tbe fad, only renders it inconceivable, 
150; the infufficiency of his reafoning, ib. 
derived Caufe from the frequent allocation 
of an event that precedes it, 183 ; ap¬ 
proached the neareft of any one to the 
Problem of the ‘‘Critic,” 185: main¬ 
tained that our notion of Caufe and 
Lffedl is a prejudice, 245- 
Idea, every thing out »/Time andSPACK, 
that we think of only, but which can 
never come into TV me and Space, 109; 
whence are Ideas acquired, iiq: the fix 
original Ideas difplayed in a Map of the 
Mind, 127 ; of God , Moral Law, and a 
Future State, 130 ; the 6 raifed from the 
Categories conftitute the very elements of 
Reafon, ib. exemplified by examples, 134 ; 
as explained by Plato, 133 ; of the Uni- 
verfe, 172 ; the fubjedive derivation of them 
from the nature of Reafon itfelf accompUped, 
212 ; its relation to Conception, 230 ; has 
no fchema, but it has an analogon, that is, 
a maximum, by which it becomes determi¬ 
ned, 237 ; it ferves to extend our know¬ 
ledge of experience, 238. 
Idea of a Science to be called the Critic of 
Pure Reason, 186. 
Ideas of Pure Reafon, 209. 
Idealifm leads to abfurdities, for it denies 
the exiftence of the external world, 132 ; 
completely, and for ever, refuted, 205. 
Idealifts, their mode of pbilofophizing ex¬ 
plained, 117; having difcovered that 
extcnfon is no effential property of real 
objeas, they deny the exiftence of the 
external World, and make the power of 
knowledge confift of Reafon alone, ib. 
Ideality of Space maintained, 189. 
I'ilufions arife when we fubftitute fubjedive 
reality for objcdive, 153 ; Illufion, which 
leads to a tranfcendental ufe of the Catego¬ 
ries, 205. 
Imagination is the faculty to reprefent an 
objedt without its prefence, 196; it 
belongs to Senfe, in order to reprefent 
the connexion of a given variety, ib. con- 
fidered as a fpontaneity, it is no other than 
the Underftanding, ib. produdive diftin- 
guifhed from reproductive, ib. 
Immanent, or intrinfic, and tranfeendent, or 
abfurd, 208. 
Immortality of the Soul inacceflible to fpe- 
culative objerftions, 152; fecured from 
the attacks of Sophiftry, 154; fully de- 
monftrated, 168. 
Impoflibility of an Ontological proof of the 
^exiftence of God, 231 j of a Cofmological 
proof of the exiftence of God, 232; of a 
Pbyfico-Tkeological proof of the exiftence of 
God, 233. ( 
Impreffions received by the Senfes are clo¬ 
thed with the Forms of Time and Space, 
* 53 - 
Indolent Reafon perfuades itfelf that it has 
accomplifhed its talk; this is a fault, 
239 - 
Influence of Philofophy upon human hap- 
pinefs, 176; upon the ftudy of the fciences, 
177. 
Intelledlual laws are the laws of the pheno¬ 
menal world, 151. 
Internal Intuition, all the eftedts in the 
world, 127 ; informs us of the exiftence 
of ejects in Time, 128 ; refolved into Sen- 
fation, ib. alfo called Phenomena, ib. 
Internal Senfe receives a variety in fuccef- 
fion, 1275 occaflons us to reprefent objedts 
in Time, 187. 
Intuition, whatever is prefent to the 
mind and affedts the fenfe-s, 109 ; every 
thing prefent in Time and Space, that we 
feel, fee, hear, tafte, or fmell, ib. mute- 
PHILOSOPHY. 
dinte knowledge, that requires no adt of 
reafoning, 127; whatever aftedts the 
fenfes while prefent, 128 ; refolved into 
Senfation, ib. divided into internal and 
external, ib. a fenfation when prefent, 
129 ; exemplified by the example of St. 
Paul’s, 134; without Conception, is blind, 
ib. is a fad, and can only exift in Time 
and Space, 166; furnilhes no knowledge 
of the things as they are in themfelves, but 
only as they appear, 168 ; cannot be re- 
prefented otherwife than as given, 170; 
a priori, is hardly to .be diftinguiflied from 
a pure Conception, 183 ; immediate knowledge, 
187; is nothing but a reprefent,ition of 
phenomena, and, if we annul ouift-ives in 
thought, we at the fame time annihilate 
the apparent things, together with Time and 
Space, 191. 
Intuitive Faculty, 167; confifts of diftindt 
parts 5 the one receives the matter of 
knowledge, the other gives it a form, 124. 
Is it poflible to know any thing of immate¬ 
rial exiftences ?. 114. 
Is Reafon a faculty of knowledge that refers 
to objedts, or merely a fubordinate faculty 
to arrange knowledge under a few heads, 
and thus to afiift the Underftanding ? 209. 
Judgments of Experience are altogether_/yK- 
thetical, 184. 
Juftice and Injuftice are principles of Reafon, 
172. 
