249 
PHILO 
confideration leads to a tranfcendental Theology, according 
to which we by no means attribute properties to the ori¬ 
ginal being as to a given objeCl, but only indicate the re¬ 
lation of that which really is given, or at leaft can be con¬ 
ceived as given, to an objeft that is thought merely as a 
Noumenon. 
The hiftory of Reafon confirms that it is the Moral 
Principle which leads us to that Idea of God, which it 
confiders as the correft one. Before the moral ideas were 
fufficiently developed, our notion of the Godhead was 
very rude, and in the greateft degree anthropomorphifti- 
cal. The extremely-pure Moral Laws of the Chriftian 
Religion occafioned a greater development of the moral 
Ideas, and at the fame time fuch a determinate notion of 
God, as perfectly agrees with the moral principles of Rea¬ 
fon, and which is on this account confidered as the correct 
one. 
It is now evident, that it would be an abfurd proce¬ 
dure, and in direft contradiction to the aim of this Moral 
Theology, were we to reverfe the cafe, and fay, that, hav¬ 
ing obtained a certain and apodiftical knowledge of God, 
we derive the Moral Laws from his Will. This proce¬ 
dure would not only be contradictory, becaufe it is thefe 
laws themfelves whole practical neceility requires the pre- 
fuppofition of an all-wife ruler of the world, and becaufe 
Speculative Reafon is incapable of leading us to the ob r 
jeCtive validity of this Idea; but it would annihilate the 
moral principles altogether, by explaining them as con¬ 
tingent. We (hould in this cafe confider the practical 
law’s of Reafon as binding, becaufe they are the laws of 
God; whereas, it is precifely becaufe they are inter¬ 
nally binding, that they are confidered as the laws of 
God. Moral Theology is only of an immanent ufe, to 
enable us to attain that deftination in this life which 
practical Reafon points out to us; but not of a tranfcen- 
dent nfe, to enable us to derive our deftination from the 
Will of God, a knowledge of whom we can by no means 
attain by the way of fpeculation. 
SeCt. III. Of Opinion, Belief, and Certainty. 
The taking a thing for true is an event in the mind ; 
and refts either upon objective grounds, or entirely upon 
fubjeCtive grounds. In the former cafe, the objeCl deter¬ 
mines the reprefentations, and the judgment is valid for 
every body ; in the latter, the caufes are only met with in 
the Judging SubjeCt, which induce him to judge in a cer¬ 
tain manner. When the taking-for-true is occafioned 
by objective grounds, it is conviClion; but, if it refts merely 
upon lubjeCtive grounds, it is perfiafion. In order to know, 
therefore, whether our taking-for-true is perfuafion or 
conviction, we communicate our judgment to others. 
If we find every body agrees with us, this is at leaft a 
ground to prefume that our reprefentation agrees with 
the objeCt itfelf; but, if others do not agree with us, we 
are thereby led to deteCt the fubjeCtive grounds of our per¬ 
fuafion, and thus toexpofe the illufion which caufed us to 
confider the merely fubjeCtive grounds of taking-for-true 
as objective ones. 
The taking-for-true, as an event in the mind, in re¬ 
ference to the objeft of the judgment, has three degrees : 
Opinion, Belief, Certainty. Opinion is a taking-for-true 
with the confcioufnefs of the infufficiency both of the 
fubjeftive and objective grounds. Belief is a taking-for- 
true with the confcioufnefs of the fufticiency of the fub¬ 
jeCtive and the infufficiency of the objective grounds. 
Certainty is a taking-for-true with the confcioufnefs of 
the fufticiency both of the fubjeCtive and objective 
grounds. Conviction is the confcioufnefs that my taking- 
for-true refts upon grounds that are, for myfelf, object¬ 
ively fufficient. Certainty is however connected with 
the confcioufnefs, that the taking-for-true refts upon 
objective grounds that are fufficient for every body. 
Though opinion is a taking-for-true without fufficient 
grounds either objective or fubjeCtive, ftill it can only 
occur when fomething is to be taken for true from 
VOL. XX. No. 1365. 
