SPAIN. 
419 
France and Madrid; and, if a favourable opportunity offered, 
to attack the Duke of Dalmatia’s corps, or any of the cover¬ 
ing divisions that should present themselves. He foresaw 
that this would necessarily draw upon him a large French 
force, and of course would prove an important diversion in 
favour of the Spaniards; who would by this means have the 
opportunity of collecting in the south, and restoring their 
affairs. The army was now near the French position. The 
cavalry under Lord Paget were pushed so forward, that their 
patrols reached as far as Valladolid, and had frequent suc¬ 
cessful skirmishes with the enemy. Colonel Otway met a 
detachment of French cavalry, charged them, and made the 
whole prisoners. 
On the 18th of December, Sir John’s head-quarters were 
at Castro Nuevo, and Sir David Baird’s at Benevente, on the 
road to join him. On the 20th, Sir John reached Majorga, 
where he was joined by Sir David Baird. The united Bri¬ 
tish army now amounted to rather fewer than 26,000 men, 
of whom about 2000 were cavalry. The weather was ex¬ 
tremely cold, and the ground covered with deep snow. Still 
the exertions of the troops were indefatigable, and the cavalry 
in particular attacked and defeated a considerable body of 
French horse. On the 21st, the army reached Sahagun, 
where Sir John established his head-quarters, and determined 
to halt for some time, to refresh his troops, after the fatigues 
which they had undergone. 
Sir John had now arrived within a very short distance 
from Saldana, where the Duke of Dalmatia was posted, with 
the flower of the French army; and preparations were made 
for an attack, which was waited for with all the ardour and 
impatience which distinguish British troops. In the mean 
time, however, repeated couriers arrived at head-quarters, 
the bearers of unpleasant intelligence. Certain information 
was received, that a strong French reinforcement had arrived 
at Carrion, a little to the right of Sahagun, that the French 
corps, which was marching to the south, had halted at Tala- 
vera, and that the enemy were advancing from Madrid in 
considerable force. Sir John now saw that his motions had 
been watched by Buonaparte, and that all the arts of this 
experienced general had been preparing to entrap him. To 
advance was madness; to retreat, almost in the face of the 
enemy, was a measure of the utmost danger—but it was the 
only alternative. 
Gn the 24th of December, Sir John began silently and 
secretly to prepare for his retreat, and to provide, as far as 
possible, for the defence of those parts of the country which 
were still held by the patriots. With this latter view, he 
directed Sir David Baird to take the route towards Valencia 
de Don Juan, while the rest of the army was to proceed by 
Castro Gonzalo. By this division, the magazines and stores 
which had been deposited at Benevente and Zamora, were 
also effectually secured. 
According to the arrangement made. General Fraser, fol¬ 
lowed by General Hope, marched with their divisions on the 
24lh of December to Valderos and Majorga, and Sir David 
Baird proceeded with his to Valencia. To conceal this 
movement, Lord Paget was ordered to push on strong 
patrols of cavalry close to the advanced posts of the enemy. 
The reserve, with two light corps, did not retire from Saha¬ 
gun till the morning of the 25th, following General Hope. 
Lord Paget was ordered to remain with the cavalry until 
evening, and then follow the reserve. These last were ac¬ 
companied by Sir John. The retreat commenced in this 
deliberate manner. On the 26th of December, Sir David 
Baird reached the Eslar, and passed the ferry with less diffi¬ 
culty than was expected. He took post, according to his 
orders, at Valencia, and wrote to the Marquis of Romana, 
urging him to blow up the bridge of Mansilla. The other 
divisions of infantry proceeded unmolested to Castro Gon¬ 
zalo. On the 24th, the advanced guard of Buonaparte’s 
army marched from Tordesillas, 120 miles from Madrid, and 
strong detachments of cavalry had been pushed forward to 
Villalpando and Majorga. On the 26th, Lord Paget fell in 
with one of those detachments at the latter place. His Lord¬ 
ship immediately ordered Colonel Leigh, with two squadrons 
of the 10th hussars, to attack this corps, which had halted on 
the summit of a steep hill. One of Colonel Leigh’s squa¬ 
drons was kept in reserve; the other rode briskly up the hill; 
on approaching the top, where the ground was rugged, the 
colonel judiciously reined-in to refresh the horses, though 
exposed to a severe fire from the enemy. When he had 
nearly gained the summit, and the horses had recovered their 
breath, he charged boldly and overthrew the enemy; many 
of whom were killed and wounded, and above 100 surren¬ 
dered prisoners. Nothing could exceed the coolness and 
gallantry displayed by the British cavalry on this occasion. 
