PHILO 
covered a connexion according to ends, ftill only a me¬ 
chanical or phyfical connexion is found. In this cafe we 
Ihould only mifs one unity more 5 but we fliould not 
fpoil or corrupt the unity of reafon in its empirical ufe. 
That, too, which it is poffible to explain from phyfical 
grounds, can ftill, befides this, be conlidered according 
to ends. Thus, for inftance, the elevation of the earth at 
the equator may be explained, from the greater centri¬ 
fugal force of the particles in this region during its ro¬ 
tation upon its axis, in proportion to which they necef- 
farily receded from the centre during the Hate of fluidity 
of the whole mafs of the Earth ; and yet this fame eleva¬ 
tion may alfo be teleologically conlidered. Thus we 
ealily perceive, that, if the fupport of living creatures is 
an end of nature, and if for this purpofe the furface of 
the earth is to be fecured again ft deftruftion, that eleva¬ 
tion was neceflary, becaufe otherwife the mountains which 
continue to arife from fubterranean caufes would ir.cef- 
fantly alter the pofition of the Earth’s axis, and thereby 
muft occafion perpetual inundations, if every mountain 
were not infignificant in companion to the elevation of 
the Earth under the line. By means of the affumption of 
a felf-fubfifting and higheft Intelligence as Caufe of the 
World, Reafon is enabled to anfwer every queftion with 
refpeft to what is contingent, and to lead the underftand- 
ing to a greater and greater fyftematic unity? but, as to 
the affumption itfelf, it cannot fatisfy itfelf upon this 
point abfolutely; that is, Reafon can adopt no object 
correfponding to this idea, but affumes fuch a Being rela¬ 
tively, merely in order to provide better for the ufe of 
Underftanding. Reafon gives to its idea an object, but it 
does not afcribe to it objective reality, becaufe it does not 
confider this objeft as real, nay, does not even fuppofe it 
as fomething real; but only thinks it as problematical,in 
order to confider all connexion of the objefts of the intu¬ 
ition as if they had their ground in it, and this merely in 
order to extend the knowledge of the phenomena accord¬ 
ing to a rule, and thereby to promote the unity of under¬ 
ftanding. 
But, if we forfake this kind of objective meaning of the 
tranfcendenial ideas, if we intend to infure to them object¬ 
ive validity in the proper fenfe of the word, Reafon im¬ 
mediately finds itfelf in the field of the inconceivable and 
uninveltigable, and on this account in that of the empty, 
where indeed it can think nothing at all, becaufe the ob¬ 
ject it would venture to think upon is too great for it. 
Befides, from this conftitutive ufe of the ideas, fome evil 
confequences follow in the empirical ufe of the Under¬ 
ftanding, upon which we have now to remark. 
The firft: of thefe faults is Indolent Reafon , or the prin¬ 
ciple according to which the inveltigation of nature is 
conlidered as finilhed in any one point, and according to 
which Reafon perfuades itfelf that it has completed its 
talk. This Chows itfelf as well in the realizing of the 
pfyckological as of the theological idea. If the Spirituals 
fancies he finds immediately, in the reprefentation of his 
own J, the fimplicity and fubftantiality of the foul, he will 
give up all fearch after the grounds of explanation for the 
confcioufnefs of the identity of the individual given in 
experience; for he will imagine that he has already at¬ 
tained this ground of explanation in the Ample fubftance 
of the foul. He will alfo explain the intereft that we take 
in things which are not to happen, till after death, from 
the confcioufnefs of our thinking felf ( fubjeS). In all 
thefe cafes he will pafs by the phyfical grounds of expla¬ 
nation, which however are the only intelligible ones? 
and, in order to be able to comprehend the phenomena of 
internal fenfe, take refuge in abfolute unintelligibilities. 
As to the theological idea, the difa’dvantage of its being 
taken conftitutively is very obvious; for in that way we 
immediately lofe all explanation from phyfical grounds. 
