248 PHILO 
veftigated Reafon, Underftanding, and Judgment, by the 
thread of Univerfal Logic in a tranfcendental point of 
view, in order to find out whether each of thefe faculties 
did not contain knowledge entirely within ilfelf, wedif- 
covered certain original Conceptions and Judgments as a 
property of Tranfcendental Underftanding and Judg¬ 
ment, whofe objedtive validity we were able to demon¬ 
strate. Speculative Reafon, indeed, alfio contains certain 
Ideak and Principles peculiar to it; but the “ Critic” has 
convinced us that they have no proper objedtive, but only 
fubjedtive, validity. Confequentiy Pure Reafon, fo far 
as it is merely fpeculative, has no Canon. But, as the 
whole intereft in this objedtive validity fprings from 
what is PraElical, perhaps Practical Reafon may lead to 
the fatisfadtion of this intereft. 
All the intereft of Pure Reafon, as well fpeculative as 
pradtical, will (how itfelf in the following three queftions: 
1. What can I know? 
2. What ought I to do ? 
3. What may I hope? 
The firft queftion is wholly fpeculative; and, as it has 
been completely anlwered, the merely fpeculative intereft 
refpedfing it is entirely fatisfied. The fecond queftion is 
pradtical. We muft recolledt, that Pure Reafon contains, 
in the Moral Law, an objective practical pofition which 
every body mult acknowledge in his confcioufnefs. A 
“ Critic of Pure Pradtical Reafon” (fee vol. xv. page 
767.) is juft as neceffary as that of Speculative Reafon. 
The third queftion is both theoretical and pradtical. 
Pure Reafon contains a law' that ought to be followed. 
Now' it is neceffary to think of an end which is to be ob¬ 
tained by it. Hence arifes this third queftion ; If I aCt 
as I ought, what may I hope? All our hopes tend to 
Happinefs; and, although the Moral Law does not pro- 
inife this, but commands absolutely, yet Reafon connedts 
happinefs with the fulfilment of the Law-. Confequentiy 
this connexion is not objedfive. It cannot be Shown a 
priori that happinefs will be participated by him wdio ful¬ 
fils the Moral Law. Neverthelefs it muft be acknow¬ 
ledged that the morally-difpofed are worthy of happinefs. 
Now, if he who has rendered himfelf worthy of happinefs 
did not participate in it, the moral law would be merely a 
chimera. It would indeed always be an objectively-valid 
practical Law ; confequentiy the neceffity which it expref- 
fes would be neither imaginary nor illufory ; but, if the 
expedition of the virtuous man, who is confcious that 
he is in a certain degree worthy of happinefs, be not ac- 
complilhed, Morality would be a mere chimera. 
We have now commenced the anfwer to the third quef¬ 
tion, What may I hope? by confidering it pradlically. 
Do THAT WHICH WILL RENDER YOU WORTHY TO BE 
happy : this is the firft, though merely negative, anfwer, 
and the condition which muft render a pofitive anfwer is 
poflible, to which tire queftion is properly diredted : If I 
have fo condudted myfielf that I am unworthy of happi¬ 
nefs, how' can I hope to obtain it ? This is the theoretical 
fide of the queftion, the anfwer to which, as we (hall im¬ 
mediately ftiow, leads to fpeculation. 
The world, conceived agreeably to the Moral Laws, (as 
according to the freedom of rational beings it may, and 
according to the moral laws ought, to be,) we call a Moral 
World, and fay that its conception has objedlive-reality : 
for, notwitbftanding its object is not given, ftill it may 
be thought as given. It is confequentiy no objedt of 
intellectual intuition, but can be reprefented as the objedt 
of an intuition according to the law's of experience; and, 
notwitbftanding this is only an Idea , it is neverthelefs a 
Practical Idea, tending to accotnplifti this objedt as much 
as poflible. This would be a world, in which the free¬ 
dom of every one muft not only agree with itfelf, but 
with that of every other. In fuch a world w'e may think 
a proportionate happinefs as neceflarily connedted with 
.morality, fince in it the rational beings would, under the 
SOPHY. 
