188 
T U R 
“ Mahomed II. granted to the islands the privilege of 
being simple tributaries. This mode of conducting .their 
affairs would possess this advantage for the allies, that they 
would guarantee such an emancipation of Greece, without 
deviating from the principles which compose the basis of 
their policy, and without having the appearance of wishing 
to favour projects of an absolute independence.” 
This project, as might be expected, was by no means 
relished by the Greeks themselves; indeed the experience of 
the system in the provinces north of the Danube, is by no 
means in favour of the tendency of such a mode of ad¬ 
ministration to promote the happiness and welfare of the 
people. 
These measures seemed to satisfy the Porte, which resumed 
its usual tone of friendly communication with the English 
ambassador, and renewed the promise for the evacuation of 
the principalities; the execution of this promise, however, 
was still delayed; and Lord Strangford was finally obliged 
to leave Constantinople on his return to England, October 
18th, without having the satisfaction of witnessing the 
accomplishment of a point which had so long been the 
object of his negociations. This extraordinary protraction 
of the measure, was attributed chiefly to the ascendancy in 
the divan of a party opposed to the grand-vizir, and which 
consisted of the commander-in-chief of the troops on the 
Bosphorus, the aga of the janissaries, the mufti and Dschan- 
ib-Effendi. This faction violently opposed a concession of 
any kind to the Christian powers, or the Greek insurgents. 
Ghalib-Pacha, the vizir, was compelled to give way. On the 
14th of September he was dismissed from his office, but with 
n® demonstration of displeasure on the part of the sultan, 
who, in the hatti-sherif, announcing his removal, attributed 
it chiefly to the weakness of his character, which was said 
not to be fitted for the direction of affairs at a crisis so 
difficult. He was succeeded by Mehmed-Selim, pacha of 
Silistria, a creature of Dschanib-Effendi, to whose influence 
he was supposed to owe his appointment. Dschanib-Effendi 
himself died a few days after at the age of 76 years. 
1825.—The internal tranquillity of the Porte seemed 
threatened this year by the insubordination of some troops, 
and it was found that they intended to exalt Abdul Hamed, 
the son of the sultan, a youth of fourteen, to the throne of 
his father. The death of the prince, by the small-pox, hap¬ 
pened at this critical juncture. The heads of the leaders of 
the insurrection were privately taken ofT, and the rebels were 
sent against the Greeks. 
During the winter, the Greeks had been occupied much 
more with their own internal dissentions, than in making 
preparations to meet the common enemy. To such a height 
did these dissentions arise, that, after the close of the cam¬ 
paign of 1824, the Moreots, dissatisfied with the individuals 
who were at the head of affairs, broke out in an open 
insurrection. After some delay and blood-shed, the insur¬ 
gents were dispersed, and the rebellion was quelled by the 
end of the year. The leaders sought safety in flight: some 
of them were seized; others left the Morea, and took refuge 
in Kalamos, an island appointed by the Ionian government 
for the reception of Grecian refugees. Some (and among 
these was Colocotroni) surrendered to the government. 
Though the provisional government was strong enough to 
suppress these disturbances, they had the effect of making 
the people of the Morea, who placed their confidence almost 
exclusively in Colocotroni, backward and slack in the ap¬ 
proaching campaign. Another disastrous result of them was, 
preventing the reduction of the fortress of Patras, which, it 
was supposed, might easily have been taken during the 
winter. But in consequence of these internal dissentions, it 
was the middle of January before a few vessels sailed up the 
Gulf of Corinth, and, aided by some land forces, recom¬ 
menced the blockade. 
On the other hand, the Porte made all the preparations it 
could for a vigorous campaign. Omar Pacha was removed 
to Salonika, whilst Redschid Pacha, who had influence 
among the Albanian soldiers, was transferred irom Larissa. 
KEY. 
