WAR. 
who can only advance with the tardiness inherent in large 
bodies, and besides are encumbered with the immense train 
of their subsistence. Celerity of movement, multiplying the 
force of an army by enabling the mass to be carried alter¬ 
nately upon every point of the line, is an advantage of in¬ 
valuable consequence; but this is not the only reason for 
recommending this method. There are two others, viz. the 
increased facility of subsistence, and the uncertainty into 
which it throws the enemy. 
An army of 20,000 men can find subsistence, in central 
Europe, on every part of their march, by merely causing 
the country, within some leagues, to contribute to their 
wants; and if they convey with them biscuit for eight or ten 
days, that is, during the first period while corps are in posi¬ 
tion, or manoeuvring in a contracted area with other columns, 
they will be enabled to subsist till the magazines are formed. 
Thus, military operations are, in a great degree, emancipated 
from the necessity of pre-arranged magazines, and the regular 
encumbrance of field-ovens. 
The army which commences offensive operations takes the 
lead in all the movements, and those of the enemy are neces¬ 
sarily subordinate to them. If, therefore, it occupies with a 
corps, each of the great avenues leading to the enemy, he 
will be in a state of uncertainty along his whole line of 
defence or operations, and remain in suspense as to the 
point upon which he ought to collect his masses to oppose 
them. Upon these facts, the following series of maxims are 
founded : 
1. When an army undertakes an invasion, or acts offen¬ 
sively, it takes the lead (or, as the French term it, Vinitia- 
tive ) in the movements. 
2. This advantage precludes the necessity of marching in 
mass, until near the point where the enemy is to be found 
and attacked; until then, it is preferable to move in several 
strong corps, in proportion to the collective strength of the 
army, and to direct them upon the communications which 
lead concentrically to the point. 
3. The general direction can only be upon the centre, one 
of the extremities, or the rear of the hostile line. An ex¬ 
tremity will usually be found most eligible, because, from 
that point, the rear is easily attained; the centre, only in the 
case where the enemy’s line is scattered, and his corps sepa¬ 
rated by great intervals. 
4. In this case, the greater number of the corps should 
advance upon one of the isolated parts, and endeavour to 
surround it, while the remainder should occupy a central 
point to keep the rest of the hostile army in check. 
5. When the principal mass of these corps is directed into 
the rear of an enemy, by passing one of the extremities of 
his line, one corps should remain upon that extremity, in 
order to keep open the communication with the line of 
operations, while the opponent is cut. off from his. This 
corps serves likewise to attack him in flank, and to prevent 
him from withdrawing out of a faulty position by a secret 
movement. 
6. These operations are most advantageous when the 
enemy is at a great distance from his own base. The princi¬ 
ple may, however, be applied to positions less distant (two 
or three marches); provided the different corps have no 
greater distance to traverse to the point of reunion, than that 
which separates them from those of their own advanced posts 
who face the enemy. But this rule should not be under¬ 
stood as applying to isolated divisions upon an extended 
front of ninety or a hundred miles, unable to unite on a day 
of action, and whose movements cannot be simultaneous 
upon the decisive point. The difference is easily perceived 
between such operations and those of several corps con¬ 
centrated in a position, the depth of which equals the 
extent of front, and whose simultaneous co-operation is 
certain before the enemy can make an attempt upon their 
line. 
7. By means of this system, the army occupying a greater 
space marches more rapidly, and is enabled to subsist on the 
roads. Cattle and biscuit alone will be required to follow 
55S) 
each corps, in sufficient quantity to subsist it when in the 
vicinity of the enemy, where the other corps having likewise 
arrived, they are obliged to live within a smaller periphery. 
The stock of provision will be sufficient, if equal to the 
time required for collecting another. 
8. Magazines are then formed in the rear as the army 
advances. They are collected by means of regular requisi¬ 
tions made on the neighbouring provinces, and enforced by 
a few troops; contracts are entered into with the local ad¬ 
ministrations, and precautionary convoys follow from the 
frontiers. Cattle, rice, and biscuit, are the most useful pro¬ 
visions; the easiest to be transported. 
In this view of the theory of initial operations, such as 
Jomini, and other authorities, consider them, no great re¬ 
gard is paid to the waste of human life, by the frequent want 
or irregularity of the issue of provisions, or notice taken of 
the indiscipline which naturally arises when famine drives 
the soldier to marauding. A relentless conscription system 
may, indeed, supply recruits; but they are a very inadequate 
instrument when compared to formed soldiers. 
It remains to examine the art of forming a plan of cam¬ 
paign or operations in reference to insular expeditions. 
1. When an army is directed to make a descent upon 
an enemy’s coast, with the object of penetrating into the 
country, a point of debarkation should be selected, where 
the enemy possesses no local means to arrest the progress, 
such as a fortified city or a defensible peninsula. If, how¬ 
ever, circumstances compel the descent near or upon such 
a spot, immediate measures should be taken to mask or cap¬ 
ture it, and secure the success of ulterior operations. 
2. If the expedition is intended to be confined solely to 
the coast, the point of debarkation should possess the indis¬ 
pensable qualifications of facility of communication with the 
fleet; security of retreat; and reimbarkation. A point 
possessed of these advantages is a fit spot for a temporary 
base of operations. 
3. An expedition intended to operate ulteriorly, should be 
ah initio superior to the probable immediate force of the 
enemy, so that the success of the landing and march into the 
country be not problematical. 
4. No combinations of invasion should be made depend¬ 
ing on the co-operation of corps expected from distant or op¬ 
posite quarters. It is important to have them collected, as 
much as possible, on or near one point of embarkation, to 
proceed from thence in mass to execute the enterprise. 
5. In the plan of an expedition, no combinations should 
be admitted which include two or more lines of operations 
from separate bases. Armies transported by sea are, from 
that circumstance, not numerous; division renders them 
still weaker, and if on one point a misfortune occurs, the 
others must reimbark. 
6. In colonial and insular expeditions, it is only neces¬ 
sary to combine the means in proportion to the strength of 
the object, and with attention to the season and climate. 
But on all occasions where the reduction of a fortress is in 
contemplation, the engineer department should possess an 
adequate materiel as well as the artillery. 
The connection between manoeuvring lines and those 
which nature has marked out, and the views of the general- 
in-chief, form separate classes, each named after the nature 
of that connection. 
1. Simple lines of operations are those when an army 
operates in a single direction from a frontier, without form¬ 
ing detached corps. 
2. Double and multiplied lines, when an army acts upon 
the same frontier with two or three isolated corps, towards 
one or several objects. 
3. Interior lines of operations are formed to oppose several 
hostile lines, and are so directed as to possess internal con¬ 
nection, and enabled to move and approach each other, 
without allowing the enemy to oppose a superior mass to 
them. 
4. Exterior lines, on the contrary, possess the opposite 
qualities; they are such as an army may form, at the same 
time, 
