2G0 
of a variety of parts, which lie perma¬ 
nently one near another, 127 3 is always 
. prefent to the mind, 128 ; a pure intuition, 
ib. fubjeftive reality, 1323 it is high 
time to put an end to the abfurd notion 
of an abfolute external Space which deprives 
us of the entire fcience of Geometry, 134 5 
our notions cannot alter Space itfelf, 135 ; 
is attendant on every outward object, and 
conftitutes its form, 163; an Intuition 
a priori, 187 ; the form of External Senfe, 
il). its metaphyfical expofition, ib. is not 
an abftraft conception, 188 3 is the foun¬ 
dation of all External Intuition, ib. is a 
Pure Intuition, ib. is an infinite given 
quantity, ib. its tranfcendental expofition, 
io. its Ideality proved, ib. is nothing inde¬ 
pendent of the Mind, ib. it does not in 
any way belong to the things in themfelves, 
190; every feparate part of it is a pure 
intuition, 241. 
Speculative Philofophy is fufceptible of 
univerfal evidence, 116; Speculative 
Reafon contrafted with Praftical Reafon, 
138. 
Spiritualifts, their mode of philofophizing 
explained, 117; perfuading themfelves 
that they know immaterial objefts, derive 
their knowledge of the Mental Faculties 
from them, ib. 
Spontaneity, or a felf-aBive faculty, 127; 
the power of forming Intuitions, 152 ; of 
the firft degree is Senfe, ib. connects a 
variety given to the Mind, 193. 
States owe their amelioration to the Morality 
implanted in us, 177. 
Statuary, when he carves a figure, does 
nothing but unite Intuitions, 128. 
Stewart (Dugald), confidered as the firft 
Englifh metaphyfician, in; not fatisfied 
with his own ‘ Philofophy of the Human 
Mind,' ib. his intention of completing his 
Analyfis of the IntelkBual Powers, 112 ; 
confiders the notion of Extenfion as a fact 
altogether unaccountable, ib. his promife 
of twenty two years Handing to complete 
his Mental Analyfis, ib. a prediction that 
he never can accomplifh it, ib. has occu¬ 
pied a great portion of his life in attempt¬ 
ing to perform a talk which Kant has ac- 
complifhed thefe forty years ,119; his au¬ 
thority ftands fo high, that, were he to 
recommend the inveftigation of a work, it 
would have the defired efi'eft, ib. he ftates 
that the acquirements of the enlightened 
few are imparted to the many, ib. every 
improvement in the ftudy ofthe Mind may 
be regarded as a difcovery, 120; over¬ 
looked the improvements in modern me- 
taphyfics, ib. invited to examine Kant’s 
fyftem, ib. h>s Seft. VII. entitled Kant 
and other Metaphyficians of the New Ger¬ 
man School, 120; recommends to pufil our 
enquiries regarding the Mind as far as we 
can, ib. devoted to, and demonftrates the 
utility of, the Philofophy of Mind, 121 ; 
a partial and injudicious ftudy of the 
mind replete with danger, ib. recommends 
an accurate analyfis of the mental powers , 
ib. hopes to fee the reign of error fuc- 
cceded by that of true philofophy, ib the 
conqueft of early prejudices will fortify 
the conclufionsof Reafon, 122 ; calledupon 
to recommend an invefiigation of the Critic 
of Pure Reason, ib. no fuch recom¬ 
mendation in Sett. VII. ib. fays, I do not 
profefs to be an adept in the Philofophy of 
Kant, ib. ftates that he is utterly unable 
to unriddle Kant’s meaning, and is wholly 
unacquainted with the new difeoveries 
made by Kant, ib. infers, becaufe he can¬ 
PHILOSOPHY, 
not underftand Kant’s works, that they 
are incomprehenftble, ib. advifed to refer 
them to young ftudents of his own Urvi- 
verfity, ib. fays that Kant has made no 
new difeoveries, but has appropriated the 
opinions of others to himfelf, under the 
deep difguife of his new phrafeology, ib. is 
utterly unable to underftand Kant’s works, 
yet pofttively afierts that they are deftitute 
of all fenfe and meaning, 123; being ig¬ 
norant ofthe fubjeft, is not qualified to do 
juftice to Kant’s merits, ib. his Difl’erta- 
tion gives a very unfatisfaftory account of 
tiiis renowned fyftem, ib. totally ignorant 
of the German language, ib. an Abftraft of 
Kant’s Philofophy forwarded to him in 
1813, and his criticifms folicited, ib. 
great expectations formed of his patronage, 
ib. requefted to intereft the Univeriity of 
Edinburgh, ib. has had frequent opportu¬ 
nities of preparing himfelf lor the talk of 
reviewing Kant’s works, ib. German 
Metaphyfics a phenomenon of the 
eighteenth century, 124; his chief reliance 
is on Kant’s own Latin Work 1 De Mundi 
Senfibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Princi- 
piis,' 1770, ib. hopes his remarks will call 
forth fome perfon to correft his miftakes, 
ib. his inability to perform the talk he lias 
undertaken, ib. cannot read the language 
in which the ‘ Critic' is written, nor his 
barbarous Latin tranflation of that work, 
ib. has had recourfe to Dr. Willich’s 
chronological account of Kant’s works, 
ib. mutilates the extracts he takes from 
the doftor, denies to Kant any originality, 
125; fays Cudworth has advanced as far 
as Kant, ib. fancies he has difeovered 
Tranfcendental Philofophy in Cudworth, 
and that Kant’s Critic is a plagiarifm, 
ib. did not avail himfelf of Cudworth’s 
labours, ib. cannot fubferibe to all his 
doftrines, ib. is ftill labouring to perform 
what he afierts Cudworth had accom- 
pliihed more than a century ago, ib. has 
failed to eftablifh his pofition, 126 ; pre¬ 
tends to dilcover a fimilarity between 
Cudworth and Kant, ib. is making every 
effort to write Kant down, 129; has not 
attacked any one fundamental pofition, 
ib. will he ftill afiert that Cudworth 
equals Kant ? 130 ; his objeft is to defend 
Cudworth’s doftrine, 131 ; ranks Catife 
and EjfeSl among his natural prejudices, ib. 
