PHILO 
what can be known. It is then able to determine a priori 
what objects lie within the fphere of knowledge, and what 
are excluded from it. From a want of this limitation it 
follows, that the Sceptic, who does not allow the tranfcen- 
dent ufe of the principles of Underltanding, but who in¬ 
deed does not remark the difference between their tranf- 
ceiiclmt and then immanent ufe, at laft begins to doubt the 
validity of the latter. This happened, among others, to 
the celebrated David Hume. That great man was pro¬ 
bably aware that in many judgments we go out of the 
conception of the fubjeft, and conned with it determina¬ 
tions which cannot at all be found in it, though he never 
perceived clearly the difference between fynthetical and 
analytical judgments. Thus much at lead is certain, that 
he felt very forcibly the difficulty which the underftand- 
ing meets with whenever it endeavours to account for the 
objective validity of fynthetical judgments a priori. He 
fhowed this with regard to the polition of Cciufality, 
taking from this principle of pure thiderjianding its ftrift 
univerfality, and maintaining that it was merely fubjedive, 
r.otw ithffanding its application to experience. He affirms, 
that in the common mode of judging it is difficult to de¬ 
tect the mere fubjedive nature of the polition of Caufaiity, 
and that our notion of its objective validity is only a pre¬ 
judice. Thus much is certain, that, as to the determined 
Effects of Caufes, or converfeiy, the Caufes whole Effects 
are given, we can only obtain them from experience. As 
the penetrating Hume remarked this, it appears that he 
confounded the principle of Caufaiity itfelf with this de¬ 
termination ; and, becaufe we never can determine il priori 
the Effects of Caufes, he fancied that the polition itfelf, 
Whatever happens has a Caufe, was of empirical origin, and 
by no means univerfally true. He therefore concluded 
falfely from the contingency of our determination accoi-- 
ding to the law, that the Law itfelf was contingent, and 
confulered its application toobjefts given to us in expe¬ 
rience juft as unwarrantable as its application to objefts 
which never can be given to us. As he merely confidered 
thefynthefis of conceptions, and did not fall upon that 
peculiar principle, namely, the poffibility of experiencing 
an event, he maintained the pofition to be untenable. 
It was indeed folely this pofition of Caufaiity which heat- 
tacked, notwitiiftanding he muft have met with the fame 
difficulty in comprehending a fynthefs h priori with regard 
to all the other principles of pure Underltanding. He 
would probably have arrived at the true folution of thefe 
principles, and at the fame time at the difference of their 
tranfcendent and immanent ufe, if he had only fallen upon 
the principle according to which their entire number 
could have been afcertained. 
Scepticifm is therefore, properly, a preparatory to a 
found Critic of Underltanding and Reafon, but it never 
can become a fyftem that can fatisfy Reafon. When it 
has fucceeded in making the Dogmatilt doubt his affer- 
tions, it has fulfilled its office. Even in this however the 
Sceptic would fail, and become himfelf a Dogmatilt, if, 
without a complete Critic of Reafon, he Ihould maintain 
that it is abfolutely impoffible ever to attain that know¬ 
ledge which the dogmatilt fancies he already poffeffes. 
Seft. IV. Of the Dfcipline of Pure Reafon with refped to 
Hypotliefes. 
When a thing is given in experience, and its exiltence 
is confidered as conditioned, though its condition is un¬ 
known, we are permitted to ajfume fomething, which may 
be confidered in conformity to the laws of experience as 
a poffible condition of the given phenomenon. Among 
the various grounds of explanation, that has the greatelt 
claim to objective validity from which the given can be 
completely derived, without requiring any other collate¬ 
ral conditions to explain that in the phenomenon which 
does not flow from the affumed ground ; otherwife the 
agreement of fevera! conditions would only be accidental, 
and would ltand in need of a further ground of explana¬ 
tion. The affumption of a ground of explanation, which 
Vol. XX. No. 1364. 
