633 
PLATO. 
be one. God, according to Plato, is the Supreme Intel¬ 
ligence, incorporeal, without beginning, end, or change, 
and capable of being perceived only by the mind. He 
certainly diftinguiflied the Deity, not only from body, 
and whatever has corporeal qualities, but from matter 
itfelf, from which all things are made. He alfo afcribed 
to him all thofe qualities which modern philofophers 
afcribe to immaterial fubftance, and conceived him to be 
in his nature fimple, uncircumfcribed in fpace, theauthor 
of all regulated motion, and, in fine, poffeffed of intelli¬ 
gence in the higheft perfection. But whether he entirely 
feparated all ideas of extenfion from his conception of 
the Deity, is a queftion which we find ourfelves unable 
to folve. Thus much, however, is certain, that what¬ 
ever were Plato’s conceptions refpefting the eflence of 
Deity, he afcribed to him power and wifdom fufficient for 
the formation and prefervation of the world, and fuppofed 
him pofTefTed of goodnefs, which inclined him to defire, 
and, as far as the refractory nature of matter would 
permit, to produce, the happinefs of the univerfe. This 
Great Being he diftinguiflied by the appellation of To Aya- 
0 oi', The Good. “God, that he might form a perfeft 
world, followed that eternal pattern which remains im¬ 
mutable, and which can only be comprehended by reafon.” 
Thefe are the exprefs words of Plato, who every where 
inculcates this doctrine as fundamental in cofmology. 
But concerning this pattern, or archetype, he writes fo 
obfcurely, that his interpreters and followers have been 
led to adopt very different opinions. He frequently 
fpeaks of God under the appellation of Minrl, and repre- 
fents him as the Caufeof all things. “ That Good Caufe,” 
fays he (e which appointed the years, and months, and 
hours, juftly claims the appellation of wifdom and intel¬ 
ligence.” And again. “You muft confefs in the na- 
ture.of God himfelf a ruling mind, and the energy of an 
efficient caufe.” 
From thefe and other fimilar paffages fome have in¬ 
ferred, that the whole of Plato’s doftrine on the forma¬ 
tion of the world amounts to nothing more, than that 
the Deity employed his underftanding or reafon in plan¬ 
ning and executing the fyftem of the univerfe; and con- 
fequently, that by ideas exifting in the reafon of God are 
only meant, conceptions formed in the divine mind. 
But by ideas Plato appears to have meant fomething 
much more myfterious ; namely, patterns, or archetypes, 
fubfifting by themfelves, as real beings, ovras avia., in the 
divine reafon, as in their original and eternal region, and 
ifiuing thence to give form to fenfible things, and to 
become objefts of contemplation and fcience to rational 
beings. The divine reafon, the eternal region of ideas 
or forms, Plato fpeaks of as having always exifted, and 
as the divine principle which eftablilhed the order of the 
world. He appears to have conceived of this principle, 
as diftinft not merely from matter, but from the efficient 
caufe, and as eternally containing within itfelf ideas, or 
intelligible forms, which, flowing from the fountain of 
the divine eflence, have in themfelves a real exiftence, and 
which, in the formation of the vifible world, were, by 
the energy of the.efficient caufe, united to matter, to pro¬ 
duce fenfible bodies. Thefe ideas Plato defines to be the 
particular natures of things, or effences as fuch ; and 
afferts, that they always remain the fame, without begin¬ 
ning or end. Vifible things were regarded by him as 
fleeting fhades, and ideas as the only permanent fub- 
ftances. Thefe he conceived to be the proper objefts of 
fcience, to a mind raifed, by divine contemplation, above 
the perpetually-varying fcenes of the material world. 
His conceptions on this fubjeft are beautifully expreffed 
in a paflage of his Republic, in which he compares the 
ftate of the human mind with refpeft to the material and 
the intellectual world, to that of a man who, in a cave 
into which no light can enter but by a Angle paflage, 
views, upon a wall oppoiite to the entrance, the fhadows 
of external objefts, and miltakes them for realities. It 
was another doctrine in the Platonic fyftem, that the 
Vol. XX. No. i 397 . 
