240 PHILO 
in doing which, experience can never juftify us, in fo far 
as we do all this only in a regulative point of view, and 
derive both the exiftence and the conformity-to-end of 
the things in the world, properly not from this being, 
but only from the idea of him. 
The refult of Tranfcendental Dialedics c onfifts in this ; 
that Reafon, even with its ideas, cannot go beyond the 
field of experience. The Analytics have fliown, that all 
the conceptions and principles of pure underftanding refer 
folely to the objedts of intuition, and that their objective 
validity, when they are referred to the things in tliemj'elves, 
is quite futile. It has the appearance as if Reafon in 
itfelf were a fource of objedtive conceptions whole objects 
lie quite out of the territory of experience. It was there¬ 
fore necelfary corredtly to inveftigate the ground of this 
fuppofed acquilition. The refult is, that though the 
tranjcendental ideas are conceptions which Reafon, inaf- 
jnuch as it Ihows itfelf in its effects, namely, in its pro- 
grefs from the conditioned to the condition, finds in itfelf, 
they (till cannot have fuch an objective validity as the 
conceptions of the Underftanding, that is, refer to objects. 
They are indeed only fit for regulative principles; and in 
this fignification their ufe is directed folely to objedts of 
experience, the knowledge of which is carried by them to 
a fyllematic unity, which is the proper unity of Reafon, 
and which the Underftanding could not give them. 
End of the Critic. 
METHOD OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY- 
Introduction. 
The difference between Univerfal Pure Logic and 
'Tranjcendental Logic will now be clear. In a l'peculative 
fubjedt, nothing is fo much to be recommended as atten¬ 
tion to the difference between thinking and knowing. The 
r.egledt of this was probably the true fource of the Dia¬ 
lectics of Pure Reason, or of that illufion by which 
we perfuade ourfelves that the conceptions of an abfo- 
lutely-unconditioned thing,though the produdls of Reafon 
alone, have not only fubjedtive but objective reality ; fince 
it is very corredt to fay of conceptions, independently of 
their objedice reality, that the underftanding can think a 
thing as conditioned only under the prefuppofition of a 
higheft condition which is not itfelf conditioned. Uni¬ 
verfal Logic, which develops the laws of thinking, does not 
thereby give the laws of knowing, a kind of thinking which, 
in addition to the confiftency of the thought, poffeffes 
objiHive reality alfo. That the fquare upon the greateft 
fide of a right-angled triangle may be either greater or 
fmaller than the hum of the fquares of the other two fides, 
is a poffible thought. Geometry teaches, that this objedt, 
in pure intuition, is impoftible; but the objective reality 
of its contrary becomes apparent only by a tranfcendental 
judgment, in which we perceive that the fynthefis by 
which any definite fpace arifes is the very fame which, as 
fynthefis of apprehenfion, generates the objedts of expe¬ 
rience. By inveftigating the conditions of the objective 
reality of our thoughts, and by confidering the reprefen- 
tation of the objective unity (of what neceflarily belongs 
to each other in the given) as the univerfal conception of 
an objedt, we find indeed, in the fun&ion of a Judgment 
formally, this neceflary determination of thought; and in 
this manner we obtain a principle for the condition, ac¬ 
cording to which, upon the whole, the objective unity is 
thought. But thele conditions (the Categories) are 
however nothing but thoughts ; namely, poffible modes 
of thinking objedts. It was neceflary to fhow in particular 
their objective reality ; and this re.fulted from the confi- 
deration which explained them to us as Jehemata; that is, 
as conceptions which reprefent a given variety as necefla¬ 
rily connected in reference to Time. The ufe of thefe 
fchemata for the purpofe of reprefenting objedts of expe¬ 
rience mull however Hand under rules a priori, and thefe 
have been found to be the principles of tranfcendental 
5 O P H Y. 
judgment. Hence it followed that thefe Principles, as 
well as the Categories, have indeed objedtive validity, 
but only with reference to objedts which are given in the 
intuition; and that we are by no means juftified in deter¬ 
mining thereby objedts which can only be thought by the 
indefinite idea of the objedtive unity. Of all this, Univerfal 
Logic takes no notice, becaufe it abftradts from the ob¬ 
jedtive reality of reprefentations. It has not therefore 
to produce, like Tranfcendental Logic, any particular 
conceptions, judgments, and conclusions; but it only 
develops the poffible agreement of reprefentations, as it 
is met with in conception, judgment, and conclufion ; 
that is, the rules of Logical Truth; whereas, on the con¬ 
trary, the latter has to feek the laws of ubjedive truth . 
Hence it is, that the Method of Univerfal Logic can re- . 
late only to the method that we avail ourfelves of in the 
fciences. As it has nothing to do with the objedtive va¬ 
lidity of reprefentations, and as all thinking receives its 
meaning from this, it cannot form any guide for fuch a 
fyftematic connexion of the reprefentations as would give 
them meaning. Tranjcendental Logic, on the other hand, 
treats of the conditions of the objedtive validity of the 
reprefentations, confequently of the laws according to 
which thoughts are Knowledge. It will therefore he 
able to aflign the formal conditions of a complete Syfiem of 
Pure Reafon. We fay “ the formal conditions,” becaufe 
it has alfo to do with certain definite knowledge, which is 
therefore capable of very different methods. Since our 
tranfcendental method will fet afide the determinate contents 
of knowledge, and will only attend to its objedtive mean¬ 
ing; confequently to this, that it is upon the whole 
Knowledge, and not merely thought, it will fhow the 
conditions under which a complete fyllem of knowledge 
is poffible. 
This method will, in the firft inftance,aflign thofe laws 
which we muft obferve, with regard to method, in order 
that we fhould not make any incorredt ufe of the condi¬ 
tions of knowledge determined d, priori. This will be done 
in the Discipline of Pure Reafon. On the other hand, 
the Canon of Pure Reafon will contain, in the fecond 
place, the laws of the corredt ufe of thofe conditions. The 
Architectonic of Pure Reafon will, in the third place, 
conftrudt the Syfiem itfelf of all knowledge, fo far as it ab¬ 
ftradts from its definite contents, and as thefe contents 
are only thought formally by univerfal conceptions. The 
History of Pure Reafon will, in the fourth place, de- 
feribe the path which Reafon has hitherto taken in its ef¬ 
forts to extend the compafs of knowledge, to enclofe it 
within ftridter bounds, and to determine it d. priori. 
Chap. I. Discipline of Pure Reason. 
If we abftradt from the objedive reality of certain con¬ 
ceptions which are connedted together in a judgment, 
there is then no effential difference between affirmative 
and negative judgments. In this mereiy-logicai fignifi¬ 
cation of our reprefentations, we can exprels every po- 
fition negatively, in the fame manner we may makeevery 
negative pofition affirmative. It is exadtly the fame thing 
whether I fay “All men are mortal,” or “All men are 
not immortal.” In order to know by which of two op- 
pofite judgments fomething in the objedt is affirmed, or 
fomething is negated, a further confideration is neceflary 
befides that of the logical form of the judgment. For, as 
foon as I have in mind the objedtive reality of the given 
reprefentations, it appears that by a judgment fomething 
is affirmed or denied on its own account, that is, in refe¬ 
rence to an objedt, independently of the logical form of 
fuch judgment. 
By theie ohjtdlively-negative judgments, our knowledge 
is indeed not extended, but (till its utility is evident! for, 
though we are not pofitively inftrudted by it, yet we do 
not err fo long as we denote by a negative judgment the 
want of knowledge, merely with a view to iignify its 
empty place, and keep it open for future information. If 
the knowledge concerns an objedt with regard to which 
i fubjedtive 