Being furnished with full power and means to raise the 
requisite troops, he immediately commenced to do so, in¬ 
tending afterwards to pass over to Roumelia; and, having 
there likewise increased his army, to descend upon Messo- 
lunghi with his united forces, levying soldiers as he passed 
along by Prevesa and Arta. While he was to advance from 
the North, the troops of Mahomet Ali Pacha of Egypt, 
who had by this time succeeded in suppressing, for the 
present, the insurrection in Candia, were to land in great 
force upon the Morea. As they were disciplined in the 
European manner, and were well supplied with all the ne¬ 
cessaries of war, it was thought the irregular troops of the 
Greeks would be unable to stand before them. 
Mahomet Ali’s fleet, which wintered in the harbour of 
Suda in Candia, set sail under the command of his step-son 
Ibrahim Pacha, on the 23d of December, for Rhodes, where 
it arrived on the 1st of January, 1825. There 5,000 dis¬ 
ciplined soldiers awaited him: with these he was to return 
to Candia; and, having completed his armament there, to 
sail for the Morea without delay. At the same time, trans¬ 
ports with provisions were actively fitting out at Constan¬ 
tinople for the use of the garrisons at Modon and Patras. 
The blockade of Patras was now going on with vigour; 
orders were issued daily for the collecting fresh troops, and 
the sending of additional ships from Hydra; and the direc¬ 
tion of the forces both by land and sea, as well as the pre¬ 
sidency of the government, was conferred on Conduriottis. 
To check the approach of Redschid Pacha, Nota Bozzaris, 
and generals Suka and Milios were sent forward with a body 
of troops to occupy the pass of Makrinovo, the ancient 
Olympus, through which it was necessary he should pass. 
The progress of the blockade at Patras was observed with 
double interest; for its fall was daily expected, and there 
was no probable means of checking the armament of the 
Egyptians, except by withdrawing the squadron which was 
cruising before the fortress. At length advices arrived of the 
departure of the expedition from Candia: further delay was 
impossible; and the Greek squadron sailed from Patras, but 
unfortunately too late. The Egyptian squadron of thirty 
sail had anchored off Modon, and disembarked 6,000 sol¬ 
diers, infantry and cavalry, well disciplined and commanded 
chiefly by European officers. These troops immediately 
encamped round Modon, whilst the ships returned without 
delay, to Suda in Candia. A few days after, Ibrahim 
Pacha, at the head of 800 men, advanced to the summit of 
the range of hills which rise at the back of Navarino. The 
inhabitants flew to arms, whilst 700 Roumeliots, under the 
command of General Ciabella, hastened into the fortress; 
The Pacha remained quietly at his station for some hours, 
and then returned to his encampment. 
The storming of Patras was now abandoned, and the 
troops were drawn off to be marched further south. Up¬ 
wards of 2,000 soldiers, principally under the command of 
Hadji Christo Joannes Mavromichales, son to Petro Bey, 
of Maina, were thrown into Navarino: a small corps of 
artillery, amounting to 50 or 60 men, were sent off with all 
haste from Napoli; and the command of the fortifications 
was given to Major Collegno, who lost no time in assuming 
his post. Provisions were sent in from all parts of the 
Morea, sufficient for a long siege; large bodies of Roumeliots, 
under the command of their respective generals Giavella, 
Karatasso, Constantine Bozzaris, and Karaisaki, took posi¬ 
tions in the rear of the enemy. While Conduriottis and 
Prince Mavrocordafo prepared to set out from Napoii with 
fresh troops, Ibrahim received reinforcements from Candia ; 
in March a second debarkation took place, which made his 
force amount to upwards of 15,000 men: and before the 
end of that month, a battery had been erected against Na¬ 
varino. This place, which had been taken by the Greeks 
in the first year of the war, instead of having been re¬ 
paired and strengthened, had been left nearly in the same 
state in which it was, when taken from the Turks in 1821. 
By the middle of April, Conduriottis had succeeded in 
assembling about 6000 men at Cremidi. But after several 
desultory 