Kant, lias performed the Herculean talk 
of uniting all philofophy into one Syfem, 
no; has furnifhed a complete Catalogue 
of the Elements of the Mind, ib. how 
can pofterity ever duly confecrate his me¬ 
mory for removing the ftumbling-blocks 
that flood in the way of religion and phi¬ 
lofophy ? ib. has eftablilhed Morality on 
the adamantine bafts of Truth, and van- 
quilhed Atheifm and Scpticifm, ib. has 
placed Reafon upon her judgment-feat, 
no; the author of the Cr itic of Pure 
Reason, ib. has eredted Philofophy into 
a complete and permanent fyftem, which 
he has called Transcendental Phi¬ 
losophy, ib. the greateft of all philo- 
fophers, ib. the greater part of his life de¬ 
voted to the Analyfls of the Mind, 112 ; 
fully explains the notions of Extenfon, 
Time, Space, &c. ib. lias made conlidera- 
ble contributions to Aftronomy, Natural 
Philofophy, and Mechanics, by his new 
Theory of Motion, 113; lie conceived he 
fliould be at firft mifunderfood, but ulti¬ 
mately adopted, ib. treats of objedts that 
intereft the whole human race, 114 5 his 
philofophy not borrowed from preceding 
ages, ib. fufpedted that in all controver- 
fies the truth did not lie all on one fide, ib. 
his criterion of what is knowable, ib. in- 
veftigates thefaculty oifmple apprehenfon, 
115 ; forced to fall back on the relources 
of his own mind, ib. talked himfelf to 
find a univerfal anfwer to the queftion. 
What is the nature and extent of human know¬ 
ledge T ib. ar.fwers Hume’s doubts refpec- 
ting Caufe and EffeCt, ib. determines this 
notion to be a Category of the Mind, ib. 
difeovers the other 1 1 Categories, ib. 
claffes all prior philofophers under the 
four fedls of Materialifs, Idealifts, Spiri- 
tualifts, and Sceptics, ib. founds a fyftem 
free from the errors of his predeceflor, 116; 
difeovers the point of delufion which pre¬ 
vented a union of principle, 117 ; deter¬ 
mines that it is not neceflary to inveftigate 
deeply the nature of the objedts in order 
to acquire a knowledge of the knowing fa¬ 
culty, ib. the mental faculties are ob¬ 
jedts of confcioufnefs, ib. his mode of phi- 
255 
lofophizing aims at univerfal evidence, 118; 
a complete view of his fpeculative princi¬ 
ples, ib. his folution of Hume’s problem, 
Whence is our notion of Caufe and EJeCl de¬ 
rived ? ib. this furnilhed him with a com¬ 
plete analfis of the Human Mmd, ib. had 
now difcovered a fcience indifpenfable to 
mankind, 119: his philofophy has a di¬ 
rect refeience to the molt facred inlerefts 
of mankind, ib. his theoretical principles 
precifely determine the number of thofe 
dodtrines of mechanics, &c. which have 
their origin in the mind, ib. his dodtrines 
of vital importance to man, ib. the moft 
enlightened, diftinguilhed, anl illuftrious, 
fjccefl’or of Locke and Leibnitz, 120 ; his 
Philofophy introduced into Britain with 
great pretenfions, 123 ; at 22 years of 
age combaled Leibnitz’s Theory of Mo¬ 
tion, 124; theeffential difference between 
Senfe and Underflanding is a leading feature 
with him, 125 ; his account of Time and 
Space is completely fatisfadtory, ib. Ilia 
additions to Hume’s doubts, 126; his 
analyfis of the Human Mind, ib. not led 
away by Hume’s coiiclufions, ib. refumed 
the inveftigations of Caufe and EffeCl, ib. 
this notion not derived from experience, 
127; fettled Time and Space at an early 
period of his career, ib. his Philofophy 
does not lead to Idealifm, 128 ; has com¬ 
pleted the theory of Pythagoras, 129; and 
Copernicus compared, ib. his Philofophy 
has efi'edted a glorious revolution, ib. his 
theory converts all the fubftances of the 
world into mere appearances, ib. the 
pradtical advantages of his fyftem pointed 
out, ib. it leads ciredtly to the Godhead, 
a plain ftatement of what lie has added to 
the Philofophy of Mind, 130; his claim to 
originality vindicated, 131 ; his intelledlual 
chart, ib. caught a glimple of what Hume 
was about, and completed this into his 
renowned Syfem, 133 ; his fyftem deferves 
to be inveftigated, and not reviled, ib. has 
completely analyzed the mental powers, 134 3 
conftantly devoted to that invifible power 
Virtue, 135 ; his charadler pourtrayed by 
Mad. De Stael, ib. determines the empire 
of the Senfes and the Soul, 136 3 is accufed 
of repeating old Syflems in a new language, 
but this is unfounded, ib. acknowledges 
that he is greatly indebted to Flume, 139 ; 
his De Mundi Scnfibilis atque intelligibilis 
forma et priftcipiis, written in Latin to ob¬ 
tain the metaphyfical chair, ib. has deter¬ 
mined Time and Space to be mental recep¬ 
tivities, 140 ; had not yet difcovered his 
Categories, ib. his letter to the great Lam¬ 
bert, 141 ; arrives at certain notions whicli 
lie thinks he never lhall have occafion to 
change, 142 ; folicits Lambert’s co-ope¬ 
ration, lb. has left as a legacy to pofterity 
a fcience complete in all its parts, and to 
which future generations can neither add 
nor detradt, ib. returns from his voyage of 
d fcovery, ib. his 1 Prolegomena ,’ ib. his 
own account of his labours, ib. deftined to 
make the difeoveries he gave the world, 
1444 it will require a new generation be¬ 
fore they can be felt, ib. deftined to ac- 
complifli a complete revolution in fpecu¬ 
lative fcience, 151 ; his method is diame¬ 
trically oppofite to that of his predeceffors, 
ib. has a digued to each of our faculties 
its limits and powers, 152; inveftigated 
the Knowing Faculty, ib. has eftablilhed 
the connexion between the different 
parts of his fyftem, 154; his political re- 
fiedtions on the French revolution and the 
death of the king of France, 1553 his 
tonverfatioii as remarkable for its point 
as 
