246 
PHILOSOPHY. 
itfelf, is juft as liable to propofe grounds of explanation 
for what is given in experience, which are oppofite to the 
objedive validity of thofe Ideas, as to propofe grounds in 
favour of them. Now it is quite certain ft priori , that no 
conclufion can lead us from that which is given in expe¬ 
rience, to objects which never can be given; but that, on 
the contrary, the condition of each given thing muft 
always be met with in experience, and the grounds for 
the non exiftence of the objects of Ideas, as well as for 
their reality, mu ft be of quite another kind from all thole 
which are produced by Speculative Reafon. In this ftate 
of things, when the mind is led by hypothefes to doubt 
the objedive reality of Ideas, it is allowable to frame 
other hypothefes to counterbalance them, which is by no 
means a difficult affair. If, for inftance, the accidental 
production of men, depending on governments, on ca¬ 
price, frequently even on vice, makes us doubt that our 
deftination of man reaches beyond this life; we may 
oppofe to this doubt another argument, and conlider it 
poflible that the proper life of man is intellectual, which 
did not commence with our birth, and will not terminate 
with our death ; and that our prelent life is only an 
exiftence in Intuition, and the mere type of a pure lpiritual 
life; that if we could know the objeCts as they are in them- 
J'elves, without being encumbered with the Intuition, we 
Ihould find ourfelves in a fpiritual world, in which our 
only real exiftence has neither commenced with our birth, 
nor will it terminate with the dilfolution of our body. 
In all this we do not mean to favour the objective fignifi- 
cation adopted in thefe modes of reprefentation, but only 
to indicate the cafe wherein we may be allowed to employ 
hypothefes in the fpeculative ufe of Reafon. We muft 
not employ them in a dogmatical way, with a view to 
extend our knowledge beyond the territory of experience ; 
but only polemically, to defeat the attacks of an oppo¬ 
nent who grounds himfelfupon hypothefes. 
Seel. V. The Difcipline of Pure Reafon with regard to its 
Proofs. 
At firft it appears ftrange, that in certain pofitions we 
Ihould go out of a conception, and conned with it a priori 
another wdiich is not thought in it. The Mathematics 
indeed, in all their pofitions, furnilh examples of this 
Jynthefs a priori. As, however, this fynthefis is always 
comprehended by means of the exhibition in the pure 
intuition, the queftion concerning its poffibility in mathe¬ 
matical judgments feemsto be attended with nodifficulty. 
But that which takes place in the principles of pure 
Underftanding cannot be comprehended in this way. 
If we had been earlier made attentive to this, that thefe 
pofitions cannot in any way be reduced to analytical 
ones, perhaps the true folution of the difficulty would 
not have remained fo long unaccompliftied. The 
“ Critic” has performed this, by (bowing that this fynthefis 
is objedive merely becaufe the conception of an objed 
fprings up originally from it, and becaufe, by thinking 
the event as effed, it is reprefented as an objedive unity, 
that is, as a connexion of a variety which is neceffarily 
and univerfally valid, and is in this manner diftinguilhed 
from the merely-fubjedlive connexion fn the apprehenfion. 