The 18th dragoons had signalized themselves in several 
former skirmishes; they were successful in six different at¬ 
tacks. Captain Jones, when at Placencia, had even ven¬ 
tured to charge 100 French dragoons with only 30 British ; 
14 of the enemy were killed, and six taken prisoners. The 
cavalry, the horse-artillery, and a light corps, remained on 
the night of the 26th, at Castro Gonzalo ; and the divisions 
under Generals Hope and Fraser, marched to Benevente. 
On the 27th, the rear guard crossed the Eslar, and followed 
the same route, after completely blowing up the bridge. 
We shall not attempt any farther detail of this dangerous 
and calamitous retreat, in which our army suffered extremely, 
from the fatigues of constant marching, from the badness of 
the weather, and even from the brutality of the Spaniards, 
in whose cause they had embarked. Before they reached 
Astorga, it was found necessary to divide the army. A 
body of 3000 men, under Brigadier-general Crawford, was 
detached on the road to Orense towards Vigo, while the 
main body, under the command of Sir John Moore, marched 
by Astorga and Lugo, on the road to Corunna. They left 
Astorga on the 30th of December, and on the 11th of Ja¬ 
nuary came in sight of Corunna. The army had now 
reached the sea-port from which they were to embark, but 
adverse winds had detained the transports, or the whole of 
the troops would have been speedily and safely on board. 
Only a few ships lay in the harbour, and in these some sick 
men and a few stragglers, under pretence of sickness, had 
immediately embarked. 
During the whole march from Sahagun to Corunna, the 
British army was closely followed by the French, under 
Buonaparte and the Duke of Dalmatia ; and the two armies 
were often so near each other, that the French patrols fell in, 
during the night, with the cavalry piquets of the British. 
The Duke of Dalmatia had joined Buonaparte at Astorga, 
and had increased his force to nearly 70,000 men, while the 
whole force of the British did not exceed 26,000. When 
Sir John’s army reached Lugo, it was found that three divi¬ 
sions of the French were arranged in front, and it was 
thought advisable, on the 8th of January, to offer the enemy 
battle. This offer, however, the French thought proper to 
decline, and the Duke of Dalmatia stirred not from his post. 
When the army reached Corunna, the French were far in 
the rear, and it was hoped that the transports might arrive 
before the enemy could come up. 
The retreat of the British, considering the circumstances 
under which it was effected, was a brilliant and successful 
achievement. Two hundred and fifty miles of country had 
been traversed in 11 days, during the worst season of the 
year, through bad roads, over mountains, defiles and rivers, 
and in almost daily contact with an enemy nearly three 
times their numbers. Though often engaged, the rear guard 
of the British had never been beaten, nor even thrown into 
confusion. Many losses had indeed been sustained, in bag¬ 
gage, artillery and horses, and many stragglers had fallen 
into the hands of the enemy; but neither Napoleon, nor the 
Duke of Dalmatia, could boast of a single military trophy 
taken from the retreating army. The greatest danger was 
still to be incurred; the position of Corunna was found to 
be extremely unfavourable; the transports had not arrived, 
and the enemy began to appear upon the heights. The 
situation of the army was by most of the officers thought so 
.desperate, that they advised the general to propose terms to 
