253 
as its infiruCtion, ib. highly approves of 
the labours of Schultz, ib. defirous of 
Schultz’s co-operation, 157; it is morti¬ 
fying that his labours fiiould ftill be ap¬ 
preciated by imperfect extracts, 160; has 
by his perfevering efforts achieved a true 
Ph'ilofopby of Mind, 163; has devoted the 
firft part of the 'Critic' to the develop¬ 
ment of the two important notions of Time 
and Space , ib. his explanation of their 
poffibility, 171; nothing fhort of his fub- 
lime difcoveries could have led to fuch af- 
tonifhing refults, 182. 
Kantefian, a bold Theory, and feems to fly 
in the face of common fenfe, fo indeed was 
the Copernican, 129; its practical advan¬ 
tages are immenfe, ib. has given the 
death-blow to all fpeculative arguments 
employed to elucidate nature, ib. has 
finally eradicated Materialifm, Idealifm , 
Spiritualifm, and Scepticifm, ib. pofTeffes 
very extraordinary attraction for the re¬ 
flective mind, 132; completely fatisfies 
the enquiring mind, ib. has occupied for 
more than twenty years all the thinking 
heads in Germany, 135 ; it givesa Angu¬ 
lar attraction to all kinds of ftudy, 136; 
if its foundation is not underftood, how 
can its fuperfiruCture be comprehended? 
138 ; as it contains nothing but truth , the 
more it is inveftigated the more it will be 
confirmed, 145 ; the nobleft fyftem that 
the hiftory of the mind prefents, 149; 
traced to its generation, 1503 fo Arrange 
at the firA glance, refolves difficulties 
which no other can, 1533 explained with 
aAonifhing accuracy by Kinker, 158; not 
arbitrarily affumed, but a fall of internal 
experience , 160; not one Angle Aep can be 
made in this theory until the ever-obtru¬ 
ding notions of Time and Space are com¬ 
pletely defined, 163 ; was the firA that 
produced a ‘ Critic' as a complete Syflem 
of Reafon, 169. 
Kepler confirmed the theory of Copernicus, 
129. 
Key to all true Knowledge is Intuition, 
Conception, and Idea, 109. 
Kinker (I.), tranflated Kant's works from 
the Dutch under the title of EJJhi d'une 
Exposition fuccinte de la Raifon Pure, 138; 
this work may be fafely referred to as an 
eafy introduction to the New Philofopby, 
158 - 
Knowing Faculty, as explained by the four 
philofophic feCts, the Materialifis, the 
IdealiAs, the Spiritualifls, and the Scep¬ 
tics, 1173 is given us folely for thepurpofe 
of generating experience, 152 ; when 
it paffes thefe limits it abufes its pow¬ 
ers, ib. arifes from the union of Intui¬ 
tions with Conceptions , 205 5 is fpecula¬ 
tive when it refers to an objeCt which 
cannot be given in experience, 234; 
difference between Mathematical and 
Philofophical, 242 ; the former is intuitive , 
the latter dfcurfve , ib. 
Knowledge begins with experience, no; 
generated by the Mind, ib. wholly con¬ 
tained in Time and Space, ill; an enquiry 
into the true nature of this power, 117 ; 
Its common nature explained, 118 ; con¬ 
veyed through the medium of Senfation, 
128 ; of external fubflances is nothing but 
Senfation, ib. defined, 134; completely 
defined for all future generations, 134; 
its different bafes afiigned, 1523 the pheno¬ 
mena is all we can know, r58 ; we do not 
know the things as they are in thcnfelves, 
but only as phenomena, 169; d priori an¬ 
nounces itfelf in everyone’s confcioufnefs, 
169; it fprings from the nature of the 
PHILOSOPHY. 
mind, ib. not obtained by means of Ideas, 
ib. its fubje&ive and objealive part deter¬ 
mined, 170; its whole field divided into 
Theoretical and Prallical, 172 ; is only 
arrived at through Philofophy, 179 ; Pure 
and Empirical, 183 ; begins with expe¬ 
rience, ib. is a compound of impreffians 
received from without, and the operation 
of the mind, ib. is tranfcendental when it 
only concerns our mode of knowing objeCts, 
186 ; a priori is deduced from the two pure 
Intuitions Time and Space, 190; begins 
with Intuition, by which the variety or 
parts of an objeCt are given, 194; is the 
determinate reference of given reprefenta- 
tion to an objeCt, 195; mult have the 
objeCt prefent in an Intuition, 196; we 
know ourfelves only as -we appear, but not 
as we are in ourfelves, ib. we do not know 
the things in themfelves, but only as they 
appear to us, 199 ; if we could know the 
objeSlsin themfelves, we lhould find ourfelves 
in a Spiritual World, 246 ; it is either hif- 
torical or rational, 230. 
Lambert confidered as the firA genius in 
Germany, 141 ; a philofophical corref- 
pondence between him and Kant, ib. 
exerts himfelf to afliA in Kant’s fpecula- 
tions, ib. a letter from Kant to Lambert, 
ib. his perfpicuous remarks in anfwer to 
Kant’s letter, 142; his hypothefis to ex¬ 
plain experience, 233. 
Language greatly promoted by Philofophy, 
178. 
Laws of Nature, knowledge of them leads to 
the explanation of an infinite number of 
phenomena, 121 ; do not contradict the 
Idea of Liberty, 228. 