Inftead of deriving, as we ought, the explanation of the 
phenomena of Nature from the laws of the mechanifm of 
matter, we appeal, according to this conftitutive idea, to the 
uninveltigable decree of the highelt wildom, and perfuade 
SOPHY. 239 
ourfelves, that, in breaking at once the thread of expe¬ 
rience, we have procured ourfelves an entire intelligibility, 
whereas, if we would but examine it, we Ihould find the 
very contrary. This difadvantage is not found in the 
merely-regulative ufe of the idea. For, even if we fuppofe 
that all the connexion of the objects of nature is teleo¬ 
logical, the explanation of the phenomena from phyfical 
grounds does not thereby fuffer any detraction, becaufe 
this fuppofition is not made abfolutely, but only in refe¬ 
rence to the empirical ufe of underftanding; fo that the 
view of the things as being connected according to ends 
only runs parallel to the phyfical connexion according to 
the laws of matter, but does not annihilate it. Nor do 
we determine thefe ends prior to experience, or force them 
as it were upon Nature, as is done in the fuppofition of 
the idea as a conftitutive one, but we only expeft them. 
Herein, however, confifts the fecond fault in the ufe of the 
idea as a conftitutive one, which we term Perverted Reafon. 
We affume a fupreme intelligence, and give to the idea 
objective reality in the ftrift fenfe of the word, in which 
pre-fuppofition we confider ourfelves juftified, becaufe we 
think we have difcovered, in certain parts of Nature, a 
connexion according to ends. Then we reverfe the cafe? 
and determine, according to this hypoftatical principle, 
the ends which Nature ought to have. A wile Intelli¬ 
gence is the caufe of the exiftence and of the connexion 
of the things in the world, confequently it muft be made 
according to ends. Thus we introduce fomething into 
Nature which is in itfelf quite foreign to it. For it is 
Nature only becaufe it is the aggregate of the objefts of 
intuition, and this only as they are given and thought 
according to the laws of experience. A principle out of 
Nature, and yet influencing its objefts, would therefore 
annihilate all Nature. Befides, we fliould mifs thereby 
our chief objeft ; for, if we would infer, from the wife ar¬ 
rangement of things, a wife maker, we aft contrary to this 
view if we pre-fuppofe him, and in this thought prefcribe 
ends to Nature. When we refleft upon the poffible 
queftions which may occur with regard to fuch objefts as 
overftep all experience, the affection, that they are all to 
be anfwered, appears at firft fight bold. If we however re¬ 
fleft, that pure Reafon alone produces the conceptions of 
thefe objefts, without their being in any way given to it, 
we eafily perceive, that this very pure Reafon muft furely 
be able to account for its own productions. If we enquire 
whether there is fomething different from the world that 
contains the ground of its order and its connexion accord¬ 
ing to univerfal laws, the anfwer is, beyond all doubt; for 
the world is the aggregate of objefts of intuition, and 
Reafon is compelled to think fomething that forms ill 
fome manner their foundation, and is not intuited, but 
of which we cannot fay any thing more, but tiiat it is the 
tranfcendenial ground of the phenomena. But herein lies, 
at the lame time, the anfwer to the queftion, Whether 
this being is a fubftance of the greateft reality, whether 
it is neceflary, See. The Categories apply to the objefts 
of intuition, and make the thinking of them poffible; 
but whether they have any other meaning out of this 
field, that we cannot know. There remains, therefore, 
nothing but the univerfal conception of the objedive unity, 
by which we are enabled to think the objeft that forms 
the foundation of the phenomena. Laftly, if we enquire 
whether we may not think this being according to ana¬ 
logy with the objefts of experience, the anfwer is, “Cer¬ 
tainly we may, but only fo far as we propofe to ourfelves 
a fcliema for the empirical ufe of underftanding, and not 
thereby to determine what he is in himfelf,” We may 
think him according to analogy as an intelligence, in order 
that, as we explain to ourfelves by this conception a pro¬ 
duction of art, we alfo obtain a clue with refpeft to the 
objefts of the fen Able world, for their fyftematical unity, 
by means of the idea of a higheft Intelligence. We may 
further determine this idea in another manner, namely, 
anthropomorphi/iically; we can alfo attribute to it pleafure 
and difpleafure, and a will, and thefe in the higheft degree; 
. in 
