238 PHILO 
prove their objedtive validity; that is, it will fhow, that 
Reafon leads the underftanding by means of thefe ideas to 
the fyftematic ufe of experience, which, on the other hand, 
is loft, if we confider them as of tranfcendent ufe. We 
eafily remark the difference between the pofitions, “ Some¬ 
thing really exifts as an objedi," and “ Something is an 
objedi only in idea." The former fays, that the reprefen- 
tation of an object, in the ftridt fenfe, has objective reality; 
and, as no objedt can be given to us otherwife than in the 
empirical intuition, hence it follows, that the conception 
of an objedi merely in idea has no objedtive reality. The 
latter is nothing but a jchema that does not immediately 
refer to any objedi, but that, however, the underftanding, 
as the fource of all objedtive reference, can imagine, in 
order to reprefent, befides this reference, th ejy/lemalic 
unity of the objedts, and thus to extend this unity by 
thinking a certain whole of experience. Only in this im¬ 
proper fenfe we are able to afcribe objedtive reality to the 
tranjcendental ideas; and our tranfcendental dedudtion of 
them will only have to make this apparent. We fhall 
fhow, of the pfychological, cofmological, and theological, 
ideas, that though, properly fpeaking, they cannot be re¬ 
ferred to objedts, they ferve however as rules for the un¬ 
derftanding, in order to extend, by the reprefentation of 
the maximum which lies in them, our knowledge of expe¬ 
rience, which without this guidance could not take place. 
It is evident, that, as the conception of an objedt in idea 
only can be confidered only as an enquiring conception, 
it mull be fomehow further determined than by the mere 
thought of an objedlive unity; and, as all determination of 
the conception of an objedt can only be according to the 
Categories, the objedi in idea muft neceflarily be thought 
by the Categories. If we wifh to adopt fuch an objedt 
abfolutely, or even hypothetically only, we fhould have no 
authority for this objective ufe of the Categories. The 
conception, however, only ferves as a guide for the ufe of 
underftanding in experience; and the exiftence of its ob¬ 
jedt is not even propofed, which ftill would be, properly 
fpeaking, an objedtive reference. If we were to affume, 
for example, an all-wife and beneficent author of the 
world, it would be with a view to have a ground of ex¬ 
planation for the agreement of the various means and 
ends in nature, and we fhould proceed entirely after the 
manner of hypothefes, according to the number of con- 
fequences that all admit of being explained from the 
adopted ground in determining the right to think fuch a 
being as exifting. Since, however, we might overlook 
that this inference from things that are given in expe¬ 
rience would lead to a fuperfenfible fotnething between 
which and thofe things no tranfition is found, we might 
alfo mifs the true heuriftic end of the idea itfelf, as foon 
fhall be fhown. 
According to this, we are firft of all able, with refpedt to 
the pfychological Ideaoi the fubftantiality of the Soul, to 
propolis as a guide to the experience of the phenomena of 
our mind, the idea of a permanent fubftratum, as a fimple 
fubftance which exifts with perfonal identity. In fo far as 
I am given to myfelf as an objedt in experience, I know 
myfelt by the changeable determinations of knowing, 
feeling, and defiring; and I perceive nothing permanent 
by means of Internal SenJ'e. In order to arrive at a fyfte¬ 
matic unity of all the phenomena of my o« n felf, and to 
extend this experience, Reafon thinks all the determina¬ 
tions of the mind as inhering in a fingle fubjedl; and, ac¬ 
cording to this idea, it endeavours to derive all thefe ma- 
nifeftations from one, and all power from a fingle funda¬ 
mental power. In this idea lies, therefore, the perma¬ 
nency, the identity, the fimplicity, confequently the per- 
fonality, of this fingle fubjedt, and its relations to the ob¬ 
jects in fpace. All this is not pre-fuppofed as a real 
ground from which the properties of our mind are to be 
explained. For, in the firft place, thefe may reft entirely 
upon different grounds that are quite unknown to us ; 
and, fecondly, we fhould difappoint curfelves if we fancied 
we could know the foul by means of thefe predicates. 
SOPHY. 