Leibnitz, his theory of motion combated by 
Kant, 124; diAinguilhes between Senfe 
and Underfunding, ib. aA'erts that they 
only differ in degree, ib. this diAinftion is 
falfe, 125 ; the neceflity of Time and Space 
difcuffed with Dr. Clarke, 1315 a great 
SpiritualiA, 145; interrogated the Deity 
regarding knowledge, 151 ; approaches to 
the pure forms of the mind, 153 ; miAook 
the origin of knowledge, 191; confidered 
the phenomena to be the things in themfelves, 
confufed by the fenfitive faculty, 206 ; 
his monads, 207 ; omitted the tranfcenden¬ 
tal refe&ion, and confounded the pheno¬ 
mena with the noumena, ib. intellefitualized 
the Categories, and, together with them, 
phenomena, 207 ; his intellectual fyfiem 
re As on falfe pcftions, ib. endeavoured to 
evade the argument that the world is 
infinite, 217; his explanation of the term 
monade, 218 ; a follower of Plato, 231. 
Liberty, its idea inacceffible to fpeculative 
objections, 152; is the faculty of a being 
in fo far as he is a thing in itfelf, and not 
merely a phenomenon, 227; does not contra¬ 
dict the Neceffity of Nature, 228. 
Liberty and Equality, and the Rights of 
Man, 181. 
Life, a voyage of probation, 129 ; a future 
one opened to us, ib. 
Locke, claffed material and immaterial objeCts 
under Idea, 133; the confufion in his Syf- 
tem arifes from the want of an Analyfs of 
the Mind, 134; a complete Materialifi, 
145 ; the fate of hisdoCtrinedecided, 149 ; 
fought in our fenfations the faithful image 
of the objeCts that caufe them, 151; his 
Effay on the Human Underfianding, 163; 
perfuaded himfelf that he had difcovered 
the origin of the Categories in experience, 
195; fenfualized the Categories, for he 
confidered them as conceptions derived 
from experience, whereas they conAitute it, 
2073 a follower of AriAotle, 251, 
4 
Logic, a fpeculative fcience which has had 
its cffential parts fettled for many centu¬ 
ries, 116; the neceffary laws of thinking 
in general, 172; its importance in Natu¬ 
ral Philofophy, 177; Tranfcendental Logic, 
the fcience of the rules of thinking, 193 ; 
is a Canon of UnderAanding, and Reafon, 
ib. Conclufions of Reafon and of Under¬ 
Aanding, 208; difference between Tranf¬ 
cendental and Pure Univerfal , 240. 
Logical and Tranfcendental Reflection, 206. 
Man does not exifl in Time and Space, ill ; 
when he arrives at maturity is confcious 
of many defeCts and bad habits contracted 
in infancy, 121; not to judge from what 
he feels and fees, 129 ; confidered a Phe¬ 
nomenon and Noumenon, 130; if he only 
confulted his Senfations, he could form no 
idea of the fupreme goodnefs, 136 ; awards 
to himfelf a Happinefs proportionate to his 
Virtue, 149 ; can neither alienate his 
ownLiberty nor infringe upon that of others, 
ib. the virtuous alone worthy of happinefs, 
154; commanded to realize the mode in which 
reafon alls, 155; is diflinguiflied from 
brutes by his capacity for language, 185 ; 
the power of perfectibility Is his charac- 
teriAic, ib. the true deAination of Man, 
ib. not fatisfied with the perceptible, but 
conAantly exerts himfelf to difeover their 
laA grounds, 166 ; can only have intuitions 
in Time and Space, ib. in order to fulfil 
his deAination, muA exf for ever, 168 ; 
muA perceive every thing in Time and 
Space, 170; his higheA deAination, 171; 
his abfolute worth and dignity reA upon 
his moral faculties, ib. is both of a Senfual 
and Spiritual nature, ib. is the only being 
that falls into difagreement with himfelf, ib. 
his very nature is contrived for difeordand 
felf-combat, 174; falfely confidered as 
exifling only for enjoyment, and then 
defiined for ever to peri fh, 175 i ou §ht to 
fubjeCt the ends of his fenfes to his higher 
or moral end, 176; may eafily tranquillize 
his mind if he has aCted upon rational 
grounds, ib. is defiined to a continual 
progrefllve knowledge, 182; not merely def- 
tined for this earthly exfence , 214- 
Map of the Human Mind, 113; completely 
developed, 127; defies all improvement, 
131 ; mufi ultimately be adopted, ib, its 
aflonilhing difeovery enabled its Kant to 
ereCITRANSC EN DENTAL PHILOSOPHY, 
133; its practical application, 134. 
Material Philofophy explained, 172. 
Materialifm leads to abfurdities, lor it de¬ 
prives us of a Free Will, 13® 5 Kant’s 
attack upon this fyfiem is alone a mafier- 
piece, 13d. 
Materialifis, their mode of philofophizing 
explained, 117; they formed arbitrary 
notions of the objeCts around them, and 
thence deduced the nature of the Knowing 
Faculty, 117; having difcovered that 
extenfon is an effential property of the 
things, they convert the Knowing Faculty 
into a mechanical power, ib. 
Mathematical Judgments are intuitive, 168 3 
fynthetical, 185; principles are confitutive, 
the Dynamical principles are regulative, 
237 3 method cannot be followed in Philo¬ 
fophy, 241. " 
Mathematics, the fciente of the Laws 
of the Senfitive Faculty, or of the two 
Mental Receptivities Time and Space, 
109 ; a pure fcience a priori, ib, entirely 
defiroyed, if External Space can be 
maintained, 135 ; founded upon pure 
Space and Time, 153; univerfally certain 
without the tefiimony of experience, 168; 
a fcience of Reafon retting upon pure 
fundamental 
