558 
WAR. 
is dedicated to St. John; is a plain building, erected in 
1790; and is a rectory, under the patronage of Brazen- 
nose college, Oxford. 
WAPPINGER’S CREEK, a post village of the United 
States, in Poughkeepsie, New York. 
WAPPINGER’S CREEK, a river of the United States, 
in New York, which runs into the Hudson; 8 miles south of 
Poughkeepsie; length 33 miles. 
WAPPO, a small sea-port on the Grain coast of Africa. 
WAPPOCOMO, a river of the United States, in Virginia, 
which runs into the Potomac; 9 miles east-south-east of Fort 
Cumberland. 
WAPUWAGAN ISLANDS, a cluster of islands near the 
coast of Labrador. Lat. 50. 2. N. long. 60. 14. W. 
WAR, s. [werre, old Dutch ; guerre, Fr.; wer, German 
and A. Saxon, which Wachter derives from weren, to de¬ 
fend.] Fighting with murderous weapons. 
On, you noblest English, 
Whose blood is fetch’d from fathers of war proof. 
Shakspeare. 
The instruments of war, in poetical language. 
The god of love inhabits there. 
With all his rage, and dread, and grief, and care; 
His complement of stores, and total war. Prior. 
Forces; army. Poetically. 
On the embattled ranks the waves return, 
And overwhelm the war. Milton. 
The profession of arms.—Thine Almighty word leapt 
down from heaven, as a fierce man of war into the midst of a 
land of destruction. Wisd. —Hostility; state of opposition; 
act of opposition. 
Duncan’s horses 
Turn’d wild in nature, broke their stalls, flung out, 
Contending ’gainst obedience as they would 
Make war with man. Shakspeare. 
We have given a considerable portion of the science of 
War under the articles Artillery, Fortification, Ca¬ 
valry, &c., and we have only here to consider that part 
of war which refers to the general management of campaigns 
and to engagements in the open field. To the science of 
war there properly belongs a very extensive branch of politi¬ 
cal knowledge, namely, how states become cowardly or va¬ 
liant, and what system of discipline makes the best troops; 
but there is so little information published on this head, that 
we have no materials, in the present state of things, to com¬ 
pile from. 
In war we observe three main principles. The first of 
these relates to what is commonly termed forming the plan 
of a campaign, and consists, either in an offensive or defen¬ 
sive view, in the art of embracing the lines of operations in 
the most advantageous manner. 
The second is the art of moving the mass of forces, in the 
most rapid manner possible, upon a particular part of the 
country. 
The third is the art of combining the simultaneous appli¬ 
cation of the mass of forces on the most important point of a 
field of battle. 
A plan of a campaign depends upon six essential con¬ 
siderations: 1st, The political situation of both parties; 2d, 
The situation of the moment; 3d, The relative force and 
military means; 4th, The location and distribution of the 
armies; 5th, The natural line of operations; 6th, The most 
advantageous line of operations. In forming the plan, it is 
not necessary to have regard solely to the exact balance of 
the relative means of war between the parties, but to view them 
only as they are important. Territorial and manoeuvring 
lines of operations are the principal object; and though they 
are subject to many accessory considerations, the rules of the 
art must nevertheless form their basis. Originality and great 
boldness are not incompatible with their application: such, 
for instance, as the plan which Napoleon, in 1800, executed 
in Italy. No enterprise could be more daring, none more 
rich in great and decisive combinations, or more prudent and 
cautious; since, while it menaced the enemy with ruin, no 
greater misfortune could occur, in case of check, than' the 
sacrifice of the extreme rear-guard. 
Before we proceed, it may be useful to fix, by definitions, 
several terms, upon the comprehension of which the most 
important military reasoning depends. 
By a base or basis of operations is meant a frontier, the 
course of a river, a coast, a range of mountains or fortresses, 
or any topographical or political extent of country, upon the 
imaginary line of which the corps of an army assemble, 
offensively,—to take their departure from thence into the 
enemy’s country, and towards which, in case of failure, it is 
intended to retreat; defensively,—to counteract all the mea¬ 
sures which an invading force may pursue. 
Lines of operations are divided into territorial and ma¬ 
noeuvring lines. By territorial lines are understood those 
which nature or art has traced for the defence or invasion of 
states. Frontiers covered by fortresses, or defended by na¬ 
ture, with chains of mountains, great rivers, or other obsta¬ 
cles, form their constituents. Manoeuvring lines are the 
dispositions of the general to traverse them offensively, or 
cover them defensively. Both these lines of operations are 
intimately connected. In offensive war, the line is an ima¬ 
ginary perpendicular upon the base, along which an army 
operates against the enemy; in defensive war, it is often the 
same, but still oftener parallel to the territorial line. A line 
of communication is either the same as that of operations, or 
any other by which the army receives its supplies, and com¬ 
municates with the base. 
Thus far no great variety of combinations seem to perplex 
the view; but in the selection of the particular line, the 
problem becomes difficult; because a great multiplicity of 
circumstances, many of them not purely military, interpose. 
The political situation of the belligerents; their relative re¬ 
sources ; character and situation of the fortresses; accidental 
strength of their forces; distance by sea; course of a con¬ 
siderable river; direction of a chain of mountains; nature 
of the country ; political state of either party; jealousy of a 
neutral, or apprehensions of an ally; all in their turn claim 
consideration. In general, however, the initial application 
of military masses should be, when the belligerents are 
neighbours, upon some part of the frontier, which projects 
into the hostile state; such as Bohemia with regard to Prussia, 
or vice versa, Silesia with regard to Austria. But it is a 
maxim that lines of operations have their key as well as 
fields of battle: in the former, the great strategical points are 
decisive; as in the latter, the points which command the 
weak part of a position, constitute the key. Where there 
exists a vast superiority of force on one side, the key, or great 
strategical point, may be sought at a considerable depth in 
the line of operations; but where the masses are nearly 
balanced, it is necessarily reduced to a relative proportion 
with the breadth of the base. Thus, for instance, the de¬ 
struction of a French army on the frontier of the Netherlands, 
would not immediately produce the consequence of the 
victors marching to the capital, unless they had sufficient 
superiority to mask the principal fortresses which cover her 
line of defence in that quarter, or some other accidental 
circumstance rendered such a measure practicable. As far¬ 
ther proofs of the relative proportion between the depth and 
base of a line of operations, that of Napoleon in Russia failed 
on both its pivots, before the summit was defeated; and those 
in Spain, although they were supported by intermediate for¬ 
tresses, immediately contracted, when the battle of Salamanca 
produced consequences which endangered the western com¬ 
munication with the base. 
Although it is absolutely necessary to move with a mass of 
force near the enemy, it is more advantageous to march in 
separate corps while still at a distance from him, if he has not 
a concentrated mass ready to act, and there be several roads 
leading concentrically towards the point intended to be occu¬ 
pied. It is evident, that five corps, of twenty thousand men 
each, will move forward more rapidly towards any point, 
than a hundred thousand men, marching on the same road, 
who 
