PHILOSOPHY. 
244 
pfychological and theological idea, the Critic has indeed 
proved, that the aflertions of their objedtive validity are 
jj/nthctical pofitions, wh'ofe certainty can in no way be 
proved; but trill it did not meet with any antithetic with 
regard to them. The ground of this is evident. He who 
maintains that the Soul is a Jimple fnbjlunce, is certain that 
the objedl itfelf is not 1 give it to him ; what is given is no¬ 
thing more than the reference of reprefentations to his 
thinking fubjedl; but he knows that every given fub- 
Aance is compofed. He is therefore compelled to admit 
that this Jimple J'ubJlance, the foul, is not given; that is, 
to confider it as a noumenon. This is the cafe with regard 
to the objedl of the theological idea : for this objedt is 
to be thought as a Being in whom all reality is united. 
It is evident that fuch an objedl cannot be confidered as 
given. As to the pfychological and theological idea, 
and the two laft cofmological ideas, they have this pecu¬ 
liarity, that we may think them as objedls that are not 
given in the intuition. This thought is indeed nothing 
more than the mere reprefentation of an objective unity 
that correfponds with the idea. An antithetic of Reafon 
cannot here take place, becaufe it is poflible to think the 
unconditioned as a noumenon, and not as a phenomenon; 
ccmfequently it mull not be reprefented as being given. 
If we on that account indeed mull renounce the dogma¬ 
tical affertion of the objedtive reality of that idea, we may 
defy any one, on the other hand, to prove its oppolite. 
There being, then, this equality of objedtive grounds for 
and againlt fuch an affertion, it depends on the fubjedlive 
grounds of Reafon itfelf to determine and decide it. 
Here it appears, that even pure Reafon, in fo far as it is 
jpradlical, evinces an interell in favour of the pofitions, 
There is a God ; Man A a free being ; The foul is of a per¬ 
manent nature; and this fubjedlive maxim is fufficient to 
determine Reafon with regard to their alfumption. 
Every one will allow, that an examination of the grounds 
which Reafon brings either in fupport of thefe pofitions, 
or in oppofition to them, mull be allowed ; and it would be 
both blameableand irrational ever to determine for which 
fide Reafon niufl neceffarily declare itfelf. That a fecond 
“ Critic of Pure Reafon," which is confident with itfelf, 
has not been earlier produced, may be attributed in a great 
meafure to the abfurdity which has often limited the 
freedom of expreiling our thoughts. For academical in- 
llrudlion nothing is more to be recommended than fuch a 
“ Critic.” The method which is fometimes adopted to 
protedf young minds from the poifon of unbelief, by ei¬ 
ther keeping them ignorant of its grounds, or putting them 
in an ignominious light, is blameable and miffes its aim. 
For the refledting youth, as foon as he believes himfelf 
emancipated from the guardianfhip which checked his 
freedom of thought, will let himfelf the more violently 
in oppofition to all dogmatical aflertions the more he per¬ 
ceives an impurity of intention in thole who endeavour 
lo infti 1 them into him. In a fcientific and chiefly in a 
Speculative view, nothing is fo much to be recommended 
as fincerity to one’s-lelf. There are fo many fubjedlive 
grounds little agreeing with the end of Reafon, which 
induce the mind to conceal from itfelf its want of infight, 
that we cannot be too miflruflful with regard toourfelves, 
or fufficiently circumfpedl .with regard to the fubjedlive 
grounds that may determine our judgment at every pre¬ 
tended advance in new infight. 
Befides the critical ufe of pure Reafon which we have 
adopted, and the dogmatical which we have rejedled, 
there is another, the Jceptical, which is as little admiflible 
as the former. We are certainly not jullified in ufing it 
to arm Reafon on both fides, for the purpofe of fneering 
at its inconliftency. Scepticifm may be confidered, how¬ 
ever, in a lefs unfavourable light. If it be granted that 
nothing fo much impedes the true felf-fatisfadtion of Rea- 
fon as dogmatifm, what appears more likely to promote 
it, in the firlt inltance, than that oppofition which mull 
awaken it from its dogmatical flurnbers; the complete 
ilatisfadtion of Reafon, however, can never be attained by 
fcepticifm. It is only to be confidered as a preparative to 
the “ Critic of Reafon;” and it is this alone that can 
give Reafon ultimate fatisfadlion. In the mean time the 
Sceptic very often millakes his proper occupation, and 
gives himfelf a phiiofophical air, by explaining all the 
refledlions of Speculative Reafon as idle efforts. It is 
therefore neceffary to expofe this mode of thinking. 