commits great folly in comparing Cud¬ 
worth with Kant, ib. his readers warned 
from being nulled by his ftatements, 131 ; 
prefented with a Chart and Compafs to 
diredt his future wanderings, ib. ne has 
no fyftem at all, ib. fays Time and Space 
are not fit fubjefts for argument, ib. can¬ 
not even conceive the notion of SubjeEiive 
Space, ib. alarmed for his favorite doftrine, 
132; cannot define Scnfation, Memory, 
Exifience, See. 133 ; is fincerely to be 
pitied for his inability to comprehend 
Tranfcendental Philofophy, but not to be 
pardoned for his wilful or ignorant mifre- 
prefentations of that divine fyftem, ib. 
muft not be fufiered by his authority to 
deter others from ufing their own intel. 
lefts on this fubjedl, ib. profefles to be 
able to bring down Kant’s Philofophy to 
its proper level, ib. fays Kant’s Morals 
reft on a Conundrum, 134; fays Mad. 
De Stael’s works have given the German 
Syftem a temporary confequence, 135; not 
qualified to correft the miftakes ot Mad. 
De Stael, ib. appealed with confidence to 
her judgment, 136 ; does not condefcend 
any-where to make a favourable mention 
of the new German Syftem, 137; feems 
gratified at reviling this fyftem, ib. comes 
forward to acknowledge his inability to 
comprehend the new Syftem, and is defi- 
rous to banilh it from the earth, ib. com¬ 
mits a great miftake in faying that Kant’s 
work on Praftical Reafon is an after¬ 
thought, 138 ; is now making his grand ef¬ 
fort to crujh the New Philosophy alto¬ 
gether, 139 ; he places his chief reliance 
on a work written in Latin by Kant, enti¬ 
tled De Mundi Senfibilis atqUe Intelligibilis 
Forma et Principiis, 1770, when candidate 
for the Metaphyfical Chair, 140; unfor¬ 
tunately has never feen this work,but only 
extracts from it in Dr. Willich, ib. his 
edifying remarks on thefe extrafts, ib. 
fays, Kant's pofitions are quite unintelligible, 
and feem to aim at involving plain truths in 
darkntfs and myjlery, 141 3 why he did 
not recommend the inveftigation of this 
new fcience is not eafily to be accounted 
for, 142; he poflefies an Englilh tranfla¬ 
tion of Kant’s Prolegomena, ib. his Iettets 
on Kant’s Philofophy, 143 ; baneful 
effects of his authority, ib. his miftake 
in criticizing the De Mundi Senfibilis 
inftead of the “Critic,” is not to be 
pardoned, 144; his “Elements of the 
Human Mind” do not contain the ap¬ 
proach even to fyftem, and are not likely 
therefore to eclipfe Kant, 145 ; has fet 
down Reinhold as having confounded 
Intuition, Conception, and Idea, 148; if he 
could but read German, muft be able to un— 
derftand the illuftrat.on of Kant’s Syftem 
by Schultz, 155 ; his endowments mult 
not be taken as the ftandard of Britilh in- 
telleft, 158 ; lias fpent all his life in the 
purfuit of a phantom, 160; his infur- 
mountable difficulty fully folved, 162. 
Subjective and Objeftive clearly dillinguiffi- 
ed, 155 5 ftill'further illuftrated, 1 58. 
Sublime, the, explained 136 ; and Beautiftl, 
depend on the play of the imagination, 
149 ; is the harmony between Imagina¬ 
tion and Reafon, 1543 too remarkable to 
be overlooked, 167. 
Substance muft not be clafled among com¬ 
mon words, for it is of a very different 
ftamp, it is a Category, 1333 defined, 
183. 
Superftition entirely fupprefled by Kant’s 
Theory, 129. 
Syllogifms, things of Logic that are often 
erroneous, 129 ; are of three kinds : 
1. Categorical Synthefis, in afubjeft. 
2. Hypothetical Synthefis, of a feries. 
3. Disjunctive Synthefis in a fyftem, 210 ; 
major and minor terms explained, 224. 
Syn thefis is the addition of different repre» 
fentations into one, 194 ; it may proceed 
according to a certain conception, ib. 
Synthetical Judgments are both a priori and 
a pofteriori, 135; fynthetic or progreflive 
method explained, 168. 
Synthetical Principles a priori, their pofiibilily 
proved, 199; they are as follows: 
1. Axioms of Intuition. 
2. Anticipation of Apprehenfion. 
3. Analogies of Experience. 
4. Poftulates of experimental Reafoning, 
200. 
Syftematical reprefentation of all the Synthe¬ 
tical Principles of Pure Underftanding, 
199. 
Table of the Elements of the Mind, 127 5 
of Judgments, arranged under the heads of 
Quantity, Quality, Relation , Modality, 
193. 
Taite, theory of, according to Kant, 149- 