This dedudion of the fvnthetical affertions a priori is 
always neceflary ; for, without this, how could we guard 
againft the danger of attributing objedive validity to the 
Synthetical Alfertions of Reafon? To depend on the 
decifion of common fenfe is very hazardous, fo long as we 
are unconfcious of the laws according to which the 
underftanding decides. If, however, we are convinced 
that there is an original neceflary fynthefis, in itfelf indeed 
ufelefs and without all objedive meaning, yet which, 
when fomething is given, produces the neceflary con¬ 
nexion, that is thought in it as a reprefented objed; this 
is the true touchftone by which we may diftinguifh the 
true from the falfe fynthetical affertions a priori. How¬ 
ever much it may appear, that as our own I occurs in all 
thinking always as fubjed (I think); and as in this 
reprefentation no diverfity is met with; I myfelf, confi- 
dered as exifting objed, exift only as fubjed, and am of a 
Ample nature ; yet the “ Critic” has fully inftruded us 
with refped to the objedive validity of the conception 
fubjlaitce; namely, that this conception produces the 
neceflary connexion in the empirical intuition whereby 
the reprefentation of the alteration of an objed is poflible ; 
that is to fay, by means of this pure fynthefis we reprefent 
fomething given in fpace as permanent, and its qualities 
as changing. In the prefent cafe we have nothing given 
but the reference of all our reprefentations to our own 
felf; in other words, the expofition of the conception to 
think. But a permanent Intuition of my own felf (my 
own I) is not given. And, even allowing that this repre¬ 
fentation may really have an objed for its foundation, it 
by no means follows from the Ample reprefentation I, 
that this objed muft be a Ample fubftance. It may be 
totally inconceivable by means of thefe reprefentations, 
and may be neither fubftance nor accident, neither Ample 
norcompofed; that is to fay, the conception of this objed 
can only be the conception of a noumenon, or of an objed 
not given. With refped to all tranfcendental proofs, we 
Ihould do well never to lofe fight of the following rules. 
Firft; it is neceflary, before we try to make fuch a 
proof, that we refled upon the principle on which we 
mean to ground it. As to the proof of the objedive 
reality of Ideas, it is evident, that the principle of poflible 
experience cannot be laid as a foundation to them : for 
their objeds tranfeend the coliedive fphere of experience. 
Neither can we employ the principles of pure Under- 
Handing, in order, by their means, to arrive at the reality 
of the objeds of Ideas. For, though they contain an 
objedive fynthefis, this objedive truth concerns merely 
the objeds of experience. The only means, in this cafe, 
to attain the end, is, that pure Reafon itfelf contains a 
principle, by means of which it can create a knowledge of 
objeds which tranfeends all experience. A critical exa¬ 
mination of the rational faculty, however, has convinced 
us, that Reafon has principles, which in themfelves are of 
no objedive validity; but that they are fo as regulative 
principles, confequently only with regard to experience. 
Secondly; we remark, that to each tranfcendental 
pofition, there can be only one proof. A mathematical 
propofition may be proved in various ways, the ground 
of which is, that t!;e proof is effeded by means of the 
exhibition of a pure intuition which correfponds with the 
conception of the propofition ; the conception, however, 
as a univerfal reprefentation, comprehends under it an 
infinite number of intuitions ; confequently the fynthefis, 
which the propofition expreffes, can be reprefented in va¬ 
rious ways in the particular, or individual. On the other 
hand, in order to comprehend a tranfcendental fynthefis, 
we do not go out'of the conceptions to the intuition. 
Its proof is either not at all poflible, or it will amount to 
this, that a tranfcendental fynthefis is that neceflary con¬ 
nexion which we find iri the reprefentation of objeds in 
experience. 
Thirdly; we remark, that thefe tranfcendental proofs 
muft always be dired. The mathematics is the only 
fcience which admits of an indired as well as of a dired 
proof. The ground of this lies in the conftrudion of 
mathematical conceptions. In order to be certain that, 
in a right-lined triangle, in which two angles are equal, 
the oppofite fides are alfo equal, we afl'ume the contrary, 
and find, in the exhibition of the particular cafe, that 
under this pre-fuppofition the part is as great as the 
whole. Now, becaufe this reprefentation of the particular 
occurs in the pure intuition, we are able to make a tranfi- 
tion from the particular to the univerfal, and to perceive 
that the fynthefis, which in the particular triangle leads 
to a contradidion, muft do the fame in every other. If, 
on the other hand, we take a tranfcendental pofition, it is 
certain, that, when its conceptions are once fyntheticaily 
united, no logical contradidiou can arife from conned- 
ing the fubjed of fuch a pofition with the oppofite of its 
4 predicate; 
