422 
S P A I N. 
unfortunately turned by a body of lancers, who, amidst 
the smoke from the firing, had approached unperceived. 
Our loss was very great here, and there remained only one 
fresh division, which advancing gallantly to the charge, and, 
being supported by the other corps, drove the French with 
great slaughter from the field. The battle lasted five hours, 
and so great was the loss, that of the British force engaged, 
nearly one half were killed or wounded: the French had 
fought with equal bravery, and their loss also was very great. 
Lord Wellington reached the army some time after, and 
determined to renew the siege of Badajos; breaches were 
made in the walls, and two attempts at assault were hazarded 
(6th and 9th June), but in vain; the advance of the French 
army; from the north, in concert with that of the south, 
necessitated the raising of the siege. Here ended the active 
operations of the year; our army remained some time 
encamped in the central part of Portugal, after which Lord 
Wellington marched northward and threatened Ciudad 
Rodrigo, but retreated before a superior force collected 
by the French. 
The campaign of 1812 commenced very early. Lord 
Wellington investing Ciudad Rodrigo on 8th January. 
The siege was pressed with activity, and a breach being 
made, the town was carried by storm on 19th January, 
though with a great loss, particularly in officers, among 
whom was General Mackinnon. So prompt had been our 
operations, that the French army approaching to the relief 
of the place, would not at first believe its capture. Soon 
after Lord Wellington turned his forces to the south and 
invested Badajos, already the scene of such obstinate contests. 
Here, also, the operations were pressed with great rapidity, 
that they might be brought to an issue before the arrival 
of the French army from Cadi?. On the night of 6th April, 
Badajos was attacked on several points by escalade; but we 
were repulsed in every direction except at the castle, which 
was fortunately carried and, commanding all the works, 
the consequence was the surrender of the town next day, 
after a siege which, short as it had been, cost us very 
nearly 5000 men. Secure on the south, Lord Wellington now 
marched towards the north, and detached J?ir Rowland Hill 
to make a sudden attack on the French station at Almarez, 
where the bridge over the Tagus served as the chief military 
communication between the northern and southern army. 
The expedition was successful, the entrenchments being 
stormed and destroyed. Lord Wellington now (May 19,) 
marched against the French army in tire north, commanded 
by Marmont, and reached Salamanca on 16th June. The 
forts in that town being taken after some sharp fighting, the 
French retreated to the Douro, but being soon reinforced 
resumed the offensive, and obliged our army to retreat in 
turn. These movements continued several weeks; Lord 
Wellington being obliged to yield ground to his opponent, 
but ready to attack him on the commission of any material 
fault. Such an opportunity at last occurred on 22d July, 
near Salamanca, when the French, rendered confident by 
the enemy’s continued retreat, extended their left, and pre¬ 
sented an opening, which was instantly seized by their 
vigilant adversary. Columns were sent forward against the 
enemy’s left and centre; the former succeeded completely, the 
latter met with much opposition. Great gallantry was shown 
and heavy loss sustained, on both sides; at last the French 
centre and right were both driven from the field. The 
darkness prevented the British making prisoners; but a 
body of cavalry joining in the night, the hostile rear-guard 
was attacked next morning, and obliged to surrender. The 
loss was about 3900 British and 2000 Portuguese; of the 
enemy in killed and wounded at least equal, with the loss of 
between 6000 and 7000 prisoners. The British force in the 
field was 22,000. 
The consequences of the victory of Salamanca were the 
pursuit of the French army; the occupation of Madrid on 
12th August by the allies; the abandonment by the French 
of the works constructed with vast expence against Cadiz: 
the evacuation of Andalusia, Granada, and all the south of 
Spain. But as this loss of territory was not attended by a 
loss of troops, it became incumbent on Lord Wellington to 
prepare against a vigorous attack from forces that were 
rapidly concentrating. He made repeated attempts to take 
the castle of Burgos and the military stores collected there, 
but this fort, defended by a strong garrison and a vigilant 
commander (General Dubreton), baffled all our efforts, and 
proved the cause of a considerable sacrifice of lives. Mean¬ 
time, the approach of Soult from the south, and of the army 
that had fought at Salamanca from the east, obliged Lord 
Wellington to adopt the alternative of retreat. He began on 
20th October, and proceeded westward, in a line nearly 
parallel to the Douro, taking above three weeks to recross 
the country to the scene of his victory at Salamanca. There, 
nnited with General Hill, and at the head of 50,000 men, 
he remained on ground lately so propitious; hoping that 
an opportunity might offer to attack the enemy, though 
now increased, by the junction of their two armies, to the 
number of 70,000. But Soult’s positions were found too 
strong for attack, and the interval afforded him by Lord 
Wellington was diligently employed in pushing forward 
detachments to cut off our communications with Portugal. 
Retreat now became indispensable; and here, amidst hasty 
marches, and a scarcity of five days, there occurred scenes 
of insubordination which recalled all the disorders of our 
march to Corunna, and drew from Lord Wellington a most 
severe censure in general orders. Fortunately, similar pri¬ 
vations on the side of the French prevented them from 
making many prisoners, and, on 20th November, on the 
frontier of Portugal, was closed this eventful campaign. 
The campaign of 1813 opened in the east of Spain, by 
an attack on the allied army under Sir John Murray, sta¬ 
tioned not far from Alicant; the ground it occupied was 
strong, but the length of the position, two miles and a half, 
made Suchet, who commanded the French, conceive the 
hope of penetrating it at one or other point. In this, how¬ 
ever, he was foiled with a loss of from 2000 to 3000 men; 
the only check of importance received by that commander 
in all his campaigns in Spain. Soon after this success, our 
army was engaged in the bold plan of proceeding by sea to 
Catalonia and besieging Tarragona. The wind proved 
favourable; the main body was landed near Tarragona, and 
a detachment succeeded, by great exertion, in taking Fort 
St. Philip on the mountain called the Cold e Balaguer, which 
blocked the nearest road for the arrival of the French from 
the south. Suchet, however, lost no time in marching 
northwards; our general. Sir John Murray, considered 
his force (which was chiefly Spanish) unable to withstand 
the French ; he therefore embarked and returned to Alicant, 
a measure which incurred censure, but appears fully justi¬ 
fied by circumstances, and still more by the conduct of his 
successors in the command. 
Suchet, though successful on this occasion, soon found 
himself unable to retain his extensive line of occupation. 
The battle of Vittoria brought a new enemy on his rear, and 
obliged him to withdraw first from Valencia, and subse¬ 
quently as far as Barcelona. Our army now advanced by 
land, and resumed the siege of .Tarragona, with the power 
of retreating, not as before by sea, but on the country 
behind ; an alternative to which a second advance by Suchet 
soon compelled our new commander, Lord William Ben- 
tinck. The French, however, unable to occupy an ex¬ 
tended position, blew up the works of Tarragona and 
retired. Our army advanced anew, but was again checked 
and obliged to draw back, exhibiting a striking proof of 
the impracticability of opposing an active enemy with a 
mixed force, of which the Spaniards formed a large pro¬ 
portion. 
We now turn to the western part of the peninsula, the 
field of the commander-in-chief, and of the far larger por¬ 
tion of our force. Lord Wellington, averse to open the 
campaign till every part of his troops was ready to co¬ 
operate with efficiency, did not move from quarters till after 
the middle of May. He knew that he would have much 
ground to traverse, retreat being evidently the policy of the 
French, weakened as they were by the recall of 25,000 
veterans. 
