W A R. 
561 
ground the disposition upon a double line of operations 
against a simple one, and expose themselves to be defeated 
separately, if the enemy takes advantage of his central position. 
II; The second consists in directing the movements against 
a weak point of the enemy, when that point offers the greatest 
advantages. 
An attack to the front is always to be avoided, if a concen¬ 
trated effort can possibly be made upon the extremity of an 
enemy’s line, for which simple demonstrations on the front 
are sufficient. 
A deep column being attacked on the head, is in a similar 
condition as an extremity of a line; both the one and the 
other are engaged in succession and defeated. 
An attack upon the centre is only advisable when the hos¬ 
tile line is very extensive, and scattered into separate divisions; 
then, indeed, the result must be successful because the enemy’s 
corps will thereby be totally separated and disabled from 
reuniting. 
III. The result of the preceding truths leads to the maxim, 
that as it is better to attack the extremity of a line, yet that 
both the extremities should not be attacked at the same time, 
unless there be a very great superiority on the part of the 
assa'ilant. An army of 60,000 men forming two corps of 
30,000 each, for the purpose of attacking an enemy equally 
numerous, is deprived of the power of striking a decisive 
blow; because it enables the adversary to take equal mea¬ 
sures, or even, if the movement be extended and uncon¬ 
nected, to assemble his mass against one of the divisions, 
and destroy it, by his momentary superiority. Multiplied 
attacks by means of a greater number of columns are still 
more dangerous,—more repugnant to the best principles of 
war; particularly when they cannot commence acting at the 
same moment, and upon the same point. But when there 
is a very great superiority of force on the side of the assail¬ 
ant, then indeed both the extremities of the hostile line 
should be attacked, because thus a greater number of troops 
is brought into action on both his wings; whereas if this 
great superiority were kept in one mass upon a single point, 
the adversary might deploy as many as the other party could 
bring into action, and thus engage with equal numbers. In 
this case it is only requisite to collect the greatest mass upon 
that wing where the greatest success is expected. 
IV. In the strategical movement of a great mass in a com¬ 
bined effort upon one point, it is advisable to keep the forces 
concentrated, within a space approaching to square, so as 
to have them perfectly disposable; or, in other words, that 
the depth of the disposition be nearly equal to the front, 
enabling the battalions to arrive with promptitude from all 
quarters towards the point attacked. Extensive fronts 
militate as much against good principles, as great detach¬ 
ments and isolated divisions deprived of the means of being 
sustained. 
V. One of the most efficacious means of applying the 
above general principles, is to induce the enemy to take con¬ 
trary measures. By means of small corps of light troops, 
jealousies may be created for some important points of his 
communications. If he can be persuaded that they are 
formidable, he will be tempted to detach strong divisions 
against them, and scattering his forces, be disabled from 
acting with vigour himself, and be exposed to an attack 
from superior forces. Operations by detachments have, 
nevertheless, been in fashion. To divide and subdivide, till 
the main army was reduced to the secondary character of 
mere observing, was considered as the very summit of stra¬ 
tegical science. 
VI. When the lead is taken in a decisive movement against 
the enemy, great importance is attached to an exact know¬ 
ledge of the positions and movements which he may under¬ 
take. Spies are then of the utmost consequence; but the 
use of partisans, thoroughly versed in watching the enemy, 
is of still greater utility. For this purpose, the general 
should scatter small parties in all directions, and multiply 
them with as much care as he would show to restrain them in 
great operations. Some divisions of light cavalry, expressly 
organized for this service, and not included in the order of 
Vol. XXIV. No. 1656. 
battle, are the most efficient. To operate without such precau¬ 
tions is to walk in the dark, and to be exposed to the disastrous 
consequences which may be produced by a secret march of 
the enemy. Generally speaking, these measures are too 
much neglected. The Espionnage is not sufficiently organ¬ 
ized beforehand; and the officers of light troops have not 
always the requisite experience to conduct their detachments. 
VII. It is not sufficient for a good operation of war to 
convey with ability the mass of forces upon the most im¬ 
portant points; they require, moreover, to be brought into 
action. If they remain inactive when arrived upon those 
points, the principle is forgotten ; for the enemy may make 
counter-movements to defeat the project; and it is therefore 
indispensable that, from the moment his communications or 
his flank are gained, the mass of forces must march up to 
him and attack. This is the moment when a simultaneous 
employment of the troops must take place. Masses of troops 
present do not decide battles, but the acting masses alone 
have effect; the former, indeed, produce that consequence 
in strategical movements, but the latter determine the success 
of the action. 
To insure this result, a general of ability will seize the 
proper moment to force the decisive point of the field of 
battle, and combine the attack in such a manner that all his 
forces will be brought into action, with the exception always 
of the reserve. But if the efforts emanating from this prin¬ 
ciple fail of the desired success, no other combination remains 
than a simultaneous general onset, in which the reserve is 
then to be brought forward, to make a last and decisive effort. 
Orders of battle, or the most appropriate disposition for 
leading troops into action, should possess mobility and 
solidity. To attain these two objects, troops which are to 
remain on the defensive should be partly deployed and partly 
in columns. 
The French have been very fond of engaging in massive 
columns, and the phalanx has, at first sight, an imposing 
appearance of strength. The hinder men are, however, in this 
arrangement, nearly useless—a British line two deep has been 
found to withstand the severest shocks from columns and 
even from cavalry. 
To WAR, ®. n. To make war; to be in a state of hostility. 
Was this a face. 
To be expos'd against the warring winds ? Sha/cspeare. 
To WAR, v. a. To make war upon. 
That small infantry 
Warr'd on by cranes. Milton. 
WARA, or Kara, a city of Central Africa, capital of the 
kingdom of Bergoo. 
WARADEIN, Great, or Nagy Varad, a fortified 
town of Hungary, on the river Koresch; 35 miles south- 
south-east of Debreczin, and 132 east by-south of Pest. 
Lat. 47. 2. 50. N. long. 21. 55. 5. E. Population 7000. 
WARANKUL, or Warangol, an ancient city of Hin- 
dostan, in the province of Hyderabad, belonging to the 
Nizam. Lat. 17. 54. N. long. 79. 34. E. 
WARASDIN, a county of the Austrian states, in Croatia, 
having Styria and Illyria on the west, and the county of 
Agram on the east. Its area is about 720 square miles; its 
population about 134,000. The river Drave forms the 
northern boundary of the province. 
WARASDIN, the Generalate of, a district of 
Croatia, adjoining to Sclavonia, and separated from Hungary 
only by the Drave. More extensive, -but less populous, than 
the county of the same name, this district contains 1440 
square miles, with only 108,000 inhabitants. 
WARASDIN, a town of Austrian Croatia, and the capital 
of a palatinate or county; 38 miles north-north-east of 
Agram, and 132 south of Vienna. Lat. 46. 18. 18. N. 
long. 16. 26. 6. E. 
WARBERG, a seaport of Sweden, in the province of 
Halland; 34 miles south of Gottenburg. Lat. 57. 6. 18. N. 
long. 12. 16. E. 
To WA'RBLE, v. a. [werben, old Teutonick; ner¬ 
ve ten, German; to twirl, or turn round. Johnson .—The 
6 B old 