SOPHY. 
objective grounds. In the tranfcendental ufe of Reafon 
no knowledge is poffible, confequently we cannot here be 
of opinion ; therefore, here we are not permitted to form 
fpeculative judgments. 
The taking-for-true, confidered merely theoretically, 
mult be fufficient, in order to conftitute belief; but, in a 
practical reference, the theoretically-infufficient taking- 
for-true may alfo be termed belief. Now {his practical 
point of view is either that of Skill or of Morality; the 
former regards arbitrary and contingent ends, the latter 
abfolutely-neceflary ends. 
The conditions aflumed as requifite to an end may he 
fuch, that the belief that they can accomplifh the end 
may not have fufficient grounds. In this cafe, they can 
only be confidered as hypothetically neceflary ; whereas, in 
the oppofite cafe, when the belief is fufficiently grounded, 
they are objectively neceflary. This hypothetical neceffity 
may however be objeftive; for inftance, if we are certain 
that no one can difcover any other conditions which lead 
to the propofed end, and the end cannot be obtained at 
all without our obeying thefe conditions. In this cafe 
the prefuppofition of thefe conditions is a neceffary belief. 
The mode of obtaining the end is then valid for every 
body. But, if we can conceive various ways of obtaining 
an end, and are compelled to adopt fome one, this is only 
JhbjeClively neceffary. If a phyfician, for inftance, is to 
cure his patienF, he can only apply the true remedy when 
he has found out the difeafe; but, if he is ignorant of 
this, he afts under the fuppofition, that it is this or that 
diforder. Theoretically, his belief is not fufficient; but, 
praftically confidered, it is fufficient, though it is only a 
contingent and fubjeftive belief; and another phyfician 
might perhaps fubftitute a better. This kind of belief is 
termed Pragmatical Belief. 
DoClrinal Belief is theoretically fufficient, as it merely 
concerns the judging about an objeft, of which fomething 
is afferted, but not the obtaining an end. It is poffible 
to render this doftrinal belief pragmatical, and thus to 
afcertain the ftrength of the objective grounds. This is 
to lay a wager. Frequently perfons will maintain a thing 
fo confidently, that it has the appearance as if they 
judged wholly from objeftive grounds : but, if you offer 
to lay a wager with them, by lofing which they would feel 
uncomfortable, they hefitate, and begin to perceive that 
they may perhaps have been miftaken. 
The belief in the exiftence of God may at firft be a 
doClrinal belief. The order and agreement of the means to 
certain ends, which nature fo abundantly prefents, are 
the objeftive grounds, which difpofe us to aifume the 
exiftence of a wife Caufe of fo much conformity to end. I 
know, indeed, that in afcending from the conditioned 
to the condition, I always remain with the objefts of 
experience, and that I am not buffered to leap from the 
empirical regreflion to objefts which can never be given 
in the intuition. But I perceive that, when I place this 
wife Caufe of the univerfe entirely out of the field of 
experience, (that is, out of Nature,) I admit that the 
empirical fynthefis cannot be met with in this Caufe; fo 
that in this belief I do not contradift the laws of the 
empirical ufe of Underltanding. Nature every-where 
proclaims conformity to end, and wifdom of defign. 
The objeftive ground, therefore, the belief that there is 
a God,cannot be denied. Howeverit is proper to obferve, 
that it is only belief. It cannot be termed hyputhefs, 
becaufe in that cafe we muft be able to conneft the order 
of Nature with God ; but this is impoffible, for the given 
can only be connefted with that which muft likewil'e be 
confidered as given. As a doftrinal belief, it has in it 
however fomething wavering. Speculative difficulties 
often make us doubt, but our conftant refleftions upon 
Nature always bring us back to this belief. 
With Moral Belief it is quite otherwife. It is abfo- 
lutely neceffary that fomething be done ; namely, that I 
obey the moral law under all circumftances. Now there 
is only one fingie condition under which this end can be 
3 S combined 