Sedl. III. Of the impofibility of a Sceptical Satisfaction of a 
contradictory Pure Reafon. 
The fceptical ufe of pure Reafon afferts that all know¬ 
ledge by means of pure Reafon is impoflTible. Now this 
is exadlly the refult of the “ Critic” itfelf. What is it, 
then, that diftinguiflies this “Critic of Pure Reafon” 
from Scepticifm ? 
The aggregate of all the objedls of poflible knowledge 
may be compared to our fenfible horizon, which appears 
to the eye a plain furface extending itfelf indefinitely, and 
which dill has limits. The fceptic may be compared with 
him who is fatisfied with this view of the fubjefl, and 
therefore is in no date to determine how far objedls may 
be feen in this plain. Nay, he goes further than this; 
for he abfolutely maintains that certain knowledge is not 
podible, without however having precifely determined the 
nature and extent of all poflible knowledge. This proce¬ 
dure may however ferve to detedl our ignorance, and 
fliow the prefent date of Reafon ; which as it is notable, 
properly fpeaking, to develope its bounds, the diligent 
fearch after this knowledge cannot be confidered asfuper- 
fluous. The “ Critic” has done that for Knowledge 
which the Mathematician has done for Geography. He 
determines the diameter of the circumference from the 
arch which he meafures on the furface of the Eirth, and 
is thence enabled to determine a priori the quantity of 
furface, and thus the limits of geography. The “ Cri¬ 
tic” has explained the nature of Synthetical Judgments <i 
priori , and has drown that their objective validity refls 
upon this, that they contain the application of tire Ca¬ 
tegories to empirical intuition, and in this manner repre- 
fent objedls. Thus it fucceeded in circumfcribing the li¬ 
mits of the objedtive poflibility of all our reprefentations, 
fothat we can now exadlly determine wdratobjedls are for 
ever excluded from our plain of knowledge, and what ob¬ 
jedls are to be found therein. This plain is not an inde¬ 
finitely extending furface, of'which it may be faid, that, 
generally fpeaking, it is limited, but yet the limits can 
never be afeertained ; but it may be compared to a 
fphere, wlrofe diameter is found by the curvature of an 
arch. The dedudtionof the Categories, and the princi¬ 
ples of pure Underllanding, have determined this diame¬ 
ter, and thus the extent of furface upon which objedls of 
poflible knowledge are given to us; namely, the field of 
experience. Whatever lies beyond this plain is not given 
to us, and even the problematical thought of this objec¬ 
tive unity can only ferve for the better and more compre- 
henfive knowledge of the objedls of experience. 
TheSceptic attacks the opinions of the DogmatiA, and 
fubmits them to examination ; and, as he does not find 
them completely firm, he even expofes them to cenfure. 
This procedure necefiarily led to doubts which had been 
overlooked. It is certain that this Aep muA advance the 
caufe of Reafon: its whole ufe, however, is to difeover 
to us our pretended knowledge. This is the fecond Aep 
of Speculative Reafon, which iucceeds to the dogmatical, 
and may be termed the Cenfure of Reafon. The third 
Aep, which muA neceffarily follow, is that of the Cri¬ 
tic of Reason. Scepticifm occupies itfelf with the 
fa 61 , that fome knowledge is not quite fo certain as vye 
imagine. This ignorance, thus manifefled, muA necefia- 
rily raife our curiofity to fearch after new means of ex¬ 
tending our infight. Until Reafon adopts the critical way, 
everything mult naturally remain as it w'as. It is by this 
critical way that Reafon quits empirical knowledge; that 
is to fay, ignorance ; and, by inveAigating the pofitions of 
knowledge, arrives at a knowledge a priori of the limits of 
what 
