234 PHILO 
an object which cannot be given in any experience. Now 
the queftion is, whether this mode of conclufion is alfo 
corredt in this cafe, for which we have no other ground 
but the impoflibility of choice, fince the empire of the fu- 
per-fenfible is lliut up from us. For, though it is better 
to aflume for the explanation of the order of the world 
a Canfality which we already know, than to have recourfe 
to entireiy-inconceivable grounds of explanation, ftill 
we mull not in this cafe afcribe to the proof a ftridtly- 
proving power. 
If, however, we overlook this Hep, it is then clear, that 
we are juftified to infer, from the contingency of the form 
of matter, a wife intelligence as the caufe of this deter¬ 
minate kind of form; in which cafe the unfitnefs of the 
matter may have frequently been in the way of the wife 
intentions of this being; but we cannot infer from the 
contingency of the matter of the fubllances themfelves an 
liigheft author of them, who created their matter in con¬ 
formity to his wife intentions. For the former con¬ 
clufion fupports itfelf on the analogy of a production of 
human art as referring to the artilt, which however 
cannot ferve as a bafis to infer from the world a Creator 
of the world. Confequently it is only the Maker of the 
world to which the conclufion from a wifely-conllrudled 
Nature can lead. 
As far as our obfervation goes, we find order and a 
wife arrangement in Nature. The phyfico-theological 
mode of demonllration infers a caufe proportionate to it. 
The conclulion, therefore, can only lead to a very power¬ 
ful, a benevolent, and a very wife, being. If we wilh 
to omit all limitation, and to confider this Intelligence as 
«Z/-powerful, «ZZ-benevolent, and aZZ-wife, then the phy¬ 
fico-theological proof is of no avail. 
The whole mode of proof confilts in this: The de- 
monllration begins with enumerating every thing that, 
on account of the great agreement of fo great a variety 
to one thing, can only be thought by means of the con¬ 
ception of ends. Thus far the proof would merely reft 
upon empirical grounds of demonftration. But this 
proof forfakes thefe grounds, and infers, from the contin¬ 
gency of this wife arrangement in reference to matter, 
the exiftence of an abfolutely-neceftary being. By this 
ftep it paffes into the cofmological proof. Laftly, in 
order to be able to think this being by a thoroughly- 
determined conception, it choofes for it the conception 
of the moll real being, for which it has no other ground 
but the opinion that it is able to conclude regreftively 
from this conception to the abfolutely-neceftary being; 
which procedure refts however on the afl'umed validity of 
the ontological proof. 
The Phyfico-theological proof confequently prefuppo- 
fes the Cofmological, and this again grounds itfelf upon 
the Ontological. Befides thefe three, there is no way of 
concluding, from merely fpeculativc Reafon, the exiftence 
of the higheft Being ; and the Ontological is therefore the 
only polfible proof from pure conceptions of Reafon 
(ideas), admitting that a proof is at all poftible of a pofi- 
tion fo far above all empirical ufe of Underftanding. 
Se£l. VII. Critic of all Theology from Speculative Grounds 
of Reafon. 
By Theology is underftocd the knowledge of an Origi¬ 
nal Being. This may be either from mere Reafon 
(Theologia rationalis), or from Revelation (revelata). 
The former thinks its objedl either merely by tranfcen- 
dental conceptions (ens originarium, realiffimum, ens 
entium),and is called tranfcendental Theology; or it thinks 
its objefl as the higheft intelligence, confequently by a 
conception which it borrows from the nature of the mind, 
and is therefore called natural Theology. lie who admits 
a tranfcendental Theology is a Deifi; but a Theijl is he 
who alfo adopts a natural Theology. Though the Deift 
thinks him as the moft real being, ftill he contends that 
his reality cannot be determined. He indeed confiders 
it as the ground from which all reality of the objefls of 
SOPHY. 
