181 
T U R 
tain information that the Turks were preparing to march at 
all hazards to the relief of Napoli. They did succeed in 
sending a small detachment, which gained the fortress un¬ 
observed by the troops before Corinth, or those employed in 
the blockade of Napoli. The latter were, however, in gene¬ 
ral extremely vigilant, as, excepting a convoy of fifty mules 
laden with grain, that contrived to steal across the plain of 
Argos and enter the citadel in the night and during a heavy 
storm, the exertions of the Greeks were so unremitted, that 
whoever attempted to leave or approach the walls, was almost 
sure of being intercepted. It was thus, that nearly all the 
cavalry brought by Ali Bey, were cut off in detail, during 
their attempts to obtain supplies. 
The time had however now approached, when the gar¬ 
rison of Napoli could no longer hope for relief on the side 
of Corinth. Colocotroni, who had succeeded in making 
arrangements for the more regular subsistence of the troops, 
uniting his forces with those under Nikitas, marched to the 
passes near the Isthmus with a determination not to abandon 
them before Napoli surrendered. A long time, however, 
elapsed, and the besieged were reduced to subsist on each 
other ere a capitulation took place. 
The surrender of Napoli led to another triumph on the 
part of the Greeks, destined to form the last portion of that 
terrible fate which had awaited the army of Marchmout 
Pacha. Want of provisions had rendered a change of 
position absolutely necessary, and the Turkish commanders, 
therefore, determined to march towards Patrass, the blockade 
of which place had been lately neglected by the Greeks. 
Setting out about the middle of January, with nearly three 
thousand men, of whom a large portion was cavalry, they 
had only advanced as far as Akrata, near Vostitza, when 
Lundo, who was returning from Messolunghi with a small 
body of troops, appeared on a height through which the 
road lay, and thus suddenly stopped their progress. Pet- 
mesa, another distinguished chief, next occupied the opposite 
side of the valley, and Odysseus joined the other chiefs with 
about two hundred men. The Turks, thus hemmed in, 
were reduced by famine to the utmost extremity : at length 
negotiations were entered into, by which those who sur¬ 
vived obtained permission to embark, on condition of 
giving up their arms and effects. The number of Turks 
who perished miserably without firing a shot or drawing a 
sword in their defence, was estimated at two thousand. 
Such was the termination of the second campaign in the 
Morea 5 and upon the results of which, the Porte fondly 
calculated on restoring its iron sway over Greece. Instead, 
however, of realizing this hope, the loss of the Turks, 
whether by famine or the sword, could not be less than 
twenty-five thousand men in the Peloponnesus alone. 
We return now to the operations of Mavrocordato.—The 
state of anarchy and confusion in which this chief found 
Acarnania and Etolia, was more than sufficient to damp the 
ardour of an ordinary mind. Having collected all the 
troops he could find at Messolunghi, and incorporated them 
into the newly organized levies, the whole did not amount 
to two thousand men, being less than half the number first 
proposed. With this force he however took the field, and 
having passed the Acheron, or Aspropotamos as it is now 
called, in the latter end of June, proceeded through Lou- 
traki, towards the defiles of Macrinoros, where the Greeks 
could easily defend themselves and arrange a more extended 
plan of attack, according as their numbers should increase. 
The Turks, who were posted in far superior force at Cam- 
botti, attacked the left, occupied by a part of the first regi¬ 
ment, on the 2d of July. The new system of tactics was 
now put into execution with such effect, that the enemy was 
soon forced to retreat, having been pursued to some distance 
by the Philhellenes, with a loss of thirty men in killed and 
wounded. Several days had' been passed here, during 
which there ■ were frequent skirmishes with the Turkish 
cavalry. Such was the success attending these, that the 
Greeks considered it no longer necessary to confine them¬ 
selves to the defensive, and as the siege o*f Kiapha was 
Vol. XXIV. No. 1636. 
KEY. 
carrying on with great vigour by a large body of Albanians, 
Marco Bozzaris, who had accompanied the Prince, expressed 
so much anxiety to go to the relief of his brave countrymen, 
and such confidence in the success of the enterprise, that 
he was at length allowed to set forward with six hundred 
men, although the reinforcements had not yet arrived. The 
enemy having been secretly advised of the march of Boz¬ 
zaris, attacked him at Placa, compelled him to fall back 
and retreat to the mountains. The separation of the forces, 
which were already so inferior to those of the enemy, could 
not fail to expose the small corps at Peta to the general 
attack which now took place, and was extremely prejudicial 
to the Greeks. 
On mustering their forces, it was found that their loss in 
killed exceeded two hundred, of whom nearly one fourth 
were officers. This check created such a panic among the 
inhabitants, that several thousands sought refuge in the moun¬ 
tains; while the more helpless portion of the community 
fled to the desert island of Calamos, whence however they 
were directly driven by the British authorities, who considered 
that to receive these defenceless beings would be an infraction 
of neutrality. 
Whatever may have been the motive that dictated an act, 
upon which it would be superfluous to make any comment, 
it had the eflgct of rousing the Acarnanians to a keener sense 
of their danger, and owing to the fears awakened for the 
safety of their families, numbers of the peasantry who had 
concealed themselves in the mountains, now flocked to Ca- 
touna, where the Greek force was soon doubled. Mavrocor¬ 
dato, who bad established his bead-quarters at Vracori, in 
order to keep up the communication with Messolunghi and 
the Peleponnesus, as well as to watch the motions of the 
Turkish fleet, gave the command of this small corps to a 
chief named Varnachiotti, a man whom the wealth and in¬ 
fluence which he possessed in the province, rendered it ne¬ 
cessary to conciliate; but designed to betray his country and 
pass over to the enemy. Such, however, was the great in¬ 
fluence of his family and connections, that Mavrocordato 
had no alternative in giving to him the command. 
The failure of the expedition under Kiriakouli, who fell 
in the conflict which followed his disembarkation at Splanza, 
a small village north of Prevesa, and the disappointment of 
Marco Bozzaris, added to the aspect of affairs in the Morea, 
having deprived the Souliotes of all hope of aid from their 
countrymen of the south, they were induced to accept the 
terms proposed to them, through the mediation of our consul 
at Prevesa, Mr. Meyer, who guaranteed their safe transport 
to the Ionian Islands, with their baggage and arms. 
The fall of Souli placed so many troops at the disposal of 
Omer Vrioni, who now assumed the chief command in Acar¬ 
nania, that he prepared to advance with an overwhelming 
force: and strong detachments had actually arrived in the 
immediate vicinity of the defiles early in October. The only 
chance, now left to the Hellenists, of maintaining then- 
ground and preventing the whole province from being 
occupied by the enemy, was derived from the hope, that 
when the rainy season should commence, and there were 
no longer any means of procuring supplies, the Turks 
would retreat, and thus afford time for re-organizing the 
troops who had been dispersed subsequently to the disaster at 
Peta. 
Though pressed in the most urgent manner to attack the 
enemy, before he received any more reinforcements, Varna- 
chiotti always contrived to defer it; and about the middle of 
September, the traitor openly declared himself, and induced 
the districts of Valtos and Xeromeros to submit to the enemy. 
On hearing this piece of intelligence, the Prince immediately 
united all the men he could collect, quitted the town, and 
reached Vracori on the 24th. 
Mavrocordato had not been many days in his new posi¬ 
tion, before the enemy’s army, which was increased to nearly 
thirteen thousand men, mostly Albanians, under Omer Vrioni 
in person, had passed the defiles of Xeromeros, guided by 
Varnachiotti; it Was supplied with a good park of artillerv, 
3 A and 
