6 
manner, that representation cannot be absolutely 
true. It can only be an approximation to the truth, 
and the question is. What the nature of that approxi¬ 
mation should be ? 
4. Although I make this remark, I do not dispute 
the propositions in question taken in a very general 
sense. I believe them to be perfectly just, and that 
three axioms were never proposed for the adoption of 
students more practical and well founded than they 
are; and I hope it will be found that, as I proceed, 
my remarks will bear upon these points sufficiently 
to prove their truth. 
5. But what is truth ? We say that what is true 
is beautiful; and what is beautiful is true; yet the 
great point remains to determine, in what truth con¬ 
sists ? There cannot be a doubt that wherever we 
find that the truth has been absolutely repi’esented, a 
certain amount of beauty is attached to the represen¬ 
tation of it. But it does not follow that the greatest 
amount of beauty belongs to the most exact repre¬ 
sentation of an object. Much depends on the manner 
in which objects are combined. The truth as regards 
plants, and indeed all things, can only be really judged 
of by the eye of intelligence. 
6. Two persons looking at the same object — one 
well informed and acquainted with the points which 
require to be observed, and the other with an uncul¬ 
tivated eye — regard the same thing with different 
powers of vision, although they both have the same 
object before them. 
7. Other persons seeing all that intelligence can 
discover, misunderstand the object of their art, and 
notwithstanding their faithful adhesion to truth, pro¬ 
duce the most disagreeable results. 