intuition is to be derived ; but the whole of all reality 
united in one fubjedt, he confiders as a tranfcendent objedl, 
which can never be met with in experience. By this, 
however, he does not deny, but this whole may perhaps 
alfo contain this intelligence, and we mud therefore 
indeed fay of him that he adopts a God ; but of the Theijl 
we can maintain that he adopts a living God. For the 
latter affirms that there exifts a Being, which, by Under¬ 
ftanding and Will, is the original ground of all other 
things. The objefl of tranfcendental Theology is only 
the Caufe of the World. The objefl of Natural Theo¬ 
logy* on the other hand, is the Author of the World ; and 
the adoption of the latter is, properly fpeaking, that only 
which fatisfies the intereft of Man. 
Tranfcendental Theology is cofmo-theology when it 
takes experience as a foundation, in order to derive from 
it the knowledge of the exiftence of its objefl; but it is 
onlo-theology when it undertakes to prove this exiftence 
without experience from mere conceptions. 
Natural Theology is likewife twofold; either Phyfcco- 
Theology or Moral Theology. The former infers, according 
to the natural law of Caufality, from the wife conftruftion 
and order of the world, its Caufe, entirely according to 
that analogy by which we infer, from a produftion of 
art, an artift. The latter infers from the free caufality 
reprefented in the confcioufnefs of the moral law, a being 
which it thinks as the author of all moral order. 
Theoretical knowledge is that by which we know what 
exifts; Practical, is that by which we know what ought to 
exijl. Reafon has therefore a theoretical ufe, when we 
know d priori that fomething exifts ; it has a praflical ufe 
when we know il priori that fomething ought to happen. 
Now if either that which is, or that which ought to be, is 
undoubtedly certain, but ftill only conditioned; then 
this condition may be either fuch that it mull be thought 
as the only one, confequently as determined, or it may be 
necefiary to think it as undetermined, fo that it may be 
determined in this or that manner problematically. In 
the former cafe the condition is poflulated (per thefin), 
in the latter, fuppofed (per hypothefin). Now there is a 
praflical law, the Moral Law, which is certain a priori. 
Though this law determines the Will h priori, by making 
a demand upon it, ftill it can only obtain the obliging 
power (obligation) by the prefuppofition of the exiftence 
of a Moral Lawgiver who unites all perfeflion in himfelf, 
as it is only by this prefuppofition that that can be repre¬ 
fented as attainable which the moral law commands. 
Confequently the exiftence of the higheft being in a prac¬ 
tical point of view- mull be poflulated. We (hall at pre- 
fent put this conclufion out of the queftion. But, if that 
which exifts is thought as conditioned, then, with refpedl to 
that which is given in experience, a condition can never be 
poflulated, fince we have no ground why it muft be thought 
in one only manner, and confequently as determined. 
Theoretical knowledge is fpeculative when it refers to 
an objefl or to the predicates of an objefl which cannot 
be given in any experience. It is oppofed to the know¬ 
ledge of Nature, which concerns itfelf with objefls and 
predicates that belong to experience. 
When we reafon from an event to its caufe, we remain 
within the bounds of experience and of natural knowledge. 
If we exprefs the pofition of Caufality thus, “ Every thing 
contingent has a caufe,” it is quite correft. In the empi¬ 
rical ufe of underftanding, however, the conception can 
only be referred to the fate of the fubllances, but not to 
the fubllances themfelves. Now, if I wilh to extend this 
law to intellectual contingency, and fay, “Every thing, 
whofe non-exiftence can be thought, has its caufe;” this 
pofition u'ould be tranfcendent, and the knowledge pre¬ 
tended to be founded upon it, would be merely fpecula¬ 
tive, and no knowledge of nature. It would alio be a 
fpeculative ufe of reafon, were we to infer from the con¬ 
tingency in experience a Caufe which cannot be given in 
any experience. 
Now we can eafily perceive, that every attempt to arrive 
at 
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