Deity formed the material world after a perfeft archetype, 
which had eternally fubfifted in his reafon, and endued it 
with a foul. ' This fubftance, which is not eternal but 
produced, and which derives the fuperior part of its 
nature from God, and the inferior from matter. Plato 
fuppofed to be the animating principle in the univerfe, 
pervading and adorning all things. This third principle 
in nature is, in the Platonic fyftem, inferior to the Deity, 
being derived from that divine reafon which is the feat 
of the ideal world ; herein differing fundamentally from 
the ftoical doftrine of the foul of the world, which fup¬ 
pofed the eflence of the divine nature diffufed through 
the univerfe. 
Upon the foundation of the doftrine which has been 
explained, concerning God, matter, ideas, the foul of 
the world, and daemons, Plato raifed the ftrufture of his 
phyfics. He taught that the fupreme architect, by uni¬ 
ting eternal and immutable ideas or forms to variable 
matter, produced the vifible world. That he believed the 
world to have had a beginning in time, and not to have 
exifted from eternity, appears from the whole courfe of 
his reafoning in his Timasus concerning the formation of 
the world. Other tenets included in the Platonic doc¬ 
trine of nature were—that the univerfe is one animated 
being, including within its limits all animated natures; 
that, in the formation of the vifible and tangible world, 
fire and earth were firft formed, and were afterwards 
united by means of air and water; that from perfeft 
parts one perfect whole was produced, of a lpherical 
figure, as molt beautiful in itfelf, and belt Anted to con¬ 
tain all other figures ; that the elementary parts of the 
world are of regular geometrical forms, the particles of 
earth being cubical, thofe of fire pyramidal, thofe of air 
in the form of an oftohedron, and thofe of water in that 
of an icofohedron; that thefe are adjufted, in number, 
meafure, and power, in perfeft conformity to the geome¬ 
trical laws of proportion ; that the foul which pervades 
this fphere, is the caufe of its revolution round its centre; 
and, laftly, that the world will remain for ever, but that, 
by the aftion of its animating principle, it accomplilhes, 
certain periods, within which every thing returns to its 
ancient place and ftate. This periodical revolution of 
nature, is called the Platonic, or great, year. 
Plato refers to the head of the Philofophy of Nature 
his doftrine concerning the humanJoul: a doftrine which 
he treats obfcurely, on the ground of his affumed hypo- 
thefis concerning fpiritual emanations from the divine 
nature. He appears to have taught, that the foul of man 
is derived by emanation from God ; but that this ema¬ 
nation was not immediate, but through the intervention 
of the foul of the world, which was itfelf debafed by fome 
material admixture ; and, confequently, that the human 
foul, receding farther from the firft intelligence, is 
inferior in perfeftion to the foul of the world. He con¬ 
ceived the foul of man to be, in the material part of its 
nature, formed for converfing with fenfible objefts, and, 
in its intelleftual part, capable of fpiritual contemplation : 
but what he meant by oyrtyaa, the material vehicle of the 
foul, is uncertain. He teaches, however, in exprefs terms, 
the doftrine of the immortality of the foul ; but he has 
refted the proof of this doftrine upon arguments drawn 
from the more fanciful parts of his fyftem. For example : 
in nature, all things terminate in their contraries ; the 
ftate of fleep terminates in that of waking, and the 
reverfe; fo, life ends in death, and death in life. The 
foul is a fimple indivifible fubftance, and therefore in¬ 
capable of diffolution, or corruption. The objefts to 
which it naturally adheres are fpiritual and incorruptible ; 
therefore its nature is fo. All our knowledge is acquired 
by the reminifcence of ideas contemplated in a prior 
ftate: as the foul therefore muft have exifted before this 
life, it is probable, that it will continue to exilt after it. 
Life being the conjunftion of the foul with the body, 
death is nothing more than their feparation. Whatever 
is the principle of motion, muft be incapable of deltruftion. 
7 Y Such 
