560 
WAR. 
time, upon the two extremities of one or several hostile 
lines. 
5. Lines upon an extended front are those which are 
arranged upon a great contiguous developement by isolated 
divisions; but still belonging to the same mass of forces, 
and operating upon the same object. Under this head are 
comprehended, likewise, lines formed by two separate corps 
upon one given extent; they are then double lines upon a 
great front. 
6. Deep or lengthened lines are those which, commenc¬ 
ing at their base, pass over a great extent of country before 
they can attain their object. 
7. Concentric lines of operations are either several or a 
single line subdivided, moving from distant points in order 
to arrive at the same object, in front or in rear of their base. 
8. Eccentric lines designate a single mass starting from 
one point, and dividing itself in order to form several diverg¬ 
ing lines upon isolated objects. 
9. Secondary lines are those in the great combinations 
of two armies, which designate their relative connection 
while operating upon the developement of the same fron¬ 
tier. 
10. Accidental lines are produced in the original plan of 
campaign, when unexpected events necessitate a new direc¬ 
tion for the operations. They are of the highest importance, 
and rarely adopted but by generals of the first abilities. 
Formerly, lines of operations were considered only as 
they affected the materiel of armies; it was even advanced, 
that armies encamped near their magazines had no lines of 
operations; but an example will prove the fallacy of this 
opinion. Supposing two French armies encamped, one on 
the Upper Rhine in front of Brisac, and the other on the 
Lower Rhine in front of Dusseldorf, with both their maga¬ 
zines in the safest place, that is, behind the river. These 
armies must have either an offensive or defensive object, and 
therefore have territorial, as well as manoeuvring lines of 
operations. 1st, The territorial defensive line will extend 
from the point of their position to the point which they are 
to cover; therefore they w’ould both be cut off if the enemy 
occupied that point before them. If Melas, with his army, 
could have subsisted near Alexandria in Lombardy, after 
the battle of Marengo, he was no less cut off from his line 
of operations as long as his victorious opponents occupied 
the line of the Po. 2d, Their manoeuvring lines would be 
a double against a simple one, if the enemy concentrated his 
masses to crush one of the armies; it would be a double ex¬ 
ternal line against a double internal, if the enemy formed also 
two corps, but so directed that they could be united most 
readily. 
A comparison of the combinations and results of the most 
celebrated campaigns shows, that all the lines of operations 
that have been crowned with success, depended on general 
principles, of which the following are the principal heads. 
1. A double line of operations is advantageous, if the 
enemy has, likewise, a double line; provided theirs be ex¬ 
terior, and at a greater distance than yours, and unable to 
unite without first risking a battle. 
2. An army possessing interior lines, more connected 
than those of the enemy, can, by strategical movements, 
destroy them successively, by carrying the mass of forces al¬ 
ternately upon each point. 
3. In order to effect this movement, a corps should be left 
before the army which it is intended to keep in check, with 
orders not to engage, but merely to retard the march, by 
taking posts behind defiles or rivers, and retreating towards 
the army. 
4. From the above premises, it follows that a double line 
of operations against an enemy, whose corps are in closer 
connection, will always be unfortunate with equal numbers, 
if the enemy profits by the advantages of his situation, and 
manoeuvres with rapidity within it. 
5. A double line of operations becomes still more dan¬ 
gerous, when its parts are separated by several days’ march. 
G. Simple and interior lines, on the contrary, are always 
most safe; because they admit the action of the mass of 
forces against the isolated divisions of the enemy, if he be so 
imprudent as to venture an action. 
7. A double line of operations, how'ever, may be adopted 
with success, if the forces employed are so much greater, that 
superior masses can be presented to the opponent on both 
his parts. 
8. Two interior lines, mutually sustaining each other, and 
facing two exterior lines at a certain distance, must avoid 
being compressed into a small area; for the exterior hostile 
lines might thereby act simultaneously. 
9. Again, they should not operate at too great intervals; 
for the enemy might have time to crush one of these divisions, 
while it is weakened by detaching to the other, and thus gain 
a decisive advantage. 
10. It being the interest of a commander to divide and 
isolate the opponent’s forces, his manoeuvring lines should 
never have the object of drawing the whole hostile forces 
upon him. 
In order to complete the view of territorial and ma¬ 
noeuvring lines, it is requisite to consider them as they are 
affected by the configuration of frontiers. 
1. In order to operate with advantage, there should not 
be two different armies upon the same frontier; because, 
2. Double lines will always fail, with equal chances, 
against a single line, as has already been shown. 
3. Interior lines resist with advantage against exterior 
lines, either upon the same, or upon two different fron¬ 
tiers. 
4. When the hostile fortresses are scattered upon a line of 
great extent, the most advantageous manoeuvring line is upon 
their centre; but on all other occasions, the best direction is 
upon one of the extremities, and from thence on the rear. 
When central masses are moved with ability against scattered 
corps, all other things being equal, they must always be 
successful, often even without a battle. 
5. The configuration of a frontier may have important 
influence on the direction of lines of operation. Central 
positions, forming salient angles towards the enemy, are the 
most advantageous; because they are naturally interior, and 
lead to the flanks and rear of the opponent’s defensive line. 
The sides of these salient angles are therefore so important, 
that all the resources of art should be added to those of 
nature to render them impregnable. 
]. To direct the masses upon the decisive points of the 
line of operations, that is, upon the centre, if the enemy has 
been so imprudent as to scatter his forces, or upon an extre¬ 
mity, if he is in a contiguous line. 
2. To make the great effort in the latter case upon 
that extremity, which has its back against an insur¬ 
mountable obstacle, or which leads upon the communi¬ 
cations of the enemy without sacrificing our own. 
As to battles.'—In these we had laid it down a funds, 
mental principle to effect with the greatest mass of forces, 
a combined attack upon the decisive point; and it is 
easy to understand how a general of ability, with 60,000 
men, may be able to defeat 100,000, if he can bring 
50,000 into action, upon a single part of his enemy’s 
line. 
I. The first measures for this purpose is evidently that of 
taking the lead in the movements. The general w'ho is 
enabled to have this advantage, can employ his forces 
wherever he thinks them applicable; while, on the con¬ 
trary, he who is obliged to await the enemy, is no longer 
master of a single combination; because his movements 
must be subordinate to those of his adversary. 
An army taking the lead in a movement should conceal it 
until in full execution. And a general should banish all cal¬ 
culations which suppose that the hostile general will be 
informed of a movement, and will oppose it by the best 
possible manoeuvre, from the instant that the movement is 
begun. 
When two armies combine to place the enemy between 
two fires, from the distance of several marches, they must 
ground 
