251 
PHILO 
(preparatory), which inveftigates the faculty of Reafon 
with regard to all pure knowledge d priori, and is called 
a “Critic;” or it is afyftemof pure Reafon (fcience), 
comprehending all philofophical knowledge derived from 
pure realon, both true and apparent, fyftematically con¬ 
nected. This is called Metaphysics. 
Metaphyfics are divifible into the fpeculative and prac¬ 
tical ufe of pure Reafon; and are either Metaphyfics of 
Nature, or Metaphyfics of 3 Iorals. The former contain 
all the pure principles of Reafon from mere conceptions 
of the theoretical knowledge of things in general; the 
latter the principles of praRical knowledge, which deter¬ 
mine our conduct d priori , and render it neceflary. 
The Metaphyfics of Nature confift of Tranfcendental 
Phiio/ophy and the Phyfiology of Pure Reafon. The for¬ 
mer only confiders Reafon and Underftanding in a Syftem 
of all the conceptions and principles, which refer to ob¬ 
jects in general, without however afl'uming objeCts as it 
they were given, (Ontology.) The latter confiders 
Nature ; that is, the aggregate of given objects, (whether 
they are given to our fenfes, or in any other kind of in¬ 
tuition ;) and is therefore rational Physiology. The 
ufe of Reafon in this confideration of Nature is either 
phyfical or hyperphyfical ; or, in other words, either im¬ 
manent or tranfcendent. The former refers to Nature, in 
fo far as its knowledge in experience (in concreto) is pof- 
fible ; the latter to that connexion of objeCts in experi¬ 
ence which tranfcends experience. This Tranfcendent 
Phyfiology has either an internal or an external connex¬ 
ion, both which however go beyond poflible experience 
to its objects: the former is the Phyfiology of collective 
Nature, that is, the tranfcendental knowledge of the Uni- 
verfe; the latter is the Phyfiology of the connexion of 
collective Nature with a Being out of Nature ; that is, the 
tranfcendental knowledge of God. 
Immanent Phyfiology, on the other hand, confiders 
Nature as the aggregate of all the objeCts of Senfe, con- 
fequently fo far as they are given to us, but only accor¬ 
ding to conditions d priori under which they can be 
given. There are however only two kinds of objects: 
1. Thofe of External Senfe ; that is, the whole of corpo¬ 
real nature, z. The objects of Internal Senfe, the Soul, or 
thinking nature. The Metaphyfics of corporeal nature is 
called Physics ; but, as it contains only the principles of 
its knowledge d priori, it is rational pliyfees. The Meta¬ 
phyfics of thinking nature is called Psychology, and 
contains only the principles of its rational knowledge 
d priori. 
The entire Syftem of Metaphyfics therefore confifts of 
four fubdivifions i. Ontology; z . Rational Phy¬ 
siology ; 3. Rational Cosmology; 4. Rational 
Theology. The fecond part, namely, the fcience of 
the Nature of Pure Reafon, contains two fubdivifions— 
Rational Phyfics and Rational Pfychology. 
It may be alked, How can we produce a rational know¬ 
ledge of objects which are empirically given, as in rational 
Phyfiology? We reply, that we only take from experi¬ 
ence what is neceflary to produce an object, either of Ex¬ 
ternal or Internal Senfe. The former takes place from 
the mere conception of Matter, (impenetrability, inert- 
nefs, extenfion ;) the latter arifes from the conception of a 
thinking being (in the empirical internal reprefentation I 
think). We muft, however, include in the Metaphyfics 
of thefe objects all empirical principles which can fti 11 
add any experience to our conception, in order to be able 
to judge of thefe objefts. 
