufe and the effett are 
objects of experience. Here, on the other hand, the con¬ 
clufion proceeds from fomething given in experience to 
3 O an 
