250 
P H I L O 
combined with the fum of all human ends. The Moral 
Law prefcribes to me the end, to render myfelf worthy of 
happinefs. But, if I had even completely attained this 
end, I fhould not yet have arrived at the higheft good, or 
the complete end which Reafon points out to me as the 
aim of my whole deftination. Now I fay, the only con¬ 
dition under which this end can be attained, is, that 
there is a God and a Future State; confequently the belief 
in thefe objefts is a univerfal and valid belief. There is 
here no choice poflible from among various conditions 
that might lead to the higheft good, and which fome one 
elfe might perhaps more corredtly difcover. No! there 
is only this identical one condition, or there is none at all, 
under which the union of virtue and happinefs is poflible. 
There is therefore no choice with refpeft to thefe condi¬ 
tions. We have now only to decide whether we will 
render ourfel ves contemptible in ourown eyes, or, hoping 
for happinefs, determine to make ourfelves worthy of 
it. 
This moral belief is grounded, as we eafily perceive, 
upon the moral fentiment, which muft be in fome degree 
cultivated, if this practical belief (hall take effe£l. Sup- 
pofe, for inftance, a man perfeftly indifferent with regard 
to morality ; he can only aflure himfelf fpeculatively, 
from grounds of analogy, of the exiftence of God and a 
future world; but he can never arrive at an unfhaken 
convi&ion. Yet fo much at leaft is certain; that, not- 
withftanding, from the want of a moral difpofition, he is 
incapable of hoping ever to attain the higheft good, he 
may neverthelefs be fufceptible of the fear of God and of 
futurity. For he can never be certain that there is no 
God, and no future fate, though from his fentiments he 
cannot wifh thefe objects toexift. This belief would be a 
negative belief, which would not indeed produce morality, 
but would at leaft powerfully reftrain the breaking-out of 
bad fentiments, and thus remove the impediments to a 
pofitive belief. 
Whatever pure Reafon pronounces pofitively with 
regard to the obje&ive validity of its Ideas , thus produ¬ 
cing a Canon, is of fuch a nature, that it is always grounded 
upon practical principles ; whence it follows, that this 
knowledge is within the reach of every one, and that it 
is by no means to be obtained exclufively by thephilofo- 
pher. The ilfue has proved that the belief in God and a 
future life receives its immoveable power wholly from the 
moral difpofition; and this way to conviction is open to 
every one. 
Chap. III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason. 
By Architectonic we mean the art of conftruCting a 
Syftem. The fyftematic unity is that which converts 
common knowledge into a fcience, and which, from the 
aggregate of our knowledge forms a fyftern. A fyftem, 
however, is the unity of our various knowledge brought 
under one idea. This is the idea of a whole, which 
determines <1 priori not only the extent of the variety, 
but the fituation of its parts in reference to one another. 
By this previous idea we can determine the fituation of 
thofe parts which are not yet arranged, and difcover the 
deficiences that are not yet filled up. The whole is here 
reprefented as membered (articulatio), and not heaped 
together (concervatio). It may indeed increafe internally 
(per intus fufceptionem), but not externally (per appo-. 
(itionem), refembling the growth of an animal, whole 
increafe adds no new member, but renders each ftronger 
and fitter for its purpofe. 
The idea requires for its completion a Schema, that is, 
a determined arrangement of the parts il priori. If this 
arrangement proceeds not according to an idea which 
comprehends A priori the whole, but only according to 
an empirical conception, and if we are to expedf, from 
experience, the plan for the parts; then it is only termed 
a. Technical unity. On the other hand, the Architectonic 
unity comprehends all the parts A priori. This, however, 
can only arife from an idea according to which the parts 
SOPHY, 
and their order can be determined <5 priori. What in the 
ftridl fenfe is called fcience, can only be architedftonically 
erefted, confequently only according to a fchema that 
comprifes all the parts, as members of a whole; and 
thereby accurately feparates them from each other. 
He who produces a fcience has an idea in his mind. 
He projects a fcheme, and gives a definition of it.; but, in 
the elaboration, thefe are feldom found to correfpond with 
his idea. Therefore we muft not explain and determine 
a fcience according to the definition which the inventor 
or the lateft follower of it gives, but according to the idea 
which they had originally conceived, and which is appa¬ 
rent from the arrangement of its parts. When fuch 
perfons have not clearly perceived the idea of their fcience, 
it has often occurred that they have afted contrary to 
their own end, and placed that within the fphere of their 
fcience which does not belong to it, or feparated from it 
eflential parts. The idea often lies long concealed in the 
mind, before we are able clearly to conceive it ; and we 
continue to colleff rhapfodically all knowledge relating 
to it, and connect it technically, till at length we perceive 
the idea in a clearer light, and delineate architeffonicaily 
a whole agreeably to the defign of Reafon. Our prefent 
object is to give a fcheme of the architectonic of all 
rational knowledge. 
When we abltraft from all the matter of knowledge, 
and confiderit only in reference to the knowing fubjedt, 
then all knowledge is either hiftorical or rational. Hif- 
torical knowledge is cognitio ex datis; rational, cognitio ex 
principiis. We poflefs the former when we know only lo 
much as we have received, whether it be from aChial ex¬ 
perience or from the information of others. We poflefs 
the latter when it is knowledge from principles. If it 
can be underftood by inftruffion, then the knowledge is 
grounded upon principles which the perfon inftruCted ac¬ 
knowledges. Objectively confidered, it may reft upon 
principles, that is, be rational in itfelf, and at the fame 
time only fubjeCtively hiftorical to the individual ; for. 
inftance, when the perfon inftruCted does not know how 
to ground it upon thefe principles. Thus, any one may 
learn a philofophy; and, though it may be a whole of ra¬ 
tional knowledge, yet he may only know it hiftoricaliy. 
All rational knowledge is either derived from concep¬ 
tions, or arifes from the conftruCtion of conceptions; the 
former is called philofophical, the latter mathematical. It. 
is not fo eafily poflible for the latter as for the former to 
be fubjeCtively hiftorical, while it is objectively rational. 
The reafon is this, that the-principles of the Mathematics 
are certain even to evidence, and can be at pleafure eafily 
recalled. As to Philofophy, its principles are fynthetical 
portions from conceptions, whofe fynthefis cannot be 
known in pure intuition. Philofophical inftruCtion, 
therefore, cannot produce Philofophy, but only lead to 
philofophizing. 
The conception of Philofophy is only fcholaftic if we 
underftand by it a fyftem of knowledge. In this fenfe 
Philofophy has only a logical intereft. There is, how¬ 
ever, a popular one, which has a univerfal intereft. In 
this popular fenfe, Philofophy is the fcience- that refers all 
knowledge to the eflential ends of human Reafon, (teleo- 
logia rationis humanae;) and the Philofopher is here not 
the artificer, but the legiflator, of human Reafon. It is 
this notion which induces us to perfonify Philofophy, and 
reprefent it as a fage, or model for imitation. The efl'en- 
tial and higheft end of Reafon is the defination of Man ; 
that is, the dominion of Reafon over all our fenfual de¬ 
fires ; and the fcience of this higheft end is Morality, 
which, on accountof this end, has an advantage overall 
tire other efforts of Reafon. The fpecufative and the 
natural philofopher, as well as the logician, muft direct 
all their labours to this end. 
All Philofophy is either knowledge from pureReafon, 
or rational knowledge from empirical principles. The 
former is termed pure, the latter empirical, Philofophy. 
The Philofophy of Pure Reafon is either the propadeutic 
(preparatory). 