SOPHY. 245 
can be thought as the condition ofa given thing in expe¬ 
rience, is an Hypothefis. 
From all that is faid in the “ Critic” it muft be felf- 
evident, that in the fpeculative ufe of Reafon, where no 
knowledge is poffible, no hypothefis can be admitted. If 
a thing is given in experience as conditioned, we know 
that its conditions are likewife given, though they may 
not as yet be known. If we therefore make an hypothe¬ 
fis, it is neceffary that what we affume as a condition 
fltould be conformable to the laws of intuition and think¬ 
ing. To affume as a condition for a given thing an Un- 
derftanding which intuits of itfelf; or a power of at¬ 
traction without contaft; ora particularkind of fubftance 
prefen t in fpace without impenetrability; ora relation 
offubftances different from that in experience; ora pre¬ 
fence which is not in Space, and a duration which is not 
in Time;—all this cannot be admitted; firft, becaufe I 
am certain h priori, from the pure laws of the empirical 
ufe of Underltanding, that the unknown condition of the 
given conditioned thing muft be an object of experience ; 
fecondly, becaufe, in quitting the laws of experience, I 
fhould mifs my aim. 1 feek that which is comprehenfible 
with refpecl to a given thing; and for this purpofe I fly 
to fomething that is quite unintelligible. While I ana 
fatisfying the interefts of Reafon by affuming fomething 
abfolutely unconditioned, I am doing all poffible injury 
to the ufe of Underftanding. To employ the Ideas as 
regulative principles, is an allowed ufe of them, for it 
tends to promote the unity of Underftanding. In this 
view it is allowable to confider the Soul 'as a fitnpie fub¬ 
ftance, for the purpofe of bringing all the mental powers, 
by this idea, to a fingle fundamental power, and by this 
means to have fome guide. But to affume that the Soul 
is in fa ft a fimple fubftance would be quite an arbitrary 
affair ; for that which is thought by fubftance muft always 
be given in external intuition, and confequently be corn- 
poled. 
Such tranfcendental hypotliefes have not the quality 
which is effential to hypotliefes, if they are to be admiffible, 
that is, their fufficiency to enable us completely to derive 
from them the given. If we affume an unlimited and 
perfect Caufe, in order to explain the wifdom, order, and 
extent, of the world, it appears that the evils in the world 
militate againft this prefuppofition, and we require a new- 
ground of explanation in order to be able to account for 
their exiltence. In the fame manner, the difpofition of 
the Mind, dependent as it conftantly is upon the Body, 
and which cannot be explained from the felt-lubfiltence 
of the Soul, requires a new hypothefis. 
If we profefs to be able to prove all thefe affertions of 
Reafon, we muff however remark, that the proofs muft be 
apodiftical. To pretend to render the objective validity of 
Ideas even probable, would imply a total ignorance of 
their peculiar nature. That ground of explanation alone 
can be probable,from which fomething given is eafily de¬ 
rived as a confequence, and which ground muft itfelf be 
reprefented as given. The objefts of Ideas cannot be 
thought as given, and the proof of their reality muft: ne- 
ceffarily be a priori. 
Though hypotliefes are not admiffible in the field of 
Pure Speculative Reafon, if we mean by them pofitions 
that are certain, becaufe a given thing may be derived 
from them as a confequence; yet they may be employed 
as a defence againft an opponent who dil'putes them dog¬ 
matically. This indeed is not making a dogmatical but 
only a polemical ufe of them. If pure reafon, in its prac¬ 
tical ufe, creates an intereft in the objeftive validity of 
the Ideas of the exiltence of God, the freedom of the Will, 
and the Immortality of the Soul, and is allowed to aflame 
their exiltence in a practical point of view, namely as 
pofulates, though not in a fpeculative, as hypotliefes; we 
then depend entirely on the certainty that their oppofite 
cannot be proved. The opponent that we here allude to 
would be in ourfelves; for Speculative Reafon, when it js 
aot, by means of a “ Critic,,” completely in harmony with 
3 R itfelf. 