This is then the conception of Metaphyfics which has 
fo long remained obfeure. The want of it, however, has 
always been felt. But, becaufe we had never diftinCtly 
perceived its deftination, and had not fufficiently confi- 
dered that it is a rational fcience, it has always been bur- 
thened with heterogeneous additions. It is that fcience, 
however, which no other genuine fcience can difpenfe 
with. The Mathematics; the ornament of human Rea- 
SOPHY. 
fon, even requires it, if it is to apply its pure fcience of 
quantity to the objeCts that are given to it. And, though 
Religion cannot be ereCted upon Metaphyfics, it can by 
no means difpenfe with it. It muft ferve it as a protec¬ 
tion againft the dogmatical attacks of its opponents. 
Thofe however who decry Metaphyfics without knowing 
its value, may be allured, that, fo long as human Reafon 
exifts, we fhall always have Metaphysics. 
Summary of the History of Pure Reason. 
We (hall conclude with taking a curfory view of all 
that has hitherto been done in the inveftigation of Pure 
Reafon. 
Philofophy made a beginning with the ftudy of God 
and afuture World; two objects with which, as we can 
now decide, it fhould have finifhed. But, when we re¬ 
flect,that, in the beginning of fpeculation, Reafon confi- 
dered the things which furround us as known, but thofe 
two objeCts as diftant and unknown ; and when we reflect 
further on the intereft that Reafon neceflarily takes in 
thefe objeCts, nothing feems more natural than this be¬ 
ginning of fpeculation. 
Without, however, entering chronologically into the 
hiftory of Pure Reafon, we may remark three principal 
points of view which we may take of the progrefs of 
Reafon. 
1. As to the Olje.Sl of Pure Rational Knoiv/edge, we find a 
fubtile diftinCtion. Epicurus may be called the chief of 
the Senfual PhiloJ'ophers ; Plato the chief of the Intellec¬ 
tual Phi lof op hers. The former maintained the objects of 
Senfe alone to be real, and the intellectual objeCts, which 
are not given to the fenfes, to be merely appearances, the 
conceptions of which have a logical but no objective va¬ 
lidity. The latter, on the other hand, affirmed that the 
intellectual is th e real; and that, by abftraCting from what 
the fenfes furnifh confufedly, the Underftanding difeo- 
vers the real objeCts as they are in themfelves. 
z. With refpelt to the Origin of Pure Rational Know¬ 
ledge, Aristotle may be confidered as the chief of the 
Empirifes, Plato of the Noologifes. The former taught 
that all knowledge arifes from Experience; the latter, 
that pure Reafon is alfo a fource of knowledge. In mo¬ 
dern times Locke was a follower of the former, and 
Leibnitz of the latter. Neither of them, however, was 
able to bring this confliCl to a decilion. Epicurus, with 
his fenfual lyftem, proceeded more confidently than Ari!- 
totle and Locke, for he did not allow any objective judg¬ 
ment about objeCts which cannot be given. Locke, on 
the other hand, who aflumed that all our reprefentations 
are of empirical origin, aCted very inconliftently in main¬ 
taining that by means of thefe reprefentations we can ar¬ 
rive at an evident proof of the exiftence of God, and of 
the immortality of the foul; objeCts which cannot be 
given in experience. 
3. As to the Method of Pure Rational Knowledge, it has 
been lometimes Natural, fometimes Scientific. He who 
adopts the natural method, thinks that the important 
problems of Metaphyfics, God, Freedom, and Immortality, 
are much ealier folved by common fenle than by fpecula¬ 
tion. Of courfe he muft alfo be of opinion, that the di- 
menlions and diftance of the moon are more accurately 
afeertained by the eye than by the circuitous way of the 
Mathematics. He who, on the other hand, adopts the. 
fcientific method, may proceed either dogmatically or 
fceptically, but at ali events he muft be fyltematic. The 
former mode was efpouled by the celebrated Wolf; the 
latter by David Hume. The Critical way however has 
not yet been explored. If the reader has had patience 
and perfeverance to accompany me in my travels, lie may 
now decide, whether he will join with mein endeavour¬ 
ing to convert this bye-path into a public highway,- 
through which Human Reafon may be able to arrive at 
ultimate fatisfaClion. 