guidance of the moral principle, be mutually the caufe of 
each other’s happinefs. But this Syftem of Morality, 
which is its own reward, is however only an Idea, and no 
real objedt. Its reality depends upori the condition, that 
every one does what he ought. The Moral Law remains 
in full force, and is binding for everyone, notwithftand- 
ing many rational beings exempt themfelves from obeying 
it. As the connexion between Happinefs and Morality 
cannot be comprehended d priori, all that remains is 
that we may hope for it, which indeed is poflible under 
the prefuppofition of a higheft intelligence, who is conii- 
dered as the Author of Nature, and who is thought as 
the diftributor of a happinefs exadtly proportionate to the 
morality of every one. The Idea of fuch an Intelligence 
we call the Ideal of the highef good. As this life is not 
a ftate in which the effedts of this Higliejl Caufe can be 
reprefented as taking place, it is neceffary to think fuch a 
ftate as belonging to a future life. The two affumptions. 
There is a God, and There is a future life, are therefore ne¬ 
ceffary, if the Moral Law is to be any thing more than a 
chimera ; that is, a law under which w'e may confider that 
he who has made himfelf worthy of happinefs (hall partake 
of it. 
Happinefs alone is not however the higheft good. 
Reafon disapproves of it, if it be not connedted with the 
worthinefs to be happy. Nor is Virtue alone the higheft 
good, notwithftanding it muft be the condition, according 
to Pradtical Reafon, under which alone the pofieflion of 
happinefs can be approved, But we muft not fuppofe that 
the profpedt of happinefs is requifite to render the moral 
fentiment poflible. The objedt at which pure Pradtical 
Reafon neceflarily aims, is a moral difpofition connedted 
with a proportionate happinefs. 
In this manner we have obtained a pradtical Principle 
for a Theology which, ftridtly fpeaking, is a Moral Theo¬ 
logy, and which affords us the advantage of determining 
the higheft being as a Angle, moft-perfedt, rational, and 
original. Being ; which Speculative Reafon was unable to 
effedt. Befides, in this development, the true ground is 
manifeft why we confider this Idea of God as the corredi 
one; and why, even among the heathens, Polytheifm con¬ 
tains traces of Monotheilm. In Speculative Reafon we 
find indeed the Idea of a highefi reality as of the uncon¬ 
ditioned that is thought as the condition of the thorough 
determination of every objedt; but fpeculation does noteven 
allow' us to think this higheft reality determinately ; it is 
therefore an arbitrary procedure of Speculative Reafon to 
unite the aggregate of all reality into one Angle Being, and 
to judge anthropomorphiftically. On the other hand, ac¬ 
cording to Moral Theology, that being muft bea Angle and 
fupreme Will, which is thought as the author of a happi¬ 
nefs proportionate to worth, becaufe He muft comprehend 
all moral Laws and muft have a perfedt unity of defign. 
He muft be omnipotent, in order that nature and its re¬ 
ference to morality may be fubjedted to him ; omnicient, 
in order to know ourinmoft thoughts and their moral va¬ 
lue; onmiprefent, in order to adminifter whatever is re¬ 
quifite to a perfedt world ; eternal, in order that at no pe¬ 
riod the agreement of Nature and Liberty fliould be defi¬ 
cient, See. In all thefe determinations, however, we are 
not deceived into an anthropomorphilm, becaufe we take 
the precaution which tranfcendental theology fuggefts to 
us to deprive them of their anthropomorphiftical depen¬ 
dence by remarking, that this Being is to be thought as 
out of Nature, and confequentiy not as a given objedt s 
thefe determinations, therefore, are confidered only as 
relations. But, becaufe colledtive Nature muft be thought 
as fubjedted to this higheft Will, the higheft Being nuift 
be reprefented as the Author of Nature ; and in this way 
this pradtical fubftratum leads to a phyfico-theoiogy. 
The confideration of Nature becomes now teleological, 
fince it is reprefented as having fprung from an Idea. 
But, as this Being muft be conceived as out of nature, 
and as an objedt that cannot be given in experience; this 
confideration 