For, though we are able to connect fenfe with them if we 
confider them as a Jchema in order to derive as much as 
poffibleall the determinations of the mind from one fub¬ 
jedt, ftill all their meaning vanifhes if we confider them as 
fotnething exifting, fince, in the intuition, in which indeed 
every objedt muft be given to us, nothing abfolutely 
fimple can occur; and the conception of fubftance is ap¬ 
plicable folely to objedts of intuition. We fhould there* 
fore indeed think nothing at all by thinking the foul a 
fimple fubftance, becaufe we fhould make an objedtive re¬ 
ference of this conception, and yet difregard the condition 
under which alone it can be referred to an objedt. If, on 
the other hand, the pfychological idea is merely confider¬ 
ed as a Jchema, nothing but advantage can arife from it, 
provided we guard againft confidering it as any thing 
more than a tner eidea. All hypothefes thatconfiftin the 
transfer of fuch grounds of explanation as are valid for 
corporeal nature to the nature of the foul, as to its gene¬ 
ration, deftrudtion, and regeneration, are here not at all 
admitted. We have no other intention in this idea than 
that of reducing all grounds of explanation of the pro¬ 
perties of the foul as much as poffible to one fingle prin¬ 
ciple. 
The fecond tranfcendental idea which is fit for a regu¬ 
lative principle, and in this fenfe only has objedtive real¬ 
ity, is the conception of the world. Here we muft imme¬ 
diately remark, that the Jchema by whofe guidance Reafon 
endeavours to arrive at the fyftematical unity of the phe¬ 
nomena of external fenfe, ftill needs not be the reprefen¬ 
tation of a tranfcendent objedt (which goes beyond all ex¬ 
perience), as is the cafe with the idea which ferves for the 
Jchema of the phenomena of thinking nature. This is to 
bring all the determinations of the mind, as much as pol- 
fible, to one principle; it muft confequently be the repre¬ 
fentation of an objedtive unity, which can contain nothing 
of variety ; therefore that of a tranfcendent objedt. With 
refpedt to corporeal nature, we never quit the fenfible in¬ 
tuition while we ftrive after the fyftematic unity. Thefe 
ideas, then, will contain the abfolute totality of condi¬ 
tions of the objedts of intuition, which indeed no objedi 
can completely reach. It is, however, confidered as be¬ 
longing to Nature, merely in order to render the deriva¬ 
tion of the members of a feries of phenomena more and 
more complete. Reafon here finds itfelf in an unavoid¬ 
able antinomy, when it afcribes to the idea, in the ftridl 
fenfe of the word, objedtive reality. But if Reafon, on the 
other hand, confiders this idea as a Jchema, then it may be 
faid, without fear of contradidfion, “ Every feries of con¬ 
ditions of a conditioned thing given in the intuition, is 
infinite, confequently a whole,” (from which immediately 
an antinomy arifes if we refer this conception to an objedt,) 
merely in order to guide the empirical regreftion by this 
idea. Under this idea, the underftanding proceeds from 
the conditioned to the condition, as if it could attain an 
end, and is neverthelefs conftantly reftrained by this fame 
idea from confidering any member of the feries as the ab¬ 
folutely laft. 
The fame is the cafe with the third idea, that of an ori¬ 
ginal and .creative reafon. We have no ground to refer 
this to an object in a fpeculative point of view ; and, 
moreover, it muft lofe all fignification in any objedtive re¬ 
ference, becaufe fuch an objedt cannot be given to us, 
and yet all the Jgnification a conception can have rejls upon 
this. If, on the other hand, this idea is merely treated as 
a Jchema, it gives to the underftanding a new view, which 
is diredted to the extenfion of empirical knowledge; for it 
obtains by it a guide fora teleological judgment of the 
various produdtions that nature lays before it, which can 
ferve for nothing but the extenfion of its knowledge. It 
therefore confiders every thing according to ends, and 
feeks for all the produdtions of Nature in Nature itfelf; 
the objedts with which they as means agree with their 
ends, juft as if it knew a priori that there muft be ends, 
to which they are diredted. Any fault that might arife 
from this would be, that, where we imagined to havedif- 
covered 